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I. INTRODUCTION
Child protection agencies1 face a complex and challenging task in
investigating cases of suspected child abuse and neglect. These agen-
cies must make expeditious and accurate determinations about
whether children are actually endangered, without needlessly dis-
rupting and traumatizing families.2 The burden on child protection
agencies has been greatly increased by the recent sharp rise in reports
of child maltreatment. Not only have reports of child abuse and
neglect soared,3 reaching an estimated 1.146 million reports against
1. The term "child protection agency" is used throughout the article to refer to state and local
government entities charged with conducting investigations and taking protective action on
behalf of endangered children. For an overview of the duties and responsibilities of child
protection agencies, see generally Drews, Child Protective Services, in THE ABUSED AND
NEGLECTED CHILD: MULTI-DIscIPLINARY COURT PRACTICE 87 (1978). See also Davidson &
Horowitz, Protection of Children from Family Mistreatment, in LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
§§ 7.14-.16 (1984) [hereinafter Protection of Children].
2. See generally NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHILD WELFARE ADMINISTRATORS,
GUIDELINES FOR A MODEL SYSTEM OF PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR ABUSED AND NEGLECTED
CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES (1988).
3. Reports of child abuse rose an estimated 188% from 1976-1985, the most recent year in
which statistics have been published. See AMERICAN HUMANE ASSOCIATION, HIGHLIGHTS OF
OFFICIAL CHILD NEGLECT AND ABUSE REPORTING 2-12, 23 (1987) [hereinafter REPORTING
HIGHLIGHTS]. Figures for 1985 were 1.928 million child reports and 1.146 million reports
against families. Id. In 1986, the number of child reports increased to an estimated total of 2.2
million. Telephone interview with Patricia Shene, Director of the American Humane
Association (February 5, 1988). The 1986 figures had not been fully analyzed or published at the
time of the interview.
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families in 1985,4 but the numbers of substantiated cases seem to have
increased correspondingly.5
This article addresses the legal dimensions of an important and diffi-
cult problem sometimes faced by social workers employed with child
protection agencies: noncooperation with investigations. This problem
can arise when the child's family denies access to the home or the
child, or when others, such as schools and health providers, decline to
cooperate with the investigation.6
In many states, child protection agencies do not have appropriate
investigative tools to deal with noncooperation. If agency workers can-
not gather enough information to support a child protection petition
in juvenile court,7 they may feel forced to choose between dropping
the investigation and summarily removing children from their homes.8
In states with strict criteria for emergency removal of children from
4. This figure more accurately reflects the total number of reports submitted against families
in 1985 than the actual number of families who were the subject of the reports during 1985.
Fifty-one out of the 55 states and territories providing data for The American Humane
Association study counted reports on children and families in their 1985 totals. REPORTING
HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 3, at 8.
5. Id. at 23. In 1984, 42% were substantiated.
6. The following hypothetical examples illustrate the difficulties social workers sometimes
face while investigating child protection cases:
Example 1:
A county child protection agency receives an anonymous letter stating that children located at
a certain address are being abused and neglected. The letter states that the writer has heard loud
screaming from the house and, when the front door has been left ajar, has noticed that the house
is piled with trash. In addition, the writer has observed the children to be "filthy and unkempt."
In response to the letter, the agency dispatches a social worker to visit the address in question.
When the worker knocks on the door, a person inside answers without opening it. When the
worker explains the purpose of the visit, the worker is instructed to leave. The curtains are
drawn, and the worker cannot see inside the residence. When the worker subsequently contacts
the children's school, school officials refuse to allow the children to be interviewed without
parental permission. A medical clinic treating the children is also contacted, but it declines to
talk to or share records with the agency, stating that the information is confidential.
Example 2:
A state child protection agency is visited by an individual who had left a particular religious
commune 90 days previously. The former commune member says that the commune's children
are being denied medical treatment and are routinely and severely beaten for trivial acts of
misbehavior.
When a social worker telephones the commune, the person who answers hangs up. When the
worker visits in person, the worker is asked to leave.
7. The term "juvenile court" is used generically in this article to refer to state courts charged
with handling child abuse, neglect, or dependency petitions. Every state has a statute that
establishes special judicial procedures for adjudicating allegations of child maltreatment. These
statutes assign a specific court to handle such proceedings. This court is most commonly known
as the juvenile court. See generally D. BESHAROV, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVOCACY: PRACTICE
IN A UNIQUE COURT § 6.2.3, at xxi (1974).
8. See, eg., Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1987) (assistant state's attorney sued under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for personally taking child into custody); Child Beatings" Question ofAbuse or
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their homes, agency workers may feel forced to use false threats in
order to gain access to the home and the child, or enlist the police to
intimidate families into allowing entry into the home.9 Because th re
are no alternate investigative remedies, children may needles sly
remain at risk, or families may be unnecessarily separated.
Accordingly, statutory reform is needed to facilitate investigations
by child protection agencies. State laws should create remedies that
permit social workers to enter a home to observe the child and to
investigate the circumstances of the child's care. Social workers
should also be permitted to interview and obtain pertinent records
from parents, caretakers, schools, physicians, and others with knowl-
edge or information concerning the child and family. In addition,
state law should more clearly and completely set forth the obligation
of government agencies, private organizations, and members of the
public to cooperate with child abuse investigations.
New investigative powers and guidelines can serve several impor-
tant purposes. Legal reform can ease the job of child welfare investi-
gators by providing improved means for determining whether a child
is endangered, and, if so, to gather sufficient proof to support protec-
tive action. Explicit, uncomplicated legal guidelines can both protect
investigators from criticism10 and liability, 1' and restrain those who
would otherwise commit flagrantly improper investigative practices.
When policies and procedures are specific and practical, their violation
is more inexcusable. Clearer investigative guidelines will promote
more effective administrative sanctions against, and civil remedies for,
improper child protection investigations. Such sanctions and remedies
are critical, because the exclusionary rule probably does not prevent
Discipline, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1984, at 14, col. 1; Children of Sect Seized in Vermont, N.Y.
Times, June 23, 1984, at 1, col. 5.
9. In off-the-record interviews with the author, many agency investigators and police
indicated that they sometimes "bluff" the family into permitting entry into the home. In
addition, some believe that a parent's failure to cooperate with the investigation can be sufficient
to justify taking temporary custody of the child.
10. Child welfare investigators are presently subject to intense public criticism. See, e.g.,
Kurtz, New York Child Died Because System Failed, Washington Post, Nov. 7, 1987, at AI, col.
I; Shulte & Bergal, Aid for Tot Came Too Late, Ft. Lauderdale News/Sun-Sentinel, Oct. 7, 1986,
reprinted in Ft. Lauderdale News/Sun-Sentinel Suffer the Children: The Killings the State Didn't
Stop (1986); Bergal, Bochi, & Schulte, Kids Florida Didn't Protect, Ft. Lauderdale News/Sun-
Sentinel, Oct. 5, 1986, reprinted in Ft. Lauderdale News/Sun-Sentinel, Suffer the Children: The
Killings the State Didn't Stop (1986) (pamphlet printed by Ft. Lauderdale News/Sun-Sentinel;
Dold & Gratteau, Child Abuse Deaths Soar in Illinois, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 14, 1986, at Al,
col. 1.
11. See generally D. BESHAROV, THE VULNERABLE SOCIAL WORKER: LIABILITY FOR
SERVING CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 51-107 (1985).
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the use of illegally obtained evidence in a noncriminal child protection
proceeding.12
At the same time, the law needs to accommodate family privacy
interests, and to balance those interests against the need to protect the
child. Powerful, countervailing considerations are presented: Child
abuse investigations often involve devastating invasions of family life,
yet can be necessary to protect children from pain, injury, or death.
Although the issues are difficult, explicit and clear procedural require-
ments and protections that respect the constitutional rights of children
and families must be identified.
Constitutionally based procedural rules governing child abuse inves-
tigations have not yet been firmly established. Although there is an
extensive and well-developed body of constitutional procedural
requirements for criminal investigations, and although there is a less
well-developed set of principles generally applicable to investigations
by government administrative agencies, key procedural principles gov-
erning child abuse investigations remain unsettled.
This article identifies the constitutionally based procedural require-
ments that are applicable to child abuse investigations. It then pro-
poses specific legislative reforms consistent with these constitutional
requirements. The discussion of procedural requirements for child
protection proceedings necessarily considers whether existing criminal
and administrative procedures apply to the child welfare context.
The article covers three related areas in child abuse investigations:
First, methods for gaining access to the child's residence and to other
places where evidence regarding child abuse may be found; second,
methods for gaining access to the child for an interview, for observa-
tion, or for lay or medical examination; and third, methods for
obtaining records or other information relevant to the investigation.
The focus of the article is limited to the period of time prior to the
drastic step of filing a child abuse petition or placing a child away from
home.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 418-66.
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II. ACCESS TO CHILD'S RESIDENCE OR OTHER
PLACES WHERE EVIDENCE OF CHILD ABUSE
MAY BE FOUND
A. Introduction
There are many circumstances in which a search or inspection of
the child's home is necessary to advance a child abuse investigation. 
1 3
This section of the article considers the various legal bases for gaining
access to a child's home or other places where relevant evidence may
be found. 14 It considers the practical and constitutional limitations of
the most common methods for entering private property in child abuse
investigations: consent (Section II.B); the emergency doctrine (Section
II.C); state temporary custody statutes (Section II.D); and criminal
search warrants (Section II.E). 5 This section of the article also dem-
onstrates the need for a special remedy to permit investigative entries
into private property in child protection cases by explaining the limita-
tions of those legal means for entry. Section II.F explores the consti-
tutional requirements for such a special remedy, including the
necessary standard of proof, the need for a warrant, and necessary
procedures in obtaining and executing a warrant. Section II.G pro-
poses specific statutory reforms permitting entries in child abuse
investigations.
Analysis of these issues relies on constitutional precedent from
criminal procedure and administrative agency cases, taking into
account the similarities and differences between investigative entries in
the different contexts. Although there are few cases directly on point,
fourth amendment issues in child abuse investigations cannot be
13. For example, it may be necessary to enter a child's home to determine whether conditions
there are hazardous to the child, such as dangerous unsanitary conditions, exposed electrical
outlets, or excessive cold in winter. Entry into the home may be needed to determine whether
the child is receiving minimally acceptable care; empty cupboards or baby bottles containing sour
milk, for instance, may indicate that the child is not being properly fed. It may also be necessary
to enter the home to verify a parent's explanation of a child's injury, such as whether the
bathroom sink and tap configuration are consistent with a claim that a one-year-old turned on a
hot water tap and released scalding water, causing second degree burns. Similarly, a search of
the home may uncover objects used to abuse the child, such as a belt whose buckle and shape
precisely match marks on a child's body. Where the child is a victim of child pornography,
photographs and documents may be found describing or depicting maltreatment of the child.
Finally, it may be necessary to gain entry to determine whether a child is present.
14. While most of the analysis focuses specifically on gaining entry into the child's home, the
same procedures and principles generally apply to gaining entry to other types of private
property.
15. Although criminal search warrants are available only to police, child welfare investigators
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ignored. It is inconceivable that social workers have unlimited discre-
tion to forcibly enter private homes and other property. However,
child protection investigations are conducted for different purposes, in
a different manner, and with different results than criminal investiga-
tions. A separate constitutional balance must be reached for each.
B. Consent To Enter Residence
Child abuse investigators most frequently gain entry into residences
by consent. Thus, a constitutionally valid consent is critical to the
legality of these entries.
In general, the requirements for a proper consensual entry are the
same where child abuse investigators request entry into a home as
where police request entry in a criminal investigation. Consent, by
definition, involves a concurrence of wills. This is true regardless of
the context. Typical factual differences may bear on the validity of
consent in the criminal and child protection contexts, but there is no
reason why the basic requisites of consent should vary. The key ques-
tions in determining whether a consent is valid are the same: Does the
person who gives the consent have authority to do so? Is the consent
given voluntarily? Is the scope of the consent broad enough to author-
ize the entry or search that took place?
1. Who Can Consent
a. Common Authority Rule
The rule governing who has authority to consent to a search of a
residence was established by the United States Supreme Court in a
criminal case, United States v. Matlock 16 In Matlock a woman who
lived with the accused consented to a search of their bedroom. The
Court upheld her consent, stating that a valid consent can be given by
a third party possessing "common authority" over the premises.
Determining whether a person has common authority over an area or
item of property does not depend on property law, the Court held, but
upon whether the person has, as a practical matter, joint access or
control over the area or property in question. 7 Thus, adults who live
in and share the area or property in question have "common author-
ity" and therefore can consent to entry and search. Although numer-
ous questions arise concerning who has common authority over a
16. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
17. Id at 171 n.7.
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particular area, essentially one who shares control in practice can
consent to a search irrespective of ownership.
b. Child's Ability To Exercise Common Authority
An important question for child abuse investigators is whether chil-
dren exercise "common authority" over their residence, and can indi-
vidually consent to entry. Investigators may wish to enter a residence
when the parents are not home and to seek the consent of an older
child. Although the general rule is that the child does not have com-
mon authority over the residence, and therefore cannot validly consent
to entry, some authorities state that an older child has authority over
limited areas of the home."9 According to Professor Wayne LaFave, a
child's authority to consent to entry should depend upon the age of the
child and the particular area of the home in question.2" LaFave argues
that teenagers may have authority to grant permission to police to
look around generally, but not to make an intrusive search throughout
the house.2 1 By contrast, an eight-year-old may only have authority to
permit an adult to step into the entry way of the home, because this is
often done with regard to visitors or salespersons.
22
2. What Constitutes Voluntary Consent
The seminal Supreme Court case governing voluntary consent is
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.2 3 Under Schneckloth, whether consent
was voluntary must be determined according to the coerciveness of the
"totality of the circumstances" that existed at the time and place that
consent was given.24  This principle is broad enough to govern
searches conducted pursuant to child abuse investigations.2 5
18. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.4, at 728 (1978 & Supp. 1986).
19. See generally Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence Discovered in Search of Adult
Defendant's Property or Residence Authorized by Defendant's Minor Child--State Cases, 99
A.L.R.3d 598 (1980).
20. W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 8.4(c), at 737.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 738.
23. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
24. Id. at 227.
25. Although one federal appeals court case suggests that a different standard of consent
might apply in administrative as opposed to criminal searches, United States v. Thriftimart, 429
F.2d 1006, 1009-10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970), the case predated Schneckloth.
Furthermore, the Thriftimart rationale stressed the absence of coercive elements in
administrative searches. Id. at 1010. But this element, like other differeces between criminal and
child abuse investigations, may be accounted for when applying the "totality of circumstances"
test, rather by modifying the test itself. See W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 10.1, at 203-05. This
approach was taken in the context of a child abuse investigation in Darryl H. v. Coler, 585 F.
Supp. 383, 388 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986).
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The standard for voluntary consent in a child abuse investigation,
however, should not be determined without reference to the vulnerable
position of the parents. Parents have a vital stake in the outcome of
the investigation, and may experience pressure to cooperate. A parent
is not likely to know the precise powers of the state, but might perceive
that the state may take the child if the parent is evasive or non-
cooperative. A parent thus may feel even less free to refuse entry in a
child abuse investigation than a suspect in a typical criminal investiga-
tion, even if the parent is confident that the child has not been
maltreated.
The inherently coercive nature of child abuse investigations alone
should not, of course, invalidate consent to entry. However, courts
should be aware of the coercive atmosphere of the investigation when
determining whether police and child protection workers have gained
entry through undue pressure.
This analysis suggests that there are several preconditions to
obtaining voluntary consent in a child abuse investigation. First, and
most obvious, there should be no physical threat or intimidation. The
presence of a number of policemen displaying weapons can be a coer-
cive factor,26 but the average social worker is not likely to be so intimi-
dating. In Darryl H. v. Coler,27 for instance, a district court
emphasized that a welfare caseworker who was five feet, two inches
tall and eight months pregnant at the time of the investigation was
"hardly an intimidating figure." 28
Another important factor is whether any false penalties have been
threatened. Where the threatened punishment for refusal to consent
to entry cannot actually be imposed, such a threat probably vitiates
consent.29 Consent is also invalid if obtained as a result of trickery or
misleading information, as when authorities falsely claim legal author-
ity to enter the premises."0 It has generally been considered mislead-
On the other hand, a different Illinois federal judge concluded that a different standard for
consent did apply in administrative cases. E.Z. v. Coler, 603 F. Supp. 1546, 1556-58 (N.D. Ill.
1985), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986).
26. United States v. Jones, 641 F.2d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 1981) (five officers, two armed with
shotguns and the others with pistols drawn, were an "overpowering police presence"); see also
State v. Swank, 399 So. 2d 510 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (consent valid where no weapons
displayed).
27. 585 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir.
1986).
28. 585 F. Supp. at 388.
29. See cases collected in W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 8.2(a), at 638 & Supp. at 289.
30. W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 8.2(a), at 638.
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ing for investigators to state that they will obtain a warrant, as opposed
to stating that they plan to seek a warrant.3 '
Under the foregoing principles, the following caseworker threat
would probably vitiate consent: A parent hesitates to admit a child
protective service worker into her residence, and the worker admon-
ishes, "If you don't let me in, I can get a court order and have your
child removed from your home." Such an admonition should vitiate
consent for at least two reasons. The statement arguably implies that
parents will lose custody of the child for refusal to cooperate with the
investigation, which is not true. Although "removed from the home"
might mean temporary removal to conduct an interview or physical
examination, it suggests a more long-term deprivation of custody. In
fact, failure to cooperate with an investigation is not a sufficient basis
for depriving a parent of custody of a child.32 Second, "I can get a
court order" suggests that the issuance of the order is inevitable. To
the contrary, the judge may decline to grant the order.
The correct form of this type of statement would be: "If I am not
permitted to come in, I will request a court order to allow me to enter
the house. If it is granted, I expect that a policeman will help me
enforce the order." This is a proper statement, since there are no false
claims that the worker now has legal authority to enter, that such
authority will necessarily be given, or that the child necessarily will be
taken into custody should the order be granted.33 As the examples
illustrate, investigators should be circumspect in threatening conse-
quences for denial of consent.
It may be misleading for a child abuse investigator to inform parents
that it is in their own interest to allow entry. Whether such a state-
ment is accurate depends upon exactly what is said. An investigator
who says that "we will take your cooperation into consideration in
deciding how to proceed in the case" may not be misinforming the
parents. In child protection cases where the ultimate goal is to safe-
guard the child, the cooperation of the parent often is a proper consid-
eration in determining the outcome of the case. Where the parents
31. Id. § 8.2(b), at 645-49.
32. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2055 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) (emergency
removal permitted where imminent danger to child's life or health and no time to obtain court
order); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-301(1) (1988) (emergency removal permitted where youth is
in immediate or apparent danger of harm); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.02, .03(a)(3) (Vernon
1986 & Supp. 1988) (emergency removal permitted where immediate danger to physical health
or safety of the child and no time to obtain court order).
33. Cf Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968) (where police claimed to have a
search warrant and thereafter were permitted to enter the residence, but never produced the
warrant at trial, consent was held to be invalid).
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admit maltreating their child and willingly participate in a plan to
eliminate the maltreatment, their cooperation sometimes makes it
marginally safer to leave the child at home.
34
On the other hand, where the parent simply consents to entry, as
opposed to admitting maltreatment and cooperating with a rehabilita-
tion plan, the consent probably should not be a major consideration in
making recommendations in the case. It is thus prudent to avoid
promises or assurances that consent will benefit the parents in seeking
consent to entry.
Finally, it is important to note that while asking for permission to
enter a residence, the child protection worker need not affirmatively
inform parents of their right to deny consent. This principle was estab-
lished in Schneckloth,35 and has been followed in at least two cases
involving child abuse investigations.
36
3. Permissible Scope of Search Incident to Consensual Entry
Valid consent to enter a residence does not automatically permit a
thorough search of the premises. Rather, the scope of the search is
limited by the terms of the consent. Consent to enter can be distin-
guished from consent to conduct a search. 37 Further, consent to "look
around" does not necessarily connote consent to conduct an intrusive
search of personal effects and possessions within the premises. 38 The
wording of the request by the investigator may be critically important
in defining the scope of the consent, although any additional condi-
tions or limitations placed upon the request must be respected. In
34. In borderline cases of child maltreatment, the child may be viewed as being in less danger
where the parents agree to cooperate with the agency's plan for family rehabilitation. See, eg., S.
MAGURA & B.S. MOSES, OUTCOME MEASURES FOR CHILD WELFARE SERVICES: THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS 83-84, 90, 129 (1986) (parental cooperation with agency planning and services is
viewed as an important indication of the child's well-being in the family home).
35. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 232-33 (1973).
36. E.Z. v. Coler, 603 F. Supp. 1546, 1556-57 (N.D. IIl. 1985), aff'd sub nor. Darryl H. v.
Coler, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986); Darryl H. v. Coler, 585 F. Supp. 383, 388 (N.D. Ill. 1984),
aff'd in part and vacated in part, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986).
37. See, eg., Robbins v. MacKenzie, 364 F.2d 45 (Ist Cir. 1966) (policeman given permission
to enter apartment had no permission to search; however, stolen property in plain view could be
seized), cerL denied, 385 U.S. 413 (1966); see also J. HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.23, at
117-18 (1982).
38. See eg., United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1971) (consent to search for
narcotics did not authorize intensive examination of defendant's private papers).
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addition, although there is authority to the contrary,39 consent can
probably be rescinded after the search is initiated.'
But even where entry is by consent only, items in "plain view" may
be seized and admitted into evidence.41 Such items may also provide
the basis for an immediate and expanded search if the items constitute
evidence of an immediate risk of harm to the child or suggest that
there is danger that evidence is about to be destroyed.4"
39. See, e.g., People v. Kennard, 175 Colo. 479, 488 P.2d 563 (1971) (once defendant
consented to search of his automobile's trunk, he could not thereafter withdraw his consent).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Homburg, 546 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1976) (airplane passenger
who consents to preboarding search can revoke consent and choose not to board aircraft), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 940 (1977); People v. Martinez, 259 Cal. App. 2d 943, 65 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1968)
(where, during consent search of vehicle interior, police extended search to trunk after defendant
revoked consent, search of trunk was illegal); see also W. LAFAvE, supra note 18, § 8.1(c), at
634.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 530 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1976) (where defendant
consented to entry of his apartment by police, police could seize stolen mail lying strewn about in
plain view on floor); Alberti v. State, 495 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (where police had
consent to enter apartment, piles of marijuana in cellophane bags clearly visible from front of
apartment could be seized; see also W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 8.1(c), at 629.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 44-84 (discussing entry and search based upon
emergency doctrine). Where there is no imminent danger, but evidence in plain view makes it
clear that a further search is likely to yield additional evidence, it is unclear whether the search
may go forward immediately or whether the investigator must seek a search warrant authorizing
a search going beyond the scope of the consent.
In Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987), the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether an emergency search could be extended to seek evidence not needed to protect life or
property, but evidence that a crime had been committed. Police officers had lawfully entered a
residence during an emergency, and noticed a stereo set that they suspected was stolen. The set
was moved to check the serial numbers. The Court held that moving the set was a "search,"
which required probable cause that it constituted contraband or evidence of a crime, but noted in
dictum that if probable cause did exist, the officer was correct in going forward immediately with
the search, even though the emergency did not require it. Id. at 1152-54.
The Court did not explain why such a search could go forward without a warrant, nor did it
address whether the search might go beyond inspection of the item in plain view, should it prove
to constitute evidence of a crime. The Court may have reasoned that once an entry is made
where there is evidence of crime, it is safe to assume that such evidence will be concealed or
destroyed if the search does not go forward immediately.
This reasoning might be applied to a consent entry in a child protection investigation where
there is no consent to search, and no imminent danger to the child, but there is sufficient evidence
of maltreatment in plain view to justify a further search. Arguably, a search may go forward
immediately because the parent has been alerted and, if the search is delayed to obtain a warrant,
the parent is likely to conceal or destroy the evidence of maltreatment. Realistically, this may
hold true in some but not all entries in child protection cases. For example, if the premises are in
extreme disarray, the child is temporarily with a babysitter, and the parent appears intoxicated,
there is probably little reason to think that evidence of maltreatment will be destroyed before a
warrant is obtained.
As a practical matter, it may not be safe for a child protection worker to extend a search
beyond the terms of the consent, unless accompanied by a police officer. The worker should ask
for permission to extend the search and, if permission is denied, seek a warrant; or, if there is
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4. Policy Considerations Unique to Consensual
Child Protection Entries
The constitutional principles governing consent to enter a residence
in a child abuse investigation discussed above set a minimum standard.
However, a legislature considering the problem might still ask whether
state law and policy should be more restrictive than the constitutional
law governing consent. The answer should depend upon how tighten-
ing the criteria for consent would actually affect families and children.
Generally speaking, consensual entry during a child abuse investiga-
tion is preferable to forced entry. If rules governing what constitutes
legally valid consent are tightened, the child protection agency may be
compelled to seek police assistance more often. Although even a con-
sensual entry into a residence can be very upsetting to the child and
family, it does tend to be less disruptive and traumatic than a forced
entry. In addition, a forced entry may stimulate an unnecessarily
antagonistic and adversarial relationship between the agency and the
parents being investigated. This can be especially unfortunate where
the agency must later work to rehabilitate the family.
Accordingly, law and policy should not prevent consensual entries,
inspections, and searches, so long as agency conduct in gaining the
consent is not overbearing or dishonest. Rather, statutory and admin-
istrative remedies should focus on discouraging entries where the facts
do not warrant them. Unnecessary entries can be reduced, for exam-
ple, by better defining and clarifying what constitutes child maltreat-
ment justifying an investigation.43 Similarly, by improving the
screening of child abuse reports, agencies can better distinguish and
terminate unwarranted investigations. Although these approaches
will not eliminate all unjustifiable consensual entries, they do not exac-
erbate parent-agency conflicts or increase unnecessary police
involvement.
C. Entry Under Emergency Doctrine
Another common set of circumstances allowing child abuse investi-
gators to gain entry into residences is where an emergency presenting
an immediate danger to the child exists. This means of entry is analo-
gous to the emergency doctrine applied in the criminal context.
reason to suspect that evidence will be destroyed before a warrant can be obtained, seek police
assistance.
43. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 682(2)-(4), (6)-(8) (Supp. 1987).
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While it is ordinarily not possible to enter a private residence forci-
bly in a criminal investigation without a warrant,44 courts allow war-
rantless entries in emergency situations.45 Under the "exigent
circumstances" rule, warrantless searches may be conducted where
necessary to prevent the imminent escape of a suspect, to prevent the
immediate destruction or removal of evidence,46 or to prevent an
immediate injury or loss of property.47 When the exigent circum-
stances rule involves an imminent danger to life, health, or property, it
is sometimes referred to as the "emergency doctrine."48 Where a child
is in imminent danger within a residence, the emergency doctrine may
justify a warrantless entry and rescue of the child.
Usually, police are involved in such emergency entries. For exam-
ple, police are often called in by child protection workers where there
is a possibility of violence or conflict with the child's caretaker. 49 At
other times, police are directly contacted about endangered children
or may discover the existence of an endangered child in the course of
investigating a separate crime. Occasionally, however, child protec-
tion workers may want to enter a residence by themselves, especially
when a child is in such immediate danger that there is no time to call
44. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. See generally W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 1.0.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 51-56.
46. See generally, W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, §§ 6.5(a), (b), at 432-33, 437-39 & Supp. at
185. For an interesting case considering the legality of a warrantless search based upon the
possible removal of evidence in the context of a child abuse investigation, see White v. Pierce
County, 797 F.2d 812, 815-17 (9th Cir. 1986) (where parent refused to admit police to his
residence to investigate a child abuse report, became violent and abusive, and instructed his son,
who was about to turn around to show policemen his back, to leave the room, police could
reasonably conclude that the parent might abuse the child again or flee with him if the police left
to get a court order). But see id. at 816-17, (Schroeder, J., dissenting) (assertion of constitutional
right to deny entry and use of profanity does not justify entry).
47. See generally, W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 6.6, at 467-75.
48. Id. at 468; Fortier, The Police as Good Samaritan: Constitutional Dimensions of the
Emergency Exception to Search and Seizure Doctrine (Part 1), 3 POLICE L.Q. 22 (1974); Mascolo,
The Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Requirement Under the Fourth Amendment,
22 BUFF. L. REV. 419 (1972); Note, The Emergency Doctrine, Civil Search and Seizure and the
Fourth Amendment, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 571 (1975).
49. See, e.g., State v. Boggess, 115 Wis. 2d 443, 340 N.W.2d 516 (1983) (where anonymous
phone call reporting child abuse indicated perpetrator had a violent temper, social worker
secured attendance of police officer to accompany her on investigatory visit).
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police. This might occur when a worker observes an infant crawling
toward an exposed electrical wire."
The legality of an emergency entry in a child abuse investigation can
accurately be measured by reference to criminal procedure precedent.
Whether the means of the entry or search are tested in a criminal case
or in civil litigation should make no difference. In either case, an entry
or search is constitutionally permissible if there is a valid emergency
and the entry is protective in nature.
Although the emergency doctrine has been construed and applied
in many state and lower federal court cases,"1 it has been discussed
only briefly by the United States Supreme Court. In Warden v. Hay-
den, 2 the Court held for the first time that where an immediate search
is necessary to eliminate a danger to a member of the general public,
no warrant is required. 3 Warden firmly established an emergency
exception to the warrant requirement, but it did not discuss noncrimi-
nal emergency entry situations, nor did it state criteria for determining
whether an emergency exists. Other Supreme Court cases recognizing
an emergency exception to the warrant requirement also fail to
address these questions.54
The Court addressed the emergency doctrine in dictum in the case
of Mincey v. Arizona.5  In Mincey, the Court declined to approve a
blanket rule that would have dispensed with the need to obtain a war-
rant for the search of a death scene. However, the Court commented:
We do not question the right of the police to respond to emergency situ-
ations. Numerous state and federal cases have recognized that the
fourth amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless
entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is
in need of.immediate aid.56
50. Some state statutes do not authorize child protection workers to take children into
custody during emergencies unless police are present. See, eg., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 639
(1981) (law enforcement officer authorized to take child into custody without court order when
child is in immediate danger; child protection worker not mentioned). This might be interpreted
to prohibit a child protection worker from entering a home to protect a child from imminent
harm.
51. For a collection of such cases, see W. LAFAvE, supra note 18, § 6.6(a), at 471-72
nn.21-30 & Supp. at 206; see also Note, supra note 48, at 581-83.
52. 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (entry into a private home by police chasing a robbery suspect who
had been seen entering the home was justified in part by the need to protect the home's
occupants).
53. Id. at 298-99.
54. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
539 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1947).
55. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
56. Id. at 392 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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Lower federal and state court cases, however, clearly recognize that
police may make warrantless entries into residences during child abuse
investigations when there is an emergency requiring immediate inter-
vention for the protection of a child.5 7 The precise scope of the excep-
tion, however, remains unclear. Appellate courts have stated that in
57. Among the cases recognizing that the emergency doctrine may be applied to child abuse
investigations are: Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986) (no exigent circumstances
where visual inspection of child took place four months after receipt of child abuse report);
People v. Smith, 7 Cal. 3d 282, 496 P.2d 1261, 101 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1972) (where neighbor had
taken in crying child and called police one hour later, no "true emergency" justified warrantless
entry into child's home); People v. Sutton, 65 Cal. App. 3d 341, 134 Cal. Rptr. 921 (1976) (where
police received a report from a citizen informant over the radio concerning an unattended child,
and upon approaching the home observed intoxicated woman enter the home and saw in plain
view trash and dirty clothing within the apartment, warrantless entry justified); In re Dawn 0.,
58 Cal. App. 3d 160, 128 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1976) (where five-year-old informed policeman that
younger sister was alone in the home, entry into home legally justified); People v. Draper, 196
Colo. 450, 586 P.2d 231 (1978) (where babysitter called fire department for emergency assistance
concerning infant, but upon arrival the baby had already died, subsequent search not justified);
Wooten v. State, 398 So. 2d 963 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (when policeman, after receiving
report from a passerby of a thirteen-month-old baby being shaken and struck, arrived at the
child's residence, and observing the child's lifeless condition, entered the child's apartment to
render assistance, entry held justified because of need to protect the child and secure medical
attention); Coker v. State, 164 Ga. App. 493, 297 S.E.2d 68 (1982) (where police, while searching
for a girl kidnapped from school by sex offender, found books with her name in plain view within
car in offender's driveway, emergency existed justifying warrantless entry into offender's home);
Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 51, 385 N.E.2d 1020 (1979), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 378 Mass. 751, 393 N.E.2d 391 (1979) (where police, who were searching for a thirteen-
year-old girl, found her clothing along with the photograph of a nude thirteen-year-old boy; and
where the manager of the apartment building described men who had broken into the apartment
in which the clothing and photograph were found and directed police to the present apartment of
the same man; and where police heard moaning in the apartment to which they had been
directed, sufficient emergency existed to justify warrantless entry); Nelson v. State, 96 Nev. 363,
609 P.2d 717 (1980) (where mother arrested without probable cause, entry for the protection of
unattended three-year-old illegal because police created the emergency situation); J.D. v. State,
558 P.2d 402 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) (where true motive of search was not to protect child but
to uncover evidence of possible truancy, emergency doctrine inapplicable); State v. Jones, 45 Or.
App. 617, 608 P.2d 1220 (1980) (when, after receiving anonymous call that infants and small
child had been left alone, police observed the children crying and that no adult appeared to be
present and the home was in disarray, warrantless entry for the protection of the children
upheld); State v. Frink, 42 Or. App. 171, 600 P.2d 456 (1979) (where police received anonymous
tip that child was being injected with drugs and, upon approaching apartment, observed drugs in
plain view, warrantless entry for the protection of the child was proper); State v. Bittner, 359
N.W.2d 121 (S.D. 1984) (where defendant was lawfully arrested, police properly looked upstairs
based on report of a baby in the home); In re C.E., 283 N.W.2d 554 (S.D. 1979) (where state
agency had previously removed children from home for maltreatment, returned them home 11
days prior to receiving report of a disturbance in the home, and upon approaching home to
investigate the report discovered parents intoxicated on the porch and child screaming inside,
entry into the home for the protection of child was legally justified); State v. Boggess, 115 Wis. 2d
443, 340 N.W.2d 516 (1983) (where anonymous caller provided detailed information suggesting
potential emergency situation requiring immediate assistance to abused children, information
sufficient to support immediate entry into children's residence).
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evaluating whether an emergency doctrine entry was justified, they
will view the situation in light of the officer's need to make a prompt
decision.5" This standard, however, does not explain the quantum of
evidence or the degree of imminent danger required to justify an emer-
gency entry.
1. Evidentiary Standard Under Emergency Doctrine
The question of what evidence is required to invoke the emergency
doctrine for child abuse investigations might be phrased as follows:
How likely must it be that a child is about to be harmed before a
policeman or child protection worker can make a warrantless, forced
entry into a child's residence for the child's protection? The answer to
this question may depend upon whether there is a known danger or
whether the danger is merely possible.
a. Emergency Entry Based on a Known Danger
The classic example of a known hazard occurs when a small child is
left unattended. For example, if a six-year-old child is left home alone
at night for several hours, a known danger exists. However, it cannot
be said that there is a substantial likelihood that the child will be
injured without prompt intervention. But because there is a known
danger that is serious enough to be unacceptable to the community,
intervention is probably justified. 9 Since the Mincey dictum permits
warrantless entries by police officers "when they reasonably believe
that a person within is in need of immediate aid,"'  entry for the pro-
tection of unattended children would seem to be permitted. Although
there may not be a probability or even a substantial likelihood of
immediate injury to the child, the child can be said to be "in need of
immediate aid" because of the existence of a known and unacceptable
risk. The concept of "in need of immediate aid" implies a combina-
tion of degree of risk and severity of threatened harm that would jus-
58. See W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 6.6(a), at 468 (citing Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d
205 (D.C. Cir.), cerL denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963)).
59. See, eg., People v. Sutton, 65 Cal. App. 3d 341, 134 Cal. Rptr. 921 (1976) (citizen
reported children unattended and police observed intoxicated woman entering apartment that
was in substantial disarray); In re Dawn 0., 58 Cal. App. 3d 160, 128 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1976)
(where five-year-old child was left alone until 10:00 p.m. and informed police officer that younger
sister was in the home, warrantless entry was justified); State v. Jones, 45 Or. App. 617, 608 P.2d
1220 (1980) (upon receipt of an anonymous call that infants and small child were left home
alone, police officer validly entered home to safeguard the children); State v. Bittner, 359 N.W.2d
121 (S.D. 1984) (when defendant was arrested, police properly looked upstairs because of report
of baby in the home who might otherwise be left unattended).
60. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978).
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tify prompt correction of the situation by a person of reasonable
judgment.
b. Emergency Entry Based on a Possible Danger
The following hypothetical involves a situation where there is a pos-
sibility of danger rather than a known danger:
An eight-year-old child asks to go home with her teacher, but will
not say why she does not wish to return to her own home. The
teacher reports this incident to the child protection agency, which dis-
patches a caseworker to visit the home. A neighbor informs the
caseworker that she has just heard the child screaming from inside the
home. When the caseworker knocks on the door, the parent declines
to discuss the matter and refuses admittance.
In the above hypothetical, the caseworker does not know whether
the child has been endangered or maltreated. The child may be unrea-
sonably angry at the parent for withdrawing a privilege, and the neigh-
bor may have heard an emotional outburst by the child. Yet, the
child's behavior was sufficiently unusual to prompt the teacher to
report the matter. There is a possibility of imminent danger to the
child, but such danger is not probable because the fact that a child is
screaming does not ordinarily mean that the child is in imminent
danger.
Consider again the Mincey dictum in light of the hypothetical. The
dictum states that law enforcement officers must "reasonably believe
that a person within [a dwelling] is in need of immediate aid."6 How
is "reasonably believe" to be construed? Does it mean that there must
be probable cause that the child inside is endangered? In Beck v.
Ohio,62 probable cause, in the context of a warrantless arrest, was
described as "whether the facts available to the officers at the moment
of the arrest would 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief'
that an offense has been committed., 63 This is similar to the Mincey
phrase "reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immedi-
ate aid."
On the other hand, a more recent case uses language similar to the
"reasonably believe" language of Mincey to describe the standard of
reasonable suspicion. In Michigan v. Long, ' the Supreme Court held
that a stop and search of a motor vehicle for weapons would be "per-
61. Id.
62. 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
63. Id. at 96 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
64. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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missible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on 'spe-
cific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant' the officer in believing
that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate con-
trol of weapons."65
Under Beck and Long, an officer must have a reasonable belief that
an offense has been committed to establish probable cause for a war-
rantless arrest. In contrast, for an officer to establish reasonable suspi-
cion to justify a search for weapons during the detention of an
automobile, the officer must have a reasonable belief that the suspect is
dangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons. Thus, for
probable cause under Beck the officer must believe that a specific
event has occurred, while under Long the officer must believe only that
the suspect is dangerous, that there is a possibility that the suspect will
attempt to seize weapons or attack the officer. Similarly, in Terry v.
Ohio, "reasonable suspicion" allowing a stop and frisk is established
where the officer reasonably believes that the frisk is appropriate, for
example, that the suspect may have a weapon that may be used to
attack the officer.66
Authority is mixed concerning whether the emergency doctrine
requires a probable cause or a reasonable suspicion standard. Profes-
sors LaFave and Israel take the position that the probable cause
requirement is to be applied,67 as have some lower court cases.
68
65. Id. at 1049 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Later discussion in the case makes it
clear that the quoted language was not used to describe probable cause, but reasonable suspicion.
Id. at 1049-50 n.14. This apparently is the level of suspicion identified in Terry. The Terry
Court defined the issue at one point as "whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances
would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger." 392 U.S. at 27.
For discussion of the reasonable suspicion standard, see supra text accompanying notes 167-83;
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.8(d), at 302-03 (1984).
66. 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
67. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 65, § 3.6(f), at 272-73.
68. See, e.g., People v. Sutton, 65 Cal. App. 3d 341, 134 Cal. Rptr. 921 (1976) (probable cause
satisfied by information from citizen informant concerning unattended child); State v. Boggess,
115 Wis. 2d 443, 340 N.W.2d 516 (1983) (probable cause standard not applied, but method of
determining whether probable cause exists with regard to informant's tip deemed relevant in
determining whether reasonable person would have believed that there was an immediate need to
render aid, as required by Mincey).
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However, other cases are less clear,69 or reject the probable cause stan-
dard entirely.7"
It would be anomalous to allow entry based on a known but slight
danger of harm, but to forbid entry where there is a significant possi-
bility that a child will be injured. Accordingly, it makes more practi-
cal sense for the emergency doctrine to require a reasonable suspicion
that a person within may be injured if the officer does not enter, rather
than for the doctrine to require probable cause that a person within is
in danger. For example, the hypothetical involving the eight-year-old
the neighbor heard screaming may present more danger than a six-
year-old left at home alone for several hours. A reasonable suspicion
standard would allow entry in either case, at least where no less intru-
sive approach could protect the child.7" A "probable cause of danger"
standard, on the other hand, would permit entry only in the unat-
tended child situation.
There are several reasons why a different standard should govern
emergency doctrine cases than governs cases involving searches under
nonemergency circumstances. First, it is reasonable to assume that
victims or endangered persons want police to enter and protect them
where there is only a reasonable suspicion that the individuals are in
peril. Entries for the purpose of rescue are more welcome, and less
hostile and intrusive than entries aimed at investigating crime (at least
for the victim, if not for a person placing the victim in danger).
Second, a child may not legally be able to consent to entry72 or prac-
tically be able to protect himself. Thus, there is a particularly strong
social cost in establishing a strict evidentiary standard under the emer-
gency doctrine in child abuse investigations.
Third, an emergency doctrine search is not likely to be used to
oppress persons disfavored by police. The doctrine is limited to cir-
69. In People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 347 N.E.2d 607, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, cert. denied,
426 U.S. 953 (1976), the New York Court of Appeals held that to justify an emergency entry,
first, there must be reasonable grounds to believe that an emergency exists and that there is an
immediate need for police assistance for the protection of life or property; second, the search
must not be primarily motivated by an intent to arrest and seize evidence; and third, there must
be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the
area or place to be searched. This case is summarized in W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 6.6, at
469, and is relied upon in several other cases, such as State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 686 P.2d
750, 760, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1066 (1984).
70. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 45 Or. App. 617, 608 P.2d 1220 (1980) (unnecessary to consider
probable cause).
71. But see United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 542 (1985) (criticizing post
hoc evaluations of police conduct where judges identify less intrusive alternative means by which
police objectives might have been accomplished).
72. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
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cumstances involving demonstrable imminent danger.7 3  The entry
and search itself may include only those steps necessary to protect
individuals from harm.74 And as previously indicated, the state must
demonstrate that the search was actually motivated by a desire to pro-
tect an individual from danger rather than to obtain evidence of
criminality.75
2. Imminence of Danger Under Emergency Doctrine
In measuring the immediacy of the threat or danger required under
the emergency doctrine, Mincey and many other cases require that the
danger be "imminent" or "immediate. ' 76  In the context of warrant-
less searches in criminal investigations where there is a risk of destruc-
tion of evidence, courts have held that the risk must be such that the
evidence would likely be destroyed or removed before a warrant could
be obtained and served.7 7 This principle seems logical to apply by
analogy to emergency doctrine entries. The logical analogy to this
73. See infra text accompanying notes 76-81.
74. See, eg., United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1972) (where police,
expecting to find gunshot victim, found only unoccupied room, it was unreasonable for them to
search through locked suitcase), cert denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974); Condon v. People, 176 Colo.
212, 489 P.2d 1297 (1971) (where police entered house because smell of decomposing body
allegedly came from basement, it was unreasonable for police to search closets and cupboards in
upstairs room before searching basement).
75. People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 347 N.E.2d 607, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246 (warrantless search
of hotel guest's room upheld where reason for search was to render assistance to missing hotel
maid), cerL denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976).
76. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) ("The Fourth Amendment does not bar
police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a
person within is in need of immediate aid."); Coker v. State, 164 Ga. App. 493, 297 S.E.2d 68,
71-72 (1982) (where police searching for thirteen-year-old kidnap victim saw victim's
schoolbooks in car parked in driveway, subsequent search of house was justified to find "a person
within.., in need of immediate aid") (quoting Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 820, 279 S.E.2d
650 (1981)); State v. Jones, 45 Or. App. 617, 608 P.2d 1220 (1980) (officer who made warrantless
entry into home after being told that children were left unattended and hearing crying noises
within, was reasonable in concluding that "immediate action was necessary"); State v. Bittner,
359 N.W.2d 121, 127 (S.D. 1984) (where two officers had been stabbed on premises, warrantless
emergency search of house for other possible victims in need of "immediate aid" was justified);
State v. Boggess, 115 Wis. 2d 443, 340 N.W.2d 516, 524 (1983) (where child protection worker
received detailed information that children had been beaten, warrantless entry into and search of
home was justified as "situation requiring immediate need for aid or assistance").
77. See, eg., United States v. Smith, 503 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1974) (where suspected heroin
courier was about to board airplane, warrantless body search for evidence upheld), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1124 (1975); United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir.) (where customs agents had
probable cause to believe that hashish was on premises, and that one of the defendants might
have alerted others to his arrest, warrantless search of premises allowed to avoid destruction of
evidence), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833 (1973) ; State v. Patterson, 192 Neb. 308, 220 N.W.2d 235
(1974) (where police overheard occupants of apartment believed to be used for cutting and
packaging of heroin preparing for departure, warrantless search justified).
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principle in emergency situations would be that the threat to person or
property must be so imminent that there is no time to obtain a court
order or warrant authorizing entry into the home. As discussed later
in this article, however, not all states authorize civil search warrants in
child protection cases.78
If no criminal or civil warrant is available in emergency situations,
the danger may need to be such that no less intrusive means than entry
is available to alleviate the danger.79 Thus, where a six-year-old child
has allegedly been left at home unattended, police and child protection
workers might be expected to attempt to locate the child's parents or
other caretakers before entering the home for the protection of the
child. An entry would be allowed, but only after it is clear that the
parents cannot be located, or that it is unsafe to wait any longer.
Where a civil warrant is available and can be obtained quickly, an
unattended child will often be safe for the time it takes to obtain a
warrant.8 ° In this situation, the police or the child protection agency
should be expected to seek the warrant. Alternatively, if the child
inside proves to be in enough danger to justify immediate custody
under state child protection legislation,8" the child protection agency
can take the child into custody.
3. Scope of Search Under Emergency Doctrine
A final issue concerning the emergency doctrine is the permissible
scope of a search pursuant to an emergency entry. In brief, an emer-
gency justifies only that entry and search that is necessary to deter-
mine whether there is an immediate danger, and then only to protect
the child. Police or child protection workers may not, absent probable
cause, conduct any actual search not directly related to determining or
alleviating the emergency. In the recent case of Arizona v. Hicks, 82 the
United States Supreme Court held that even a small movement of an
object, such as turning it over to check for serial numbers, can be an
unlawful "search" if the intent is to uncover illegality unrelated to the
emergency. 
8 3
Thus, even when there is an emergency that will justify an entry and
limited search, the permissible search may be inadequate for agency
78. See infra Appendix.
79. But see supra note 71.
80. See infra text accompanying note 229 (suggesting issuance of warrant upon application by
telephone).
81. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
82. 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987).
83. Id. at 1152-53.
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purposes. Unless the emergency entry has itself uncovered sufficient
evidence of maltreatment to justify a further search, the emergency
doctrine entry is no substitute for a search warrant.84 Because the
emergency doctrine does not permit a complete search for evidence,
and applies only in emergency situations, additional remedies are
needed by child protection agencies.
D. Entry While Taking Child into Custody
A third way that police and child protection agency workers may
gain entry to a residence during an investigation is in the course of
taking emergency custody of a child. Every state has a statute author-
izing law enforcement officers or child protection workers to take cus-
tody of a child where the child is endangered." The child may be
taken into custody with or without a court order, depending upon the
nature of the emergency and the requirements of state law. 6 These
statutes are often interpreted to permit law enforcement officers to
enter residences to take a child into custody, particularly when a cus-
tody order has been obtained from a court.8 7 Often an emergency situ-
ation will justify an entry pursuant to the emergency doctrine and
pursuant to the emergency custody statute. Under an emergency cus-
tody statute, however, the entry must be made for the purpose of tak-
ing the child into custody rather than for the purpose of determining
the condition of the child. Thus, the initial entry may be made pursu-
ant to the emergency doctrine and the child will subsequently be taken
into care pursuant to the emergency custody statute, after it is clear
that the child has been abused or neglected.
Taking a child into custody is an important investigative tool where
prolonged questioning or examination of the child may be probative of
84. A related question is whether an item in plain view may itself supply independent
justification for a more extensive, warrantless search. For a discussion of whether items in plain
view during a consensual entry can justify a warrantless search going beyond the scope of the
consent, see supra note 42.
85. See state statutes collected in 2 STATE STATUTES RELATED TO CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLEcT: 1986 643-94 (September 1987) [hereinafter STATE STATUTES].
86. See ag., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.050 (West Supp. 1988) which provides in part
that:
A law enforcement officer may take, or cause to be taken, a child into custody without a
court order if there is probable cause to believe that the child is abused or neglected and that
the child would be injured or could not be taken into custody if it were necessary to first
obtain a court order.
87. See, eg., 1d; Brady v. County of Tioga, 100 A.D.2d 676,473 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1984) (where
social service workers entered home to remove child pursuant to emergency custody provision of
social services law, father's suit against agency for trespass, false imprisonment, and civil rights
violations was properly dismissed).
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alleged maltreatment. However, it is of limited value in terms of
inspecting a residence, because law enforcement officers may not enter
the residence when the child is not inside or is voluntarily handed
over. In addition, as with the emergency doctrine, even if the officers
enter in order to take the child into custody, their examination of the
premises is logically limited to objects and items in plain view.8 8
Furthermore, the standard for taking a child into custody may not
permit investigative entries at times when they are appropriate and
needed. While state statutes vary widely in their requirements,89 it is
appropriate to impose a stricter standard for taking a child into cus-
tody for a prolonged period than for making an investigative entry
into a home. Moreover, a protective custody order may lead the
agency to remove the child even when, upon entry, no emergency
appears to exist.90
E. Entry Pursuant to Criminal Search Warrant
Child protection agency workers sometimes obtain evidence from
inside a residence through execution of a search warrant pursuant to a
criminal investigation. However, only police, not child protection
agency workers, can seek a criminal search warrant and enter the
home pursuant to the warrant. Child protection agency workers can
only encourage police to do so and then request access to evidence
uncovered in the search.
Moreover, criminal search warrants cannot always be obtained in
child maltreatment investigations. The definitions of child maltreat-
ment for child abuse reporting, investigation, and intervention are gen-
erally broader than the definitions incorporated into criminal law. In
addition, prosecutors are not interested in pursuing all types of cases
routinely investigated by child protection agencies. Child neglect
cases, for example, are often pursued by child protection agencies but
88. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
89. Compare TEXAS FAM. CODE ANN. § 17.02 (a) (Vernon Supp. 1988) ("Before any
temporary restraining order or attachment of the child is issued.., the court must be satisfied
from a sworn petition or affidavit that: (1) there is an immediate danger to the physical health or
safety of the child; and (2) there is no time, consistent with the health or safety of the child, for
an adversary hearing.") with OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1104(d) (West Supp. 1987) ("If it
appears that the child is in such condition or surroundings that his welfare requires that his
custody be immediately assumed by the court, the judge may immediately issue ... a warrant
authorizing the taking of said child into custody.").
90. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.050 (1987) (law enforcement officer may take child
into custody where probable cause to believe that child is abused or neglected and would be
injured or could not be taken into custody if it were necessary to first obtain a court order); id.
§ 13.34.060(1) (child taken into custody shall immediately be placed into shelter care).
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not by police. Furthermore, it may be difficult to establish probable
cause, the standard of proof necessary to obtain a warrant in the
course of a criminal investigation.9 1
F. Constitutional Limits on Statutes Permitting Child Protection
Agency Investigative Entry
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that child protection agency
investigators sometimes need to enter private property without con-
sent and in the absence of an emergency, and that using emergency
child custody statutes and seeking criminal search warrants are an
insufficient means to gain entry and conduct a search in many
situations.
The problems encountered in obtaining investigative entry may be
solved by means of a special statute authorizing such entry. Before
suggesting statutory changes, however, it is necessary to consider pos-
sible constitutional limitations on reform. Important and unresolved
issues include the quantum of proof that is needed to gain entry,
whether a warrant or other court order is required, and the procedures
that must be followed to obtain the warrant or court order.
1. Quantum of Proof Required for Nonemergency Entry
It is unclear what quantum of proof is constitutionally required to
authorize a nonemergency entry into a home during a child abuse
investigation. There are several possibilities: No particularized evi-
dence of child maltreatment may be necessary; particular and objec-
tive evidence of child maltreatment, amounting to a "reasonable
suspicion," might be sufficient; or probable cause as the term is used in
criminal proceedings might be required. Because there are no United
States Supreme Court decisions and few lower court cases directly on
point, it is difficult to predict how the courts will rule if presented with
the issue.
The Supreme Court decisions do indicate, however, that a balancing
test weighing the need for the type of search proposed against the
intrusiveness of the search will probably determine the quantum of
proof required. The most closely analogous Supreme Court cases offer
clues, but no clear answers, concerning how a balancing test might be
applied. This section of the article examines these cases and then con-
siders how the Supreme Court decisions have been applied in the
lower court decisions most closely on point. It then discusses how the
91. However, probable cause may not be required for the issuance of a noncriminal child
protection search warrant. See infra notes 92-183 and accompanying text.
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balancing test should be applied. The section concludes that, where the
search is initiated and carried out by the child protection agency
rather than by the police, the reasonable suspicion standard is the
most appropriate.
a. United States Supreme Court Decisions
The first in a series of relevant Supreme Court cases was Camara v.
Municipal Court,92 decided in 1967. The Camara case involved a rou-
tine housing inspection in the city of San Francisco under an ordi-
nance allowing city officials to enter a private residence without
permission, without a warrant, and without probable cause that the
particular residence violated the city code.9
3
The Court applied a balancing test to determine what evidentiary
standard should apply to housing searches pursuant to the fourth
amendment, and concluded that because of the great need for housing
inspections, and the relatively limited intrusions involved, mandatory
inspections could take place without evidence of a specific violation so
long as they occurred pursuant to a systematic inspection scheme.9 4
Where there was a pattern of inspections based upon such objective
factors as the "passage of time, the nature of the building ... or the
condition of the entire area," no particularized evidence of an infrac-
tion would be required.95
In reaching this conclusion, the Camara Court did not apply the
traditional standard of probable cause. Rather, the Court redefined
probable cause in the context of administrative housing inspections,
holding that "probable cause" could be satisfied by a reasonable
scheme of housing inspection, objectively applied, without any partic-
ularized evidence of a violation in the specific residence to be
inspected. 96
The reasoning of the Camara case is suggestive, but not definitive,
with regard to civil child abuse investigations. The Camara Court
emphasized that inspections without individualized proof were per-
missible because housing violations are difficult to detect.97 This fac-
tor has also been argued to apply in child abuse investigations.98 In
92. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
93. Id. at 525-26.
94. Id. at 536-37.
95. Id. at 538.
96. Id.
97. Unlike typical criminal behavior, the Court pointed out, housing code violations tend to
be invisible to the public eye. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
98. As Professor LaFave has pointed out, child abuse and neglect generally occur in the
privacy of the family home and are often extremely difficult to detect, particularly where
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addition, the Court emphasized that housing inspections were nonin-
trusive because police were not normally involved.99 This is also true
of most child protection investigation entries. On the other hand, the
Camara Court emphasized that the invasion of privacy accompanying
a housing inspection was minimal,"oo and that housing inspections
would ordinarily be made only after advance warnings.101 Neither is
likely to be true in a child abuse investigation.'0 2 Finally, the Court
emphasized the fact that housing inspections were made pursuant to
an objective and nondiscretionary pattern, l0 3 a factor that generally
does not apply to child abuse investigations." 4
The next important Supreme Court case, Wyman v. James, 10 5 was
decided in 1971. The question presented in the Wyman case was
preschool children are involved. He argues that applying the traditional probable cause standard
to child protection cases would cause special hardship for many victimized children. His
conclusion is that a relaxed standard of evidence should apply in child abuse and neglect
investigations. W. LAFAvE, supra note 18, § 10.3(a), at 242; see also Burt, Forcing Protection on
Children and Their Parents The Impact of Wyman v. James, 69 MICH. L. REv. 1259, 1305
(1971).
99. Camara, 387 U.S. at 530.
100. Id. at 537.
101. The Court stated:
Thus, as a practical matter and in light of the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a
warrant specify the property to be searched, it seems likely that warrants should normally
be sought only after entry is refused unless there has been a citizen complaint or there is
other satisfactory reason for securing immediate entry....
Camara, 387 U.S. at 539-40.
102. When the Camara balancing test is applied to civil child abuse investigations, an
important issue is presented concerning the intrusiveness of the search: Is the involvement of
police and the risk of prosecution the critical factor in determining the intrusiveness, or is the
actual invasion of privacy more important? Camara is of little assistance in answering this
question. See W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 10.1, at 188-89. Many civil child abuse and neglect
investigations do not have criminal prosecution as an ultimate objective. If this is the key
consideration, such investigations should be deemed less intrusive than criminal searches. On
the other hand, if the key factor is the degree of the invasion of privacy and the interference with
the family, such investigations should be regarded as highly intrusive. Searches without advance
warning are highly intrusive, and advance warning is often impractical in child abuse
investigations, where evidence may be destroyed or the child may be concealed or removed from
the jurisdiction.
103. Camara, 387 U.S. at 535-37.
104. The Camara Court reasoned that the objective, nondiscretionary pattern of housing
inspections reduces the possibility of arbitrary and oppressive decisions by state officials. The
objective bases of the housing inspection scheme approved by the Court thus were an important
justification for permitting it to occur without applying the undiluted standard of probable cause. -
In contrast, a decision about whether to search a house in a child abuse investigation will require
the exercise of both judgment and discretion. But see New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs.
v. Wunnenburg, 167 N.J. Super. 578, 408 A.2d 1345 (App. Div. 1979); infra note 153. Child
protection agency discretion regarding residential entries may be narrowed, as has been done by
the state of Illinois. See infra text accompanying notes 134-37.
105. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
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whether a recipient of welfare benefits was required to permit a home
visit by a welfare caseworker where there was no indication of unlaw-
ful or improper activity in the home. The welfare recipient argued
that home visits constituted a search under the fourth amendment and
could not be required without a warrant and probable cause. The
Court disagreed, holding that a routine welfare home visit did not con-
stitute a search and, even if it were considered to be a search, it was
not unreasonable. 106
Although not expressly applying a balancing test, the Court dis-
cussed a number of factors that demonstrated the substantial need for,
and relative nonintrusiveness of, welfare home visits. 107 In concluding
that a welfare home visit is not a search, the Court emphasized that
such a visit, unlike a search to uncover evidence of a crime, is
predominantly rehabilitative."0 8 By comparison, an entry in a child
protection agency investigation is arguably more focused on uncover-
ing parental misconduct, although less so than is an entry in a criminal
investigation.'o 9
The Wyman Court also emphasized that welfare home visits are not
made by force." 0 By contrast, entry must be made by force in child
protection cases when consent is denied."' Other factors relied upon
in Wyman to support its alternative holding that a welfare home visit
is a reasonable search, have doubtful applicability to child abuse
investigations. 12
106. Id. at 318.
107. Id. at 317-24.
108. According to the Supreme Court, the welfare caseworker conducting a routine home
visit is there primarily to assist rather than to police the family. Id. at 317, 319.
109. The primary concern in a child abuse investigation is whether the child has been
maltreated and is in need of immediate protection. While it is true that the ultimate purpose of
the child abuse investigation is to rehabilitate the family, the primary initial concern of the
investigator is to uncover possible abuse or neglect. See, e.g., T. STEIN & T. RZEPNICKI,
DECISION MAKING IN CHILD WELFARE SERVICES 49-73 (1984).
110. Although the recipient could lose benefits for refusing to permit the home visit, the
denial of permission was not a criminal offense, and an entry could not be made by force.
Wyman, 400 U.S. at 317-18.
111. Forced entry in child abuse investigations may occur through threats, demands by
police, or the use of physical force by police.
112. Among the factors offered to justify welfare home visits as "reasonable searches" in
Wyman, but that are not present in child abuse investigations, are the following: First, a welfare
home visit, but not a child abuse investigation, is designed to ensure the proper expenditure of
public funds; second, there is advance notice of the home welfare visit, as opposed to many
entries in child abuse investigations; third, the welfare recipient can decline to cooperate with the
search without penalty, but a person being investigated for alleged abuse or neglect cannot;
fourth, no force or intrusive snooping is generally involved in the home visit, unlike searches that
are part of abuse and neglect investigations; and fifth, while the home visit is a matter of routine
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In sum, Wyman is questionable authority for the propositions that a
child abuse investigative entry does not constitute a search, and that
such an entry is reasonable in the absence of an adequate evidentiary
foundation. On the other hand, the Court did strongly emphasize the
rehabilitative character of welfare home visits and the need to protect
dependent children; this may offer some support for a relaxed eviden-
tiary standard governing searches pursuant to civil child abuse
investigations.
In a 1985 decision, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 113 the Court considered
the standard of evidence that should apply to searches by school offi-
cials directed at high school students while on school premises.
Unlike Camara and Wyman, T.L.O. involved a nonroutine search
based upon a particularized suspicion of wrongdoing. The search in
question occurred after a teacher observed a female student smoking
cigarettes in a school lavatory in violation of a school rule. When the
student subsequently denied that she had been smoking, the assistant
vice principal searched her purse and discovered evidence of the pos-
session and sale of marijuana. The state brought delinquency charges
against the student, who moved to suppress the evidence found in her
purse."' The Court held that the fourth amendment does apply to
searches conducted by school authorities." 5
public welfare administration, the abuse or neglect investigation is based on suspected
wrongdoing in the family to be investigated.
On the other hand, one key factor applied by the Court in determining that home visits were
reasonable does apply to child abuse investigations: the public interest in protecting the
dependent child. Indeed, this is a far greater concern in abuse and neglect investigations than in
welfare home visits.
Two other justifications applied in Wyman may or may not be present in child abuse and
neglect investigations. First, the Court emphasized that welfare home visits were not designed to
uncover a crime. A child abuse investigation may or may not be designed to uncover a crime. In
some investigations there is no question of criminal prosecution. At most, criminal prosecution
is generally secondary to the investigation of neglect by child protection agencies. On the other
hand, some child protection agencies do collaborate closely with police in certain types of cases
and the criminal and noncriminal aspects of the investigations are intertwined. See infra note
446 and accompanying text.
Second, the Wyman Court emphasized that there was no police or uniformed authority
involved in the welfare home visit. 400 U.S. at 318-25. This may or may not be true in a
nonconsensual child protection investigation entry. Where the social worker conducting the visit
convinces the family that there is a legal basis for entering the home and that entry will be forced
should it be refused, the entry can be said to be nonconsensual, yet no uniformed authority is
present. However, if the resident persists in refusing entry, the police may be called and may
assist the social worker in entering the home.
113. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
114. Id. at 327-29.
115. Id at 333.
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In applying a balancing test to analyze what is reasonable in the
context of a school search, the Court weighed the state's interest in
maintaining discipline against the student's legitimate expectations of
privacy and personal security.' 16 The Court applied a "reasonable-
ness" standard to hold that searches in a school setting may be con-
ducted without a warrant, and based upon less than probable cause." 7
Specifically, the Court held that, under ordinary circumstances, the
search of a student by school authorities will be justified when there
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will produce evi-
dence that the student has violated or is violating the law or a school
rule. 118
The Court declined, however, to decide whether individualized sus-
picion is required in all school searches." 9 In a footnote to the opin-
ion, the Court pointed out that the fourth amendment does not
invariably require individualized suspicion. However, exceptions to
individualized suspicion requirements are generally only appropriate
when privacy interests are minimal and the search or seizure is not
subject to the discretion of the official in the field."'2 Because privacy
interests are substantial in child abuse investigations and the investiga-
tor does exercise discretion, T.L. 0. does not support a conclusion that
searches focusing upon identified suspects may be made in child abuse
cases without an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.
T.L.O. articulates an intermediate evidentiary standard for noncon-
sensual searches involving individualized suspicion. Strictly speaking,
the rationale of T.L.O. does not apply to civil child abuse investiga-
tions because the relaxed evidentiary standard was based upon the
need to preserve order and a proper educational environment in the
school setting. However, the Court's willingness to establish an inter-
mediate standard in a situation where there is a need for an individual-
ized suspicion suggests that the same approach might be used in the
area of child abuse and neglect investigations. T.L.O. was the first
United States Supreme Court case applying such an intermediate stan-
dard outside the context of a criminal investigation. 2 '
116. Id. at 337-40.
117. Id. at 340-43.
118. Id. at 325, 341-42.
119. Id. at 342 n.8.
120. Id.
121. An intermediate evidentiary standard resembling that in New Jersey v. T.LO. has been
applied to brief stops of suspects in criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411, 421-22 (1981); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
20 (1968).
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Another recent Supreme Court case, United States v. Montoya de
Hernandez, 22 is also relevant in establishing the evidentiary standard
governing nonconsensual searches in civil child abuse investigations.
The Court emphasized there that where some particularized suspicion
of wrongdoing is required to justify a search, "reasonable suspicion" is
the only acceptable intermediate evidentiary standard short of prob-
able cause.123 The Court rejected a "clear indication" test as a fourth
amendment threshold between reasonable suspicion and probable
cause, reasoning that such "subtle verbal gradations may obscure
rather than elucidate the meaning" of the standard in question. 24
Finally, there is the case of O'Connor v. Ortega, 25 the most recent
Supreme Court case dealing with fourth amendment requirements in
administrative searches. In O'Connor, the Court considered the stan-
dard of evidence that should apply when government errloyers and
supervisors search the work spaces of public employees. The search in
question was directed at the office, desk, and fie cabinets of a psychia-
trist employed by a public hospital. The search occurred after the doc-
tor had been placed on administrative leave for suspected work-related
misconduct. 126
Holding that the fourth amendment does apply to such searches
where the facts indicate that there is a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, the Court applied a balancing test to determine the quantum of
evidence required. The test weighed the privacy expectations of public
employees against the government's need for supervision, control, and
efficient operation of the work place.' 27 The Court decided that work-
place searches are justified when "there are reasonable grounds for
122. 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
123. Id, at 540-41.
124. Id at 541. See also LaFave, "Seizures" Typology: Classifying Detentions of the Person
To Resolve Warrant, Grounds, and Search Issues, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 417 (1984) (arguing
against a multiplicity of categorizations of seizures). New Jersey v. T.L.O. and the most recent
cases involving brief police stops all seem to articulate the same reasonable suspicion standard.
The reasonable suspicion test was phrased in United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981),
as whether officers "have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person
stopped," and in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975), as whether the
officer's observations lead him "reasonably to suspect" that the particular vehicle may contain
aliens who are illegally in the country. See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)
("at least articulable and reasonable suspicion"). The wording in New Jersey v. TLO. is
"reasonable grounds for suspecting." 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985). But see Griffin v. Wisconsin, 107
S. Ct. 3164 (1987) (upholding search of probationer's home based on "reasonable grounds" to
believe contraband was present, where sole information supporting search was report from police
detective to probation officer that there were or might be guns in probationer's apartment).
125. 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987).
126. Id at 1495-96.
127. Id at 1500-02.
Washington Law Review
suspecting" that the search will turn up evidence of misconduct, or
where it is necessary for a noninvestigative purpose such as retrieval of
a needed file.' 2 8
The Court pointed out that there was individualized suspicion of
misconduct by the doctor, but declined to "decide whether individual-
ized suspicion is an essential element of the standard of reasonableness
that we adopt today."' 2 9 This language casts doubt on any conclusion
that searches in child protection investigations may not proceed with-
out individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. However, the O'Connor
Court followed this statement with a citation to New Jersey v. T L. 0.
There the Court had stated that exceptions to the requirement of indi-
vidualized suspicion are generally appropriate only when privacy
interests are minimal and not subject to the discretion of a government
official in the field.' 3 ° As explained earlier, neither is likely to be true
in child abuse investigations.' 3 '
In summary, recent Supreme Court decisions establish a framework
for analysis but do not resolve what quantum of evidence is constitu-
tionally required to support a residential search in a child abuse inves-
tigation. On close scrutiny, the cases do not support the proposition
that residential entries in child abuse investigations may occur in the
absence of particularized evidence of wrongdoing. Although appar-
ently some evidence is required, the Supreme Court cases do not
answer the question of whether the reasonable suspicion or an undi-
luted probable cause standard applies.
b. Lower Court Cases
The few lower court cases on point also do not provide a clear out-
line of constitutional requirements for residential entries in child pro-
tection investigations. Overall, however, they support an intermediate
approach, neither requiring probable cause and a warrant nor permit-
ting residential entries without any particularized evidence of
maltreatment.
The case providing the most detailed discussion of fourth amend-
ment issues in child abuse investigations is E.Z v. Coler. '32 That case
was brought by eight minor children and their parents who were the
subjects of child abuse investigations by the Illinois Department of
128. Id. at 1503.
129. Id.
130. 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
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Children and Family Services ("DCFS"). Plaintiffs alleged a "pattern
and practice of routinely searching the bodies of minor children
reported to be abused or neglected by their parents and conducting
searches at homes in the course of investigating child abuse and
neglect reports, without warrants and without probable cause." '133
Because the complaint alleged a pattern of investigative practices in
violation of the fourth amendment, DCFS's written policies governing
agency investigations were central to the court's decision. These writ-
ten policies included an agency handbook"3 and a set of written pro-
cedures,1 35 governing the commencement of investigations, searches of
residences, and the physical examination of alleged child victims.
The handbook and procedures specified that agency case workers
were to enter the residence of the child in every child abuse and
neglect investigation and were to examine the body of the alleged child
victim if needed to verify the report of abuse. 136 However, an investi-
gation would not be commenced unless, among other things, the child
abuse report indicated that the child "had been harmed, or [was] in
danger of harm or of a substantial risk of harm," and, in addition, that
the report identified a "specific incident or circumstance [suggesting
that] the harm was caused by child abuse or neglect." 137
Measuring these procedures against fourth amendment require-
ments surrounding administrative searches, a federal district court
found that residential entries in child abuse investigations are gov-
erned by the fourth amendment, but that the searches are reasonable
when conducted pursuant to the Illinois handbook and procedures.138
The court reasoned that imposing a probable cause standard or requir-
ing a warrant would ignore "the problems resulting from children who
are not old enough to speak, children who will not admit to being
abused, parents who will not admit to abusing their children, parents
who are unaware that their children are being abused." 139 The judge
apparently rejected the probable cause standard because of the special
difficulties in obtaining evidence of abuse and neglect. Instead, the
133. 603 F. Supp. at 1563.
134. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT INVESTIGATION DECISIONS HANDBOOK (1982) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
135. The procedures and handbook are described in E.Z. v. Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1549.
136. HANDBOOK, supra note 134, at 65-66.
137. E.Z. v. Coler, 603 F. Supp. at 1549.
138. Id. at 1555-58. E.Z also addressed the issue of whether the searches at issue were
consensual. Id. at 1556-58. See also supra note 25.
139. EZ, 603 F. Supp. at 1560 (citation omitted) (quoting Defendants' Post-Hearing
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 7).
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court seemed to embrace the reasonable suspicion standard articulated
in New Jersey v. TL.O.
An earlier decision by another judge of the same federal district
court also considered fourth amendment requirements for searches in
the course of civil child abuse investigations. The court in Darryl H. v.
Coler" 14 held that a residential entry and physical examination in the
course of such an investigation does not constitute a fourth amend-
ment search, and therefore does not require a warrant or probable
cause.142 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Wyman v.
James 143 and held that, like the welfare home visit, the state child
abuse investigation was conducted for the purpose of insuring the
health and welfare of the children rather than criminally prosecuting
them.'44
The Darryl H. court also applied Wyman's alternative holding that
even if the examination were a search, it did not violate the fourth
amendment because it was reasonable. In support of this analysis, the
court emphasized that one of the reasons the Supreme Court offered in
upholding the Wyman home visits was that they were conducted for
the protection of dependent children. 1
45
On appeal, the two cases were reviewed together. The Seventh Cir-
cuit held that visual inspections of children's bodies in child abuse
investigations do constitute fourth amendment searches. 146 Although
the challenges to the residential entries were not preserved on
140. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). The court in E.Z. stated:
It is simply not possible to define a standard which must be met in every case before an
investigation can proceed without endangering the lives of innocent children. The current
DCFS Procedures, by limiting the home visits and the examination of childrens' bodies to
those necessary to verify the abuse allegations, insure that reasonable cause to investigate
exists.
603 F. Supp. at 1560. A footnote to this language notes that:
The most recent recent Supreme Court decision regarding school searches confirms that
the traditional probable cause standard may be modified where such a standard would frus-
trate the governmental purpose behind the search. In New Jersey v. T.L.O. ... , the Court
found that school officials need only 'reasonable grounds for suspecting' that a search will
turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the
school.
Id. at n.19 (citation omitted).
141. 585 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Il1. 1984).
142. Id. at 388-89; accord Kohler v. State, 713 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (fourth
amendment protections only apply to searches conducted by law enforcement personnel in child
abuse investigation).
143. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
144. Darryl H., 585 F. Supp. at 389-90.
145. Id.
146. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986).
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appeal,147 it is logical to assume that if a visual inspection of a child's
body in a child protection investigation is a fourth amendment search,
the entry into and inspection of a residence is also a search. Both
involve substantial intrusions into family privacy in the identical con-
text of a child protection investigation.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that probable cause and a warrant
are not required for a visual inspection of a child.14 8 The court did not,
however, articulate an evidentiary standard governing visual examina-
tions, except to express reservations about the criteria set forth in the
Illinois handbook.149 A more complete discussion of the court's criti-
cism of the Illinois policy occurs elsewhere in this article.150
An earlier New Jersey case, New Jersey Division of Youth & Family
Services v. Wunnenburg, 5 also held that entry into a private home in
a civil child abuse investigation is a search,152 and requires a particu-
larized evidentiary showing of less than probable cause. 3 Finally, a
recent decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court held, although
147. Ia at 896 n.2.
148. Id. at 901-02.
149. Id. at 904.
150. See infra text accompanying notes 309-22.
151. 167 N.J. Super. 578, 408 A.2d 1345 (App. Div. 1979).
152. See also State v. Boggess, 115 Wis. 2d 443, 340 N.W.2d 516 (1983) (entry by police
officers).
153. The Wunnenburg court upheld a court order authorizing entry by caseworkers into the
Wunnenburg home for the purpose of determining whether their infant child was receiving
proper care. Previously, the Wurmenburgs' parental rights to three other children had been
terminated. Upon learning that another child had been born to the same parents, but not having
further information concerning the care that the infant was receiving, the agency sought entry
into the home for the purpose of investigation.
Relying largely upon Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the Appellate Division
of the New Jersey Superior Court held that administrative searches need not always be based
upon the traditional standard of probable cause. See infra text accompanying notes 192-93. The
court found the investigative home visit to be analogous to a periodic housing code inspection,
because based on the prior finding of maltreatment, periodic visits to the home were needed to
assure that the new child was receiving proper care. Wunnenburg, 408 A.2d at 1347-48.
While the court did not say what evidentiary standard is required to justify entry into a home
in a civil child abuse investigation, it did appear to recognize the need for some particularized
information to justify the search. The applicable New Jersey statute authorized court-ordered
entry into a residence based upon a finding that "the best interests of the child so require." The
court concluded that this was supplied by the previous judicial finding of parental unfitness. It
reasoned:
It is not unreasonable to fear for the health and welfare of an infant of a mother who, 22
months previously, had been declared by a trial judge to be 'incapable of caring for
children,' to such an extent that the health of two of her other children had in fact been
impaired.
Id. at 1349.
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not with respect to a residential search, that a reasonable suspicion
standard can be applied where child abuse is suspected. 54
c. Policy Considerations: Applying the Balancing Test
Two principal factors argue for a relaxed evidentiary standard for
entering private residences in child abuse and neglect investigations.
First, because of the severe and long-term potential consequences of
child maltreatment, there is a particularly strong public interest in a
complete and accurate investigation. Child abuse and neglect tends to
continue if left unchecked. Second, as pointed out by Professor
LaFave, child abuse and neglect can be particularly difficult to detect,
especially where preschool children are involved.1 55
Fourth amendment rules have been developed for criminal prosecu-
tions as a whole, while the evidentiary balancing test is applied to civil
administrative searches according to the particular category of civil
154. State v. Parker, 127 N.H. 525, 503 A.2d 809 (1985). In Parker, a police officer looked
into the cab of a camper and saw a child's head move rapidly up and down. The officer's
suspicions were aroused because he had previously been informed that the driver was traveling
alone. The camper was pulled over and the child described an incident of sexual assault. After
being convicted for attempted aggravated felonious sexual assault, the defendant appealed,
arguing that the initial stop was illegal and therefore the child's statements should have been
suppressed. 503 A.2d at 810-11.
The court upheld the conviction, relying upon United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229
(1985); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981); and Terry v. Ohio, 329 U.S. 1, 22
(1968). These cases permit an investigative stop if it is supported by specific articulable facts that
form a reasonable basis for the officer's suspicion of criminal activity. The New Hampshire
Supreme Court apparently assumed that, except for the detention of suspected illegal aliens, the
reasonable suspicion standard articulated in Terry had not been approved by the United States
Supreme Court as the standard for the detention of a motor vehicle. See W. LAFAVE & J.
ISRAEL, supra note 65, §§ 3.8(f), .9(f) (supporting the assumption made by the New Hampshire
court). But see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (stopping and holding automobile to
check the driver's license and automobile registration held to be an unreasonable seizure where
there was no articulable and reasonable suspicion that driver was unlicensed, automobile was
unregistered, or that the vehicle or an occupant was otherwise subject to seizure for violation of
the law).
In approving the detention of the motor vehicle, the court noted the strong public interest in
the protection of children and the prevention of child abuse and abduction. This interest, the
court held, should be considered at least equivalent to the strong public interest in preventing the
entry of illegal aliens. Parker, 503 A.2d at 812. The court also pointed out that "facts that will
reasonably lead an officer to suspect child abuse or an abduction necessarily include subtler clues
than are required for a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity involving adult victims." Id.
Thus the court suggested not that there be only a relaxed fourth amendment evidentiary
standard related to the prevention of child abuse, but also that special considerations are relevant
to applying the reasonable suspicion standard in child abuse cases. There are, of course, different
fourth amendment considerations in detaining an automobile as opposed to entering a residence;
however, the basic principle that the fourth amendment standard of proof might be relaxed in
child abuse investigations could be applied in either circumstance.
155. W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 10.3, at 242; see also Parker, 503 A.2d at 812.
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search.156 Failure to obtain critical evidence in a criminal investiga-
tion may prevent the punishment of the perpetrator, but failure to
obtain critical evidence in a child abuse investigation may imminently
endanger a known child victim. Arguably, the need to protect the
child is more pressing than the need to uncover evidence solely for the
purpose of criminal prosecution.
The chief argument for a strict evidentiary standard governing resi-
dential entries in child abuse cases is the need to protect family pri-
vacy. In general, entry into a private residence receives the greatest
fourth amendment protection. 5 7 Where the search is conducted for
the purpose of uncovering information concerning maltreatment of the
child, delicate family relationships are especially likely to be disturbed,
with potentially traumatic impact on the child and the parents.1 5 8 The
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the right of families to be
free from unwarranted interference, describing this right as an "essen-
tial right,"15 9 the "basic civil right of man,"1" or "rights far more
precious than property rights."1 61
The overwhelming intrusiveness of a residential search in a child
abuse case makes it inappropriate to permit such an entry based on
any suspicion or report of child maltreatment no matter how vague
and unspecific. If there is no threshold level of suspicion, damaging
forced entries could be made based on unsubstantiated rumors and
unsupportable impressions. For example, without any required mini-
mum level of suspicion, an entry could be made because an unidenti-
fied person called the child protection agency, stated "I hear Mr. X is
mean to his children," and then hung up. To permit entries without
objective evidence of maltreatment would not only allow a serious
intrusion without a concomitant demonstrated need for the entry, but
156. As the Supreme Court noted in Camara v. Municipal Court:
Where considerations of health and safety are involved, the facts that would justify an
inference of 'probable cause' to make an inspection are clearly different from those that
would justify such an inference where a criminal investigation has been undertaken.... It is
obvious that 'probable cause' to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative
or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a
particular dwelling. Such standards ...will vary with the municipal program being
enforced....
387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
157. W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 2.3, at 290.
158. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
25, 64 (1979); A.B.A. INST. JUD. ADMIN., JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT,
STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT 54-55 (1981).
159. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
160. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
161. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
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would make it too easy to perpetrate entries for malicious and arbi-
trary purposes. The real question is whether the undiluted probable
cause standard or the standard of reasonable suspicion should apply.
Although residential searches in child abuse investigations are
highly intrusive upon the privacy of families, the potential conse-
quences of nondetection are grave. Among the possibilities are
death, 162 permanent physical disability,163 and long-term emotional
trauma to the child."64 If a high quantum of evidence 165 is required
for residential investigative entries, there is good reason to believe that
many additional children will suffer serious harm. Where there are
stricter evidentiary standards governing access to evidence, it must be
assumed that there will be more cases in which conclusive evidence of
maltreatment will go undiscovered. Furthermore, where an investiga-
tion cannot be completed, there may be insufficient evidence to bring
successful legal proceedings for the protection of the child.
A recent study demonstrates that child abuse investigators must
successfully determine whether or not a child has been maltreated.
Where investigators reported that they were unsure whether maltreat-
ment had occurred, the likelihood of further reports of maltreatment
was substantially greater than where the investigators concluded that
maltreatment had occurred. 166 The most likely explanation for this
result is that only when the workers were able to substantiate mal-
treatment were they able and willing to take effective action to protect
the child.
162. See, e.g., D. Daro, Deaths Due to Maltreatment Soar: The Results of the Eighth Semi-
Annual Fifty State Survey (1987) (unpublished paper available from the National Center on
Child Abuse Prevention Research, National Committee for Prevention of Child Abuse, 332 S.
Michigan Avenue, Suite 950, Chicago, IL 60604).
163. See, e.g., Hearing on the Reauthorization of The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act of 1974 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Children, Families, Drugs, and Alcoholism, 100th
Cong. (unpublished) (testimony by James Hollahan on behalf of the United Cerebral Palsy
Associations, Inc., and the Consortium for Developmental Disabilities) (reporting statistical
evidence that large numbers of children suffer from cerebral palsy and other developmental
disabilities as a result of abuse).
164. See, e.g., D. FINKELHOR, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 188-99 (1984).
165. See infra notes 170-81 and accompanying text (discussing quantum of cvidence
necessary for probable cause).
166. S. Wells, Decision-Making in Child Protective Services Intake and Investigation: Final
Report 38, 42, 47, 50 (1986); S. Wells, Decision-Making in Child Protective Services Intake and
Investigation: Executive Summary 6 (September 1985) (unpublished papers, on file at ABA




Legal Barriers in Child Abuse Investigations
d. The Practical Difference Between the Probable Cause and
Reasonable Suspicion Standards in Child Abuse
Investigations
A major problem in determining whether the probable cause or rea-
sonable suspicion standard should apply to searches in child abuse
investigations is that it is difficult to assess the practical difference
between the two standards. Perhaps the clearest definition of reason-
able suspicion was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Cortez167 and United States v. Montoya de Her-
nandez.1 61 In those cases the Court defined reasonable suspicion as "a
particularized and objective basis" for suspecting that a search or
investigative stop will yield probative evidence.1 69 Thus, a mere sub-
jective belief will not suffice to establish reasonable suspicion; rather,
there must be an objective basis for the suspicion.
Although probable cause also rests upon an objective basis for the
suspicions giving rise to the search, the Supreme Court has required a
more substantial quantum of proof for probable cause than for reason-
able suspicion. However, the precise degree of probability required for
probable cause is unclear. As the Court stated in Brinegar v. United
States, 170 "[iln dealing with probable cause, . . . as the very name
implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are
the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which rea-
sonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."'171 And as the
Court more recently pointed out in Illinois v. Gates, 172 "[p]robable
cause is a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in
particular factual contexts- not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a
neat set of legal rules." 173 Thus, the probable cause standard does not
appear definitively to incorporate a "more probable than not" quan-
tum of proof:
Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a
preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in
the magistrate's decision. While an effort to fix some general, numeri-
cally precise degree of certainty corresponding to "probable cause" may
167. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
168. 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
169. Cortez 449 U.S. at 417; Montoya de Hernandez 473 U.S. at 541.
170. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
171. Id. at 175.
172. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
173. Id. at 232.
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not be helpful, it is clear that "only the probability, and not a prima
facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause." 174
Professor LaFave suggests that the "more probable than not" test
should not be applied to determine whether there is probable cause
that a particular individual has perpetrated a crime, but should be
applied where it is uncertain whether any crime has occurred, such as
where a person is observed engaging in suspicious activity.1 75 This
distinction, he suggests, is supported by many lower court cases. If, to
establish probable cause in a child abuse investigation, it is necessary
to show that it is more probable than not that maltreatment has
occurred, it is not difficult to visualize the practical difference between
that standard and reasonable suspicion. In abuse and neglect cases, it
is usually not the identity of the perpetrator that is in question, but
rather whether or not maltreatment has in fact occurred. Civil neglect
investigations are primarily focused on family and household members
responsible for the child.176
While it is beyond the scope of this article to compare the prece-
dents dealing with the reasonable suspicion as opposed to the probable
cause standard, it is safe to say that probable cause is more likely to be
established where the credibility of a witness or an informant is
clear, 177 where the information provided is relatively specific and
detailed, 78 where the information supplied is independently corrobo-
rated, 79 and where the information presented is relatively recent. 8 °
Reducing these factors to practical terms is a matter of conjecture and
perhaps assumes an unrealistic level of consistency among judicial
opinions.
In spite of the difficulty in clearly distinguishing between reasonable
suspicion and probable cause, the following rough rule of thumb may
be applied to child abuse and neglect reports. Where the report names
or describes the location of the child and the perpetrator and describes
either specific maltreatment inflicted upon the child or a specific
behavior or condition of the child suggesting maltreatment, it is proba-
bly sufficient to constitute a reasonable suspicion. However, if the
174. Id. at 235 (citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969)).
175. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 65, § 3.3(b) at 190.
176. The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, which sets federal requirements for
child abuse and neglect reporting and investigation, applies only to "the person who is
responsible for the child's welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 5102 (1982).
177. W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 3.32(e), at 544.
178. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 3.3(e), at
544.
179. W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 3.3(f), at 551.
180. Id. § 3.7(a), at 681.
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report is intrinsically implausible or absurd, or if similar reports by the
same reporter have been repeatedly disproved and shown to be based
upon malicious intent, a reasonable suspicion would not be estab-
lished. If this analysis is correct, the Illinois criteria discussed in E.Z
v. Coler come very close to satisfying the reasonable suspicion
standard.181
For probable cause, on the other hand, it is necessary that the
report, together with any additional corroboration, be strong enough
to demonstrate a substantial likelihood that abuse has in fact occurred.
This would seem to require enough detail to exclude alternative and
innocent explanations of what the reporter believes has occurred.
The first example set forth in footnote six of this article illustrates
the difference. That hypothetical involved an anonymous report alleg-
ing abuse and neglect in a particular home, and stated that the
reporter had heard loud screaming, seen piles of trash in the home,
and had observed the children to be filthy and unkempt.
This hypothetical would appear to meet both the description of rea-
sonable suspicion and the criteria approved by the federal district
court in E.Z v. Coler. 182 Those criteria were that "[t]he child must
either have been harmed, or be in danger of harm or of a substantial
risk of harm.... .," and there must be a "specific incident or circum-
stance which suggests the harm was caused by child abuse or
neglect .. ."183 The screaming suggests the possibility of physical
harm, and the piled up trash and filthy state of the children suggest the
possibility of a risk to the children's health. The same factors also
suggest that the feared harm may be the result of maltreatment.
The hypothetical may not constitute probable cause for a search,
however. It is not difficult to think of an innocent explanation for the
report. The screaming may have been part of a child's tantrum. The
piled up trash may be the result of a move, or perhaps the parents are
not good housekeepers, but the trash presents no threat to the chil-
dren's health. Finally, the filthy and unkempt state of the children
may have been the result of their playing in the mud. Although an
experienced investigator may conclude from the report that there is a
significant possibility that abuse or neglect has taken place, the prob-
able cause standard would require further information to rebut these
possible alternative explanations.
181. 603 F. Supp. 1546, 1549-50 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd sub nor. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801
F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986); see supra text accompanying notes 136-37.
182. 603 F. Supp. 1546; see supra text accompanying notes 134-37.
183. EZ, 603 F. Supp. at 1549.
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It may be possible to obtain enough further information to establish
probable cause where the person taking an oral report requests and is
able to obtain sufficient additional detail concerning the incident
observed. But if the report is by letter or if the initial reporter cannot
provide substantial additional information, the probable cause stan-
dard could not be satisfied.
It may be argued that a stricter standard will impel the employees of
child protection agencies to use greater diligence in collecting informa-
tion from persons reporting child abuse and neglect. Since most
reports are oral rather than written, diligence can often make the dif-
ference between facts establishing a reasonable suspicion and those
establishing probable cause. On the other hand, it may be optimistic
to conclude that such persons will be trained to elicit the necessary
facts and that reporters will always be able to provide them.
e. Applying the Reasonable Suspicion Standard When Police
Participate in the Search
Where police conduct a nonemergency, nonconsensual search for
the primary purpose of uncovering a crime, probable cause is required.
It is also likely that probable cause is required whenever a nonconsen-
sual search is conducted solely by police in a nonemergency child
abuse case. Camara v. Municipal Court,'84 Wyman v. James, 185 New
Jersey v. T.L. O., 186 and O'Connor v. Ortega ' 87 all involved entries by
public officials other than police. Although Camara presumably per-
mits police to assist in the execution of a warrant, police would not
conduct the actual housing inspection. Both Wyman and Camara
strongly emphasized the constitutional significance of police
noninvolvement in the search.18 8
Accordingly, even if it is possible for a child protection agency to
enter a residence based upon less than probable cause, the police may
not do so except to the extent necessary to provide immediate protec-
tion of the child and to keep the peace. If special standards and proce-
dures are to exist for entries by child protection agencies, then the
inspection and search should be conducted by agency employees. This
184. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
185. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
186. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
187. 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987).
188. See supra notes 92-112 and accompanying text. In T.LO., however, the Court declined
to say whether searches by school officials at the behest of police would require probable cause.
469 U.S. at 342 n.7. In O'Connor, the Court emphasized the inability of public employers to
master the complexities of probable cause as do the police. 107 S. Ct. at 1501-02.
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should be sufficient to protect the child and may limit the intrusiveness
of the search to some extent. Further, questioning of the family
should be conducted by the agency in such a situation.
This does not mean that joint searches by police and child protec-
tion agency staff should not or cannot be conducted. Where the fam-
ily consents, where there is an emergency, or where there is probable
cause that a crime has been committed and there is evidence of the
crime in the residence, there is no reason why the police and the child
protection agency staff should not cooperate in inspecting the prem-
ises. But if entry is to be permitted based on a reasonable suspicion
that the child may be endangered, police should not directly partici-
pate in the inspection or search.1 89
This approach is also workable in jurisdictions where child protec-
tion agency investigators do not work on a twenty-four-hour basis. If
there is an emergency, police should be able to make an emergency
doctrine entry based on less than probable cause, as discussed ear-
lier.190 If there is no emergency, the entry can be made during work-
ing hours, assuming that the child protection agency is open during a
reasonable portion of the day. In jurisdictions that choose to involve
the police in every nonconsensual investigative search, it follows that
the probable cause rather then the reasonable suspicion standard
would apply.
2. Constitutionally Mandated Procedure To Gain Entry
a. Necessity for a Warrant or Other Prior Approval from an
Impartial Official
Because Supreme Court cases offer little guidance concerning what
administrative search procedures are constitutional, there are impor-
tant unresolved procedural issues regarding child protection searches.
The most fundamental of these is whether a warrant or its equivalent
must be obtained prior to a residential search. If a warrant is not con-
stitutionally required, a state may authorize the police to force entry
into a residence in a nonemergency situation based only upon the
statement of the child protection agency that the search is a necessary
part of its investigation. By contrast, where police investigate a crime,
a warrant is required for a residential search unless there are "exigent
circumstances" such as the need to prevent an imminent escape,
189. As a practical matter, this means that police could be actively involved in a
nonemergency, nonconsensual search only where a criminal search warrant (based on probable
cause) rather than a child protection search warrant (based on reasonable suspicion) was issued.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 59-75.
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destruction or loss of evidence, or to prevent an immediate injury or
loss of property. 9
i. Case Law Regarding Warrants in Searches
by Administrative Agencies
The Court in Camara v. Municipal Court 92 held that there must be
a warrant, approved by an impartial magistrate, for a nonconsensual
housing inspection. A warrant is required even where the inspection is
purely routine and not based upon any particularized complaint con-
cerning the residence being inspected. The purpose of the requirement
is to protect against arbitrary or oppressive searches. 193 Under
Camara, a warrant would seem to be required for a nonconsensual
residential search in a child abuse investigation.
Wyman v. James held that warrants are not required for welfare
home visits.19 4 The holding is inapposite to child abuse investigations,
however, because the Court pointed out that warrants would add to
the intrusiveness of welfare home visits. 195 If warrants were required,
the Court reasoned, they might be executed outside normal working
hours and would have to rest on some adverse information concerning
the child or family receiving the welfare payments. 196 Requiring a
warrant in a child abuse investigation by contrast would not add to the
intrusiveness of the search, which already may take place at any time,
and already rests upon particularized negative information indicating
a need to enter the home. In addition, Wyman only permitted rela-
tively nonintrusive visits to be conducted without warrants, such as
visits that could not be forced upon the recipients and did not involve
police.
In New Jersey v. TL. ., 197 the Court authorized warrantless
searches of minors in a school setting. 98 The decision was based upon
the need for informal and swift discipline in the school context, a con-
sideration not applicable in child abuse investigations. Similarly, in
O'Connor v. Ortega, the Court held that government employers may
conduct warrantless searches of their employees' work spaces because
a warrant requirement would disrupt the routine conduct of business,
191. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
192. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
193. Id. at 539.
194. 400 U.S. 309, 318, 326 (1971).
195. Id. at 323-24.
196. Id.
197. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
198. The Court reserved the question of whether a warrant would be required if the police
were involved in the search. Id. at 340-41 n.7.
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and would be unduly burdensome. 199 Likewise, this rationale does not
apply to child abuse investigations.
In E.Z. v. Coler, a federal district court held that warrants were not
required in civil abuse and neglect investigations because of the special
difficulties in obtaining evidence of child maltreatment. 2" It is diffi-
cult to see, however, what this has to do with the court's decision to
dispense with the warrant requirement. Requiring a warrant is logi-
cally consistent with permitting a search to be based upon a lesser
standard of proof. Indeed, police and child welfare workers may feel
more secure making a forced entry pursuant to a warrant, rather than
on their own responsibility alone.
i Warrants Without Probable Cause
There is a serious difficulty, however, that must be confronted in
making a constitutional argument for both a reasonable suspicion evi-
dentiary standard, and a warrant requirement. As the Supreme Court
recently stated in Griffin v. Wisconsin, "While it is possible to say that
Fourth Amendment reasonableness demands probable cause without a
judicial warrant, the reverse runs up against the constitutional provi-
sion that 'no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.' "201 The
Griffin Court then concluded that whenever a search upon less than
probable cause is permitted the Constitution cannot simultaneously
require a judicial warrant.2 "2
The Court was careful to note a possible exception for administra-
tive warrants, however.2 "3 As discussed earlier, Camara v. Municipal
Court requires warrants for housing inspections, while establishing a
special diluted type of "probable cause," that does not require particu-
199. 107 S. CL 1492, 1500 (1987).
200. 603 F. Supp. 1546 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (visual inspection of child's body by child protection
agency permitted without probable cause or warrant), aff'd sub nom. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801
F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986).
201. 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3169 (1987). The fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, and particularly describing the
Place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
202. 107 S. Ct. at 3169-70.
203. The Constitution prescribes. :. that where the matter is of such a nature as to require a
judicial warrant, it is also of such a nature as to require probable cause. Although we have
arguably come to permit an exception to that prescription for administrative search
warrants, which may but do not necessarily have to be issued by courts, we have never done
so for constitutionally mandated judicial warrants.
Id (footnotes omitted). The Court then explained in a footnote that while "probable cause" is
formally required for administrative searches, that phrase refers to a requirement of reasonable-
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larized evidence of housing code violations.2" A similar approach
could be taken for civil child abuse investigations, specifying that
"probable cause" for this purpose is equivalent to the standard of rea-
sonable suspicion in the context of criminal cases.2 °5 In any case,
assuming that a warrant would provide a meaningful protection
against arbitrary or oppressive state action, it would be anomalous to
dispense with the warrant requirement simply because a search may be
made based upon a reasonable suspicion.
Alternatively, if an administrative warrant, albeit based on less than
the traditional standard of probable cause, is required by the Constitu-
tion, the Constitution does not require that the warrant be issued by a
court. The Court in Griffin v. Wisconsin held that although a "consti-
tutionally mandated judicial warrant" must invariably be based upon
the traditional standard of probable cause, a warrant that may be
issued by a nonjudicial "neutral magistrate" or "neutral officer" in the
context of an administrative search might be based on less.20 6 Accord-
ingly, if we assume that a reasonable suspicion is required for a resi-
dential entry by a child protection agency investigation, there may also
be a constitutional warrant requirement, but the state can opt for an
impartial administrative official rather than a judge to review and issue
the warrant.
iii. Policy Arguments for Requiring Warrants in Child
Protection Investigations
The principal argument in favor of a warrant requirement for resi-
dential entries in child protection investigations is that the warrant
ensures adherence to other legal and constitutional requirements.
Notably, whatever quantum of evidence is required, the warrant
requirement ensures that an impartial person will screen the evidence
to determine whether the standard of evidence has been satisfied in the
individual case.
Furthermore, the process of applying for a warrant, or the knowl-
edge that a warrant must be applied for, may help discipline the child
protection agency to carefully consider and document its decisions to
ness rather than to a strict quantum of evidence to be distinguished from the lesser quantum of
"reasonable suspicion." Id. at 3170 n.4.
In other words, probable cause is required if a judicial warrant is constitutionally required.
But if the constitution does not require a judicial warrant, a judicial (as opposed to an adminis-
trative) warrant might be permitted supported by less than probable cause.
204. 387 U.S. 523 (1967); see supra text accompanying notes 92-104.
205. Cf State v. Parker, 127 N.H. 525, 503 A.2d 809 (1985) (elusiveness of evidence in child
abuse cases justifies a relaxed application of the reasonable suspicion standard).
206. 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3169-70, 3170 n.5 (1987).
540
Vol. 63:493, 1988
Legal Barriers in Child Abuse Investigations
make forced entries and searches. Without a warrant requirement, the
legal rules governing compelled entries may be neither well under-
stood nor followed by the agency.
Perhaps the most compelling practical argument against imposing a
warrant requirement is that unless the exclusionary rule applies in
child protection proceedings, the warrant will not serve as a meaning-
ful screening device for agency searches. That is, judges (or other
impartial officials) may not be motivated to carefully screen warrant
applications if the validity of the warrant will not affect the outcome of
the case. But if an improperly granted warrant may affect the out-
come of a possible criminal case, the warrant application may be seri-
ously reviewed, even if the exclusionary rule does not apply to the civil
child protection proceeding.20 7
Furthermore, a judge or hearing officer may carefully screen war-
rant applications in order to protect the family from unnecessary inva-
sions of privacy and, perhaps, to suggest less intrusive means to gather
needed information. The judge or administrative official may wish to
protect the state from public condemnation and possible liability by
blocking improper entries and searches. It is important to remember
that the mere issuance of a warrant does not necessarily shield a public
agency from liability.
A final argument in favor of providing for a warrant in child protec-
tion investigations is that it can be a practical means of obtaining
police assistance in securing a nonemergency, nonconsensual entry.
Without a warrant or other order binding upon the police, police have
no legal basis to assist in such circumstances. Although some other
mechanism might be created to secure police assistance,20 8 a warrant
does provide protection from arbitrary entries and can be required
without imposing an unacceptable administrative burden.20 9
b. Necessary Procedure for Obtaining a Warrant
Assuming that there must be advance screening by an impartial
officer of any decision to force entry into a residence pursuant to a
child abuse investigation, several other important constitutional ques-
207. See infra text accompanying notes 418--66.
208. For example, if a warrant is not constitutionally required, a statute might require the
police to assist the child protection agency to make a nonconsensual entry into a child's home
whenever police are requested to do so by an official of the child protection agency, based on the
agency's determination that there is a legal basis for entry.
209. For example, if a warrant were not required, a statute could direct police to assist the
child protection agency to enter a home upon its request. At the opposite extreme, the statute
could authorize the police to assist the agency to enter only after the issuance of an order
following a contested hearing.
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tions remain. First, may the warrant or order be issued based upon
the ex parte representations of the child protection agency? Second,
must the warrant or court order contain a particularized description of
the objects of the search and the items to be seized? Third, if so, must
there be a written affidavit to support the warrant as in the case of
searches pursuant to criminal investigations?
i. Issuance of Warrants Based on Ex Parte Representations
A warrant or court order may constitutionally be granted based
upon an ex parte statement in a criminal investigation. This ex parte
procedure is allowed because of the possibility of escape or the con-
cealment or destruction of evidence. Similarly, in child abuse and
neglect situations, it is not unlikely that the child will be concealed
from investigators or that evidence may be destroyed where there is
advance warning of the search. Although advance warning was
required by the Court in Camara v. Municipal Court, there the danger
from not promptly correcting the housing code violation was consid-
ered slight.21 0
ii. Particularized Description of Objects of Search and
Items To Be Seized
The fourth amendment requires that no. warrant shall issue unless
"particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." '211 Particularized descriptions of the objects of a
search are possible in some but not all child abuse and neglect investi-
gations. For example, where a parent claims that a child was injured
by accidentally turning on a hot water tap, a warrant may provide for
examination of the hot water tap. On the other hand, where there is a
report of dangerous and unsanitary household conditions, or of exces-
sive corporal punishment, it may not be possible to specify in advance
the specific items to be examined and seized. The problem is that child
abuse and neglect often involve a complex pattern of behavior occur-
ring over a substantial period of time. The evidence needed is often
more extensive, varied, and difficult to predict, than that needed to
investigate a crime alleged to have taken place at a specific place and
time. Strictly requiring particularized descriptions of the objects of
the search would seriously interfere with child abuse and neglect
investigations.
210. 387 U.S. 523, 532-33, 540 (1967). Furthermore, there is little harm in allowing property
owners to correct housing code violations prior to the issuance of a housing inspection warrant.
211. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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On the other hand, searches in child abuse investigations should be
permitted only to the extent necessary to uncover evidence related to
actual allegations of child maltreatment. A description of the nature
of the suspected maltreatment and the kinds of evidence being sought
may constitute a sufficiently particularized statement for constitu-
tional purposes.
In Andresen v. Maryland2" 2 the warrant authorized a search and
seizure of a long list of documents, and culminated with the phrase
"together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at
this [time] unknown." '213 The Court construed the phrase to apply
only to the crime referred to in other parts of the warrant and held
that the description, while general, was adequate on the facts of the
case.214 Emphasizing the nature of the particular crime involved, the
Court stated that "[t]he complexity of an illegal scheme may not be
used as a shield to avoid detection. ,,2'5 This same reasoning
should apply to child abuse and neglect investigations where agencies
have described the objectives and scope of the search and made their
best efforts under the circumstances to describe the actual objects to be
inspected or seized.
i Affidavit or Oath in Support of Warrant
The information that must be submitted in support of the warrant
in a criminal case must comply with the constitutional command that
"no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation. 2 6 However, the oath or affirmation need not be made
in the presence of the official designated to issue) the warrant. One
example of an apparently valid oral oath is as follows: The affiant
gives the sworn statement to the judge via telephone and, if the war-
rant is approved, the judge instructs that an original warrant will be
prepared and orally authorizes the preparation of a duplicate for use
and execution.21 7
212. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
213. Id. at 479.
214. Id. at 480-81.
215. Id at 480 n.10 (defendant charged with crime of false pretences, involving a complex
scheme of real estate fraud).
216. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
217. United States v. Turner, 558 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1977); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(A).
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G. Proposed Statutory Provisions Governing Child Abuse
Investigative Entries
Only fifteen states have statutes explicitly and specifically authoriz-
ing civil investigative searches in child abuse investigations."' 8 Of
those, all are incomplete or seriously flawed.
1. Entry for All Necessary Purposes
Existing state statutes are particularly limiting concerning entries
and searches of property. All authorize issuance of an order permit-
ting entry into a child's residence, but not always for the full range of
circumstances in which a search may be needed in the investigation.
For example, some permit entry only for the purpose of locating or
interviewing the child, 19 while others permit entry for broader investi-
220gative purposes. Some statutes address entry into the child's resi-
dence, but do not provide for entry into other locations where
evidence concerning child abuse or neglect may be found.2 2 1 Statutes
should authorize entry whenever and wherever necessary to obtain
evidence regarding child maltreatment.
218. ALA. CODE § 26-14-7(c) (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-813(c) (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 1822.52 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-104(1) (1986); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-33-5-1(a)(6) (Bums 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.335(4) (Baldwin 1985); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:403(G)(5) (West Supp. 1988); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-831 (1985); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:6-8. (West 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27.2 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 29-29.1-02
(1974); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-650(c) (Law. Co-op. 1985); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 18.021 (Vernon Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-50 (1987); Wyo. STAT. § 14-6-218
(1986).
219. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-104(1) (1986) ("A search warrant may be issued by the
juvenile court to search any place for the recovery of any child within the jurisdiction of the
court .... ); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199-335(4) (Baldwin 1985) ("A search warrant shall be
issued upon a showing of probable cause that a child is being abused or neglected. If, pursuant to
a search under a warrant a child is discovered and appears to be in imminent danger, the child
may be removed .. "); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 18.021(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988) ("A
search warrant may be issued to search for and photograph a child .. "); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-3a-50 (1987) ("If it appears... that there is probable cause to believe that a child is being
... ill treated ... the court may issue a warrant authorizing a peace officer to search for the
child.").
220. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-5-1(a)(6) (Bums 1985) ("A court may issue warrants only
upon probable cause ... to search any place for... [e]vidence necessary to enforce statutes
enacted to prevent cruelty to or neglect of children."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-650(C) (Law. Co-
op. 1985) ("[T]he agency investigator may petition the Family Court... for a warrant to inspect
the premises and condition of the child subject of the report.").
221. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-650(C) (Law. Co-op. 1985) ("[I]f the facts so warrant the
agency investigator may petition the Family Court... for a warrant to inspect the premises and
condition of the child subject of the report.").
Legal Barriers in Child Abuse Investigations
2. Residences Where More Than One Child Is Subject to Common
Danger
Child protection agencies sometimes receive reports alleging abuse
or neglect of a child who lives in a household with other children. It is
important that the agency be authorized to investigate potential dan-
ger to siblings or other children living in the same residence and to
other children subject to the same alleged danger or harm. If the
investigation is permitted to extend to other children in the same envi-
ronment or who are subject to similar dangers, the scope of the search
may be broadened, and a search for evidence may be possible if the
child is no longer present in the particular location.
This does not mean, of course, that every search should automati-
cally be broadened to encompass the potential maltreatment of all sib-
lings or other children in a household. For example, where a sixteen-
year-old girl is alleged to have been molested, there may or may not be
indications of a similar danger or harm to her four-year-old brother.
If not, there should beno basis for a search to uncover evidence of
abuse of the brother. The determination whether there is a risk to
siblings or other children in the household should take into account
such factors as the type of maltreatment of the child, the past history
of maltreatment of other children in the household, whether maltreat-
ment was connected to parental misuse of alcohol or drugs, and, espe-
cially in the case of alleged sexual abuse, the gender and age of the
children. The decision whether other children in the household are
subject to the same danger or harm must be made on a case-by-case
basis.
The second example set forth in footnote six of this article presented
a special situation where children in a common environment are sub-
ject to similar danger or harm. In the example, a religious commune
was accused of following a systematic pattern of child abuse. If the
statute authorizing child abuse investigations authorizes entries to
determine whether other children are subject to the same danger or
harm alleged in a child abuse report, then a search of the religious
commune may be possible, assuming, of course, that there is enough
evidence to justify the search.
Again, it does not follow that because one child residing in a reli-
gious commune has been maltreated an investigative search of the
entire commune is necessarily justified. For example, to demonstrate
that other children in the commune are subject to the same danger or
harm from excessive punishment, it might be shown that disciplinary
authority over children in the commune has been turned over to cer-
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tain commune leaders pursuant to commune beliefs, and that they
have a pattern and practice of abusive disciplinary practices. Statutes
need not set special guidelines governing searches of communal or
institutional settings, but agency regulations and manuals should
address the issue. It is enough that the statute authorize investigative
entries related to the same danger or harm. As with siblings in the
same household, the decision whether other children in the institu-
tional or communal setting are subject'to the same danger or harm
must be made on a case-by-case basis.
3. Standard of Proof To Gain Entry
State statutes must specify what standard of proof will be required
to permit child protection agency workers to gain entry. As discussed
previously, probable cause is clearly a valid constitutional basis to gain
entry, and entry may also be permissible based on a reasonable suspi-
222 scion. Several states, however, articulate no standard of proof or
only a nebulous standard such as "good cause." The recommended
statutory approach is to require a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing
to justify entries and searches conducted by the child protection
agency, but to include a severability clause to reduce the risk of having
the entire statute declared unconstitutional. 223 The standard of rea-
sonable suspicion probably will be upheld by the courts, but since the
issue remains unresolved, it is prudent to avoid the risk of wholesale
invalidation of the statute.
The standard of reasonable suspicion governing entry might be
stated as whether the investigator possesses a "reasonable suspicion,
based on specific and articulable facts, that the child has been [mal-
treated as defined by state law] and that there is evidence of [maltreat-
ment] in the premises to be inspected or searched. ' 224 An appropriate
severability clause might state that if the standard of reasonable suspi-
cion is ruled unconstitutional, the constitutionally mandated standard
222. See supra text accompanying notes 92-198.
223. A severability clause is a clause in an act declaring that if one part of the act is
unconstitutional or invalid, the validity of other parts shall not be affected. Judicial attitudes
toward such clauses vary. The clause is sometimes held merely to state the principle that statutes
may be separable. On the other hand, severability clauses are sometimes treated as binding to the
extent that the valid remainder of an act can serve as operative law. 2 N. SINGER, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRucTION § 44.08 (4th ed. 1986).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 167-81. Alternatively, the standard of reasonable
suspicion might be stated as whether the investigator has a "reasonable belief that the child may
have been [maltreated as defined by state law] and that there may be evidence of [maltreatment]
in the premises to be inspected or searched." See supra text accompanying notes 211-15.
546
Vol. 63:493, 1988
Legal Barriers in Child Abuse Investigations
of proof will be applied and the remainder of the statute will remain in
effect.
4. Warrant Requirement
Even if the courts decide that a warrant is not constitutionally
required as a precondition of forced, nonemergency residential entries
in child protection investigations, a warrant requirement should be
statutorily imposed as a matter of sound policy. Nothing need be
added here to the earlier discussion concerning the pros and cons of
the warrant requirement,225 except to point out that a warrant or its
equivalent may also be politically necessary. Members of the public
and their legislators may be understandably unwilling to empower a
child protection agency to forcibly enter homes based on a suspicion of
child abuse without a screening process by a judge or other independ-
ent hearing officer.
Legislators should seriously consider whether warrants should be
issued by judicial or nonjudicial officers. If, based upon a frank assess-
ment of the workload and expertise of the courts responsible for juve-
nile matters in the particular state, the legislature concludes that child
protection warrant applications are unlikely to be carefully reviewed,
the legislature should specify that a designated independent hearing
officer or other similar administrative official will review and approve
warrant applications.226 States lacking specialized judges or juvenile
officers handling juvenile matters should provide for an administrative
warrant procedure.
5. Ex Parte Approval of Warrants
In many circumstances, investigative entries need to be made with-
out advance notice. This is necessary in order to avoid the conceal-
ment or destruction of evidence prior to the search. For this reason,
criminal search warrants are issued on an ex parte basis without
advance warning to the party to be searched. Most of the statutes
authorizing searches in civil child abuse investigations provide for the
issuance of a warrant, which may presumably be done on an ex parte
basis. However, some states with statutes authorizing court ordered
investigative entries do not use the term "warrant," and do not specify
the procedure for obtaining the court order. In New Jersey Division of
Youth & Family Services v. Wunnenburg, such a statute was upheld as
225. See supra text accompanying notes 207-09.
226. See supra text accompanying note 206.
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constitutionally equivalent to a warrant procedure.227 Under the
terms of the statute the child protection agency had to apply for the
court order in advance of the entry, and the court held a contested
hearing prior to issuance of the order.228 Such statutes should be
amended to explicitly allow for ex parte orders authorizing entry.
6. Application for Warrant
Two important procedural issues concerning application for a war-
rant are not generally dealt with by the state statutes authorizing in
child abuse investigations. First, the laws do not satisfactorily outline
the content of the affidavit or statement to be made to the judge in
support of the court order or warrant authorizing entry. State law
should provide that the sworn statement may be made by telephone
and later confirmed in writing, that it must outline the objectives and
scope of the search, and that it must specify the items or category of
items to be searched for or examined.
Second, the law should provide that the judicial or administrative
officer qualified to authorize the search be available on a twenty-four-
hour basis. If the search is authorized, this individual should issue an
order stating the object of the search and either the items to be seized
or the area to be inspected.229
A chart capsulizing statutory law in the fifty states concerning
investigative entries appears in the Appendix.
III. GAINING ACCESS TO THE CHILD
A. Introduction
In most child abuse investigations, interviewing, observing, or
examining the child is essential to determining whether or not the
child has been maltreated. Where the child is old enough to commu-
nicate, where the alleged maltreatment may be evidenced by physical
signs or symptoms, or where the child's behavior may shed light on
the allegations, the child protection agency will need to gain access to
the child to complete the investigation.
Gaining access to the child raises different legal and practical issues
than gaining access to the child's residence. Entry into the family resi-
dence may not even be necessary, since the child might be interviewed
or examined at school or in a day care center. Whatever the physical
227. 167 N.J. Super. 578, 408 A.2d 1345, 1347 (App. Div. 1979).
228. Id.
229. See supra notes 211-15 and accompanying text.
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circumstances, however, interviewing or examining the child may
intrude on family privacy and, where conducted against the parents'
will, may interfere with parental control. In addition, the examination
or questioning may prove highly stressful to the child, especially
where repeated, prolonged, or especially invasive.
Because access to a child may be denied by parents or caretakers,
agencies need clear legal authority to interview and examine the child.
Where there is no clear proof that the child is in immediate danger,
legal remedies available should allow child protection workers to
examine the child without unnecessarily depriving the parents of cus-
tody or control.
This section of the article considers the various legal bases for child
protection agencies to secure access to the child for the purposes of
interviews and examinations. The section begins by addressing the
legal means most frequently relied upon by child protection investiga-
tors, and discusses their practical and constitutional limitations.
Investigators typically gain access to children for interviews or exami-
nation by obtaining consent or through the use of temporary custody
statutes.
The limitations of consent and temporary custody statutes for gain-
ing access to children for interviews and examinations are discussed,
and the constitutional requirements for an appropriate statute permit-
ting access under broader circumstances are explored. Special empha-
sis is placed on due process rights to family privacy and integrity, and
on fourth amendment protections against intrusive searches and
examinations.
As with residential entries and searches, family and personal pri-
vacy interests affected by interviews and examinations must be bal-
anced against the need to protect endangered children. Child
protection workers should not have unlimited discretion to interview
and examine children. However, when there is an objective basis to
suspect abuse and access to the child is necessary to confirm or rebut
the suspicion, practical means to complete the investigation effectively
are needed.
B. Consent To Interview or Examine Child
Children are usually interviewed and examined by child protection
workers with the consent of parents or caretakers. Accordingly, what
constitutes legally valid consent to interview or examine a child is an
important practical question. Key issues regarding the validity of con-
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sent are whether it is voluntary, and whether the person giving the
consent has the authority to do so.
230
1. Voluntariness of Consent
Where the child's parents give consent for the interview or examina-
tion, the only question presented is whether the consent was volun-
tary. Voluntariness of consent to interview or examine a child should
be evaluated by applying the same "totality of circumstances" test
employed in evaluating whether consent to enter a home is volun-
tary.23 ' Although the test is conceptually the same, there may be spe-
cial factual questions raised by its application to interviewing or
examining a child. For example, assume that a social worker wants to
visually examine the bodies of two small children to determine
whether bruises are present. If the mother protests, but helps to dis-
robe the children, has she consented to the examination? A federal
district court held that a mother had given consent under such cir-
cumstances, 232 but the Seventh Circuit drew an opposite conclusion on
appeal.233 The Seventh Circuit concluded that the mother may have
involuntarily participated in disrobing the children as a way to allevi-
ate their apprehension. 3
2. Authority To Consent
The issue of who has authority to consent to an interview or exami-
nation of a child is factually different from the issue of who can con-
sent to the search of a residence. Who can consent to a residential
search depends on who is deemed to have "common authority" over
230. See supra notes 16-36 and accompanying text. Issues relating to the scope of consent
may also sometimes be present. For example, permission might be granted to interview only
about a specific topic or to conduct only a limited physical inspection or examination. As with
consent to searches, the scope of consent presumably limits the scope of the interview or
examination, unless there is another independent legal basis to proceed. For a discussion of the
scope of consent in the context of entries and searches, see supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
231. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
232. Darryl H. v. Coler, 585 F. Supp. 383, 388-89 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd in part and vacated
in part, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986).
233. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 906-07 (7th Cir. 1986). The Seventh Circuit also
indicated that where, in a companion case, social workers stated that they would obtain a court
order depriving parents of custody of their children if they did not permit the social worker to
enter the home and examine the children, the court had "serious doubts" that consent was
voluntary. Id. at 897 n.5. For the district court opinion in this companion case, see E.Z. v.
Coler, 603 F. Supp. 1546, 1557 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd sub nor. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893
(7th Cir. 1986).
234. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d at 907 (overturning district court determination on
summary judgment that inspection was conducted with consent).
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the area in question.235 A person with control or joint access over a
residence, however, does not necessarily have joint control over a child
who lives there. Nevertheless, as a general concept, "common author-
ity" logically applies to whether a person has authority to consent to a
child protection agency interview or examination of a child.
a. Consent to Physical Examination by Individual Caretaker
Where an infant is left in the care of a neighbor, it is probably
understood that the neighbor can change the infant's diaper in the
presence of a visitor. The neighbor necessarily has temporary access
to and control over the child's body, and this simple act of baby care
does not involve any privacy element that would prevent it from being
carried out in the presence of a third party. The neighbor in this situa-
tion may be said to have "common authority" with the parents over
the baby's body. A resident of a house may consent to an entry by a
police officer because he has such "common authority" as to permit
him to admit a stranger. By analogy, a babysitter who can allow a
stranger to observe the baby's body may arguably allow a child protec-
tion worker to do so. If the same babysitter is caring for a twelve-year-
old of the opposite sex, however, he has no access to the child's body
incident to his caretaking function, and thus cannot consent to a phys-
ical examination of the child by a child protection worker.
b. Consent to Interview by Day Care Center
The common authority principle may also be applied to whether a
day care center owner can permit a child to talk to a child protection
worker. Day care providers are allowed to let children talk to anyone
present at the day care facility, and so arguably should be empowered
to consent to interviews by child protection workers so long as the
children are not removed from the place where the parents have left
them. On the other hand, it might be argued that permitting a child to
be questioned concerning possible maltreatment is well outside the
scope of the normal conversation that is anticipated by a parent who
places a child in a day care center. Realistically, however, a parent
placing a preschool child in a day care center should expect that the
child may talk about anything. Therefore, just as authority to admit
strangers* to a residence gives authority to admit police, authority to
allow a child to talk to strangers 'should grant authority to allow the
child to be interviewed by child protection workers.
235. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text. In this context, "common authority"
means joint access or control over the area of property in question.
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c. Consent to Interview or Examination by Child's School
i. Interviews
A school's authority to consent to interviews of children depends
both upon parental delegation, and upon state law conferring author-
ity on the school to supervise, educate, protect, and discipline children
while at school. Public education is compulsory,236 and school per-
sonnel are free to speak to children with or without parental permis-
sion concerning matters relevant to their education. Those
empowered to talk to children about these matters presumably include
visiting educational and psychological specialists in addition to the
school's own staff. Because abuse or neglect has a bearing on a child's
school performance and adjustment, schools may already have the
power to permit child protection workers to interview children on this
subject. However, it is prudent to address it legislatively. 37
ii. Physical Examinations
A public school's power to conduct physical examinations of chil-
dren and therefore to consent to examinations by others, depends
largely on state laws and regulations concerning public education. For
example, state law may permit public health or school nurses to
examine or treat children in certain circumstances. If so, examina-
tions by child protection workers are arguably allowable, under the
analysis set out above. In some states, the child protection agency
may have authority to conduct an examination of the child without
the consent of the school.238
3. Child's Authority To Consent
a. Interviews
Child abuse reporting acts authorize any person to report child mal-
treatment, including child victims. These statutes therefore empower
a child to report and discuss any alleged maltreatment with the
agency. 39 But where the report originates with someone else, it may
236. See generally Oberman, Education Rights, in LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 12.02
(1984).
237. See infra text accompanying note 346.
238. Relevant constitutional and statutory issues are discussed in detail elsewhere in this
article. See infra notes 290-339, 345-47 and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-808 (1977) (any person may make a report if such
person has reasonable cause to suspect that a child has been abused or neglected); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 11166(d) (West Supp. 1988) (any person who has knowledge of or observes someone
whom he or she knows or reasonably suspects has been a victim of child abuse may report the
known or suspected instance); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.624 (West Supp. 1986) (any
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be uncertain whether the child has sufficient control over his person to
independently authorize an interview. If parents are not present, and
the child has passed the age where he or she is forbidden to talk to
strangers, the answer should be yes, either if the principle of "common
authority" is applied in this context, or if the law recognizes children
as having the right to speak for themselves.
b. Physical Examinations
Children do not usually have authority to consent to a physical
examination. As a matter of both law and practice, parents generally
retain control over the routine examination and treatment of their
young children by medical professionals.2" A "mature adolescent,"
however, may be able to consent to such an examination without
parental approval. The consent of an older adolescent may even be
required in order to allow a physical examination without a court
order. Supreme Court decisions approving the right of a minor to
consent to an abortion and to purchase contraceptives establish a pri-
vacy right that arguably creates a right in a "mature adolescent" to
exercise control concerning such a bodily examination."' a
On the other hand, the Supreme Court held in Parham v. JR. that
parents may commit their minor children to a public mental hospital
without their consent and without a civil commitment hearing to
review the decision. 42 If a parent can commit a child to a mental
institution without judicial review, it would seem that the parent
would have the right to prevent or override a child's consent to a phys-
ical examination. If the privacy interest articulated in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth 4 is strictly limited to issues surrounding pro-
creation, the parent arguably has such a right. Alternatively, however,
the conflict might be reconciled to permit either the mature adolescent
or the parent to authorize the exam over the objection of the other.
person, including a child, who has reasonable cause to suspect child abuse or neglect may report
the matter), reprinted in STATE STATUTES, supra note 85, at 403.
240. See generally Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical Care Decision-Making Authority: A
Suggested Interest Analysis, 62 VA. L. REv. 285, 286-92 (1976).
241. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); see also Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 671 (1977), discussed in Dodson, Legal Rights of Adolescents:
Restrictions on Liberty, Emancipation, and Status Offenses, in LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
§§ 4.16-.17 (1984).
242. 442 U.S. 584 (1979). The Court held that inquiry should be made by a neutral fact
finder to determine whether statutory admissions criteria are met and that the continued need for
commitment must be reviewed periodically, but that the decision maker need not be law-trained.
Id. at 607-11.
243. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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The federal Constitution arguably allows the state to determine
whether or not the adolescent or parent may consent to a physical
examination pursuant to an allegation of child abuse. The Parham
case only upheld, and did not mandate, the state civil commitment
scheme. Given that state244law governs the age of majority, which
controls the exercise of many important constitutional rights, states
probably are free to define when children are permitted to consent to
medical examination in this and other contexts without parental
consent.245
C. Gaining Access to the Child Through Temporary Custody
In addition to obtaining consent, child protection agencies may con-
duct interviews and arrange for physical examinations in the course of
taking emergency custody of a child. State laws authorize law
enforcement officials or child protection agency employees to take
children into custody under specified circumstances prior to filing a
child abuse or neglect petition.246
The criteria for taking a child into temporary custody vary among
the states. In states where the criteria for gaining an ex parte order or
taking the child into custody without a court order are relatively lax,
this approach is frequently used to gain access to the child in the face
of parental opposition. For example, an Oklahoma statute provides
that "if it appears that the child is in such condition or surroundings
that his welfare requires that his custody be immediately assumed by
the court, the judge may immediately issue a ... warrant authorizing
the taking of said child into custody. '247 Under this statute, the court
is arguably authorized to take the child into custody for the purpose of
investigative interviewing or observation.
There are several problems, however, with gaining access to a child
through temporary custody statutes. First, such statutes may not
authorize medical examinations. Second, in some jurisdictions the
state agency taking the child into custody must place the child in fos-
244. See, e.g., Nelson v. Browning, 391 S.W.2d 873, 880 (Mo. 1965) ("The status of minority
or majority of all persons within a state is exclusively a matter for that state to determine itself.").
245. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8-4 (1984) (providing that minors 14 years of age or older are
emancipated for purposes of consenting to medical, dental, health, or mental health services);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3(h) (Supp. 1987) (providing that unemancipated minors of
"sufficient intelligence to understand and appreciate the consequences" may consent to medical
or surgical treatment); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.640 (1987) (providing that minors 15 years of age
or older may consent to hospital care or medical treatment). See generally Bennett, supra note
240, at 293.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
247. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1104(d) (West 1987).
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ter care even if prompt return of the child seems safe.2 48 Third, where
the statute gives blanket authority to take the child into custody, the
agency may routinely hold the child for an unnecessarily prolonged
period.249
In addition, many state statutes apply relatively strict criteria for
custody orders, making it difficult to gain access to the child for inves-
tigative purposes. For example, a Texas statute allows an ex parte
temporary custody order only when there is an affidavit or sworn peti-
tion that "(1) there is an immediate danger to the physical health or
safety of the child; and (2) there is no time, consistent with the physi-
cal health or safety of the child, for an adversary hearing."25 0
D. Constitutional Limits on Gaining Access to Child
When child protection investigators do not receive consent to inter-
view or examine a child, the state's emergency child custody statutes
may not provide any workable means to pursue an investigation. A
few states have enacted special legislation authorizing access to the
child for investigative purposes,251 but this legislation is not well
thought out. New legislation is needed, but any statutory reform must
account for possible constitutional limitations on interviews and
examinations.
1. Constitutional Issues in Interviewing Children
Statutes permitting child protection agencies to interview and
examine children in child abuse investigations must satisfy both the
substantive and procedural due process requirements of the fourteenth
amendment. Such statutes must also address the issues of whether
gaining access to the child for an interview or examination constitutes
a "seizure" under the fourth amendment and, if so, what level of sus-
picion is required and whether a warrant is necessary.
a. Due Process: The Right to Family Integrity
A due process analysis of the powers of child protection agencies to
interview children in child abuse investigations should begin with rec-
248. See, eg., WASH. REv. CODE § 26.44.050 (1987) (law enforcement officer may take child
into custody where probable cause to believe that child is abused or neglected and would be
injured or could not be taken into custody if it were necessary to first obtain a court order); id
§ 13.34.060(1) (child taken into custody shall immediately be placed into shelter care).
249. For suggested changes to these statutes, see infra notes 347-48 and accompanying text.
250. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 17.02(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
251. See infra note 341 and accompanying text.
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ognition of the fundamental rights to exercise parental autonomy,252
and to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into family
privacy. 25 As the court stated in Stanley v. Illinois, "It is cardinal
with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in
the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. ' 254 The integ-
rity of the family unit has found protection in the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment. This right to family
integrity is recognized as a form of liberty guaranteed by the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment. 5
The right to family integrity is not absolute. States can adopt neces-
sary policies to protect the health, safety, and welfare of children.256
Where a parent has maltreated a child, the state may intervene to pro-
tect the child, including, when necessary, separating the child from the
parents257 or even permanently terminating the parent-child relation-
ship. 8 When the state seeks to intervene to protect the child, how-
ever, parents clearly are entitled to procedural due process. 259 The
scope of procedural protections provided must be commensurate with
the degree of infringement of parental rights that is sought by the
state.26o
252. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (parental right to decide the religious
training of children outweighs the state's interest in public high school education); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parents entitled to arrange for the education of their
children in private schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (parents may arrange to
have their children taught a foreign language).
253. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (statutes regulating obscenity may not reach into
the privacy of one's own home); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of family
privacy includes use of contraceptives).
254. 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citations omitted).
255. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Lassiter v. Department of Social
Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431
U.S. 816 (1977); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
256. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
257. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1977) (removal of children requires showing
of parental unfitness); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring) (removal of children requires showing of parental
unfitness); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972) ("We do not question... that neglectful
parents may be separated from their children.").
258. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs.,
452 U.S. 18 (1981).
259. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977)
(procedural due process afforded to foster parents held less than those afforded to biological
families prior to removal of children).
260. Doe v. Staples, 706 F.2d 985, 989-90 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1033 (1984).
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The specific procedural protections required where the state seeks to
compel access to a child during a child protection investigation are
determined by applying the balancing test articulated in Matthews v.
Eldridge.261 The test employs three factors: First, the private interest
affected by the state action in question; second, the risk of erroneous
deprivation of the private interests resulting from the state procedure;
and third, the countervailing financial and administrative state inter-
ests supporting use of the procedure in question. 62 This approach has
been applied by the United States Supreme Court in evaluating proce-
dural protections in termination of parental rights proceedings.263
Applying the Matthews v. Eldridge factors is much like applying the
fourth amendment balancing test set forth in Camara v. Municipal
Court.2  While the Camara approach balances the need for a search
against its intrusiveness, the Matthews v. Eldridge approach weighs the
interests of the state against the "private interest" with which the state
interferes. Both approaches balance the public need against the degree
of interference with private rights. Both tests also take into account
the practical effect of whatever procedural protections are at issue.
Interviewing a child without parental permission during a child
abuse investigation can represent a significant interference with paren-
tal rights. Parental autonomy in child rearing is diminished by the
temporary dilution of parental authority over the child. More signifi-
cantly, the interview delves into child rearing practices and may imply
parental failures, and expose intimate details of family life.26 The
questions are sensitive and private, and can be highly upsetting to both
parent and child. 66 This effect is exacerbated when questioning is
prolonged or when multiple interviews are conducted.
On the other hand, children typically talk to many people on a wide
range of subjects, including personal details of their daily lives. These
conversations go on in schools, doctors' offices, and day care centers.
So long as questioning by child protection workers is moderate in tone
261. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
262. Id. at 335.
263. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs.,
452 U.S. 18, 27-34 (1981).
264. 387 U.S. 523 (1967); see supra notes 92-104 and accompanying text; see also Darryl H. v.
Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 901 (7th Cir. 1986) (fourth and fourteenth amendment rights in child abuse
investigations "closely related").
265. Cf Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (school program designed
to detect and combat drug abuse which would have used questionnaires inquiring into family
relationships and child rearing practices violated students' and parents' rights to privacy).
266. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNiT, supra note 158, at 25.
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and duration, it is not nearly as intrusive as taking a child into custody
or forcing entry into a family home.
The state's interest in conducting interviews of children in child
abuse investigations is compelling. Interviewing children is an essen-
tial aspect of child abuse investigations and is vital to protecting a
child's life and health.267 Without the interview, there may be insuffi-
cient evidence of maltreatment to justify protective action, and the
child may be placed at risk of further injury or death. Interviews are
often highly probative and are less intrusive than almost any other
possible means of conducting an investigation. The two most common
alternatives, interviewing friends and neighbors of the family or forci-
bly entering the home are likely to be more stigmatizing, more upset-
ting, or both.268
b. Procedures Protecting Family Privacy Rights
Family privacy rights likely to be disrupted by interviewing children
without parental consent should be safeguarded through appropriate
procedures. These procedures should establish some defined quantum
of suspicion that neglect has occurred before intrusive investigation
methods can be employed, and must address the issue of whether a
warrant ought to be required.
The evidentiary standard required to support investigatory meas-
ures should not be too demanding. Law enforcement officers and
other public officials who conduct investigations may question poten-
tial witnesses whenever a valid investigation is being conducted.269
Thus, a child protection agency is free to question neighbors and other
members of the public without any prior evidence so long as it does
not misstate or improperly divulge facts concerning the family.
Because the child protection agency is free to question other witnesses,
the practical result of erecting a stringent barrier to interviewing chil-
dren might be to compel the agency to question friends and neighbors
instead. This could be stigmatizing as well as counterproductive. A
probable cause standard27 ° is therefore inadvisable.
267. See, e.g., Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 902 (7th Cir. 1986).
268. See E.Z. v. Coler, 603 F. Supp. 1546, 1561 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd sub nom. Darryl H. v.
Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 903 (7th Cir. 1986). These cases recognize the stigma that can be caused by
interviewing neighbors and teachers. A fortiori, procedural obstacles should not be created
compelling agencies to interview friends and neighbors in preference to interviewing the child.
269. See generally W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 65, ch. 6. Prohibitions of police
questioning without an arrest involve only the use of improper means to extract confessions.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 170-80.
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Requiring a reasonable suspicion2 7 1 of maltreatment as a precondi-
tion for an interview, however, should not present a difficult barrier.
An agency should not launch a full-scale investigation of a specific
family in any case without at least a reasonable suspicion. Therefore,
it is logical to permit child protection agencies to interview children
without parental permission where there is a reasonable suspicion of
maltreatment. Requiring a warrant, however, would impose an added
administrative burden on the agency. The invasion of parental rights
is limited, and the interview is critically important. It is unlikely that,
and it would be undesirable for, a warrant or prior court approval to
be a constitutional prerequisite for an interview.
c. Manner of Questioning
Conditions for interviewing children should be more strict than for
interviewing adults: Children are vulnerable, and family relationships
delicate. Oppressive, hostile, or outrageous questioning may unconsti-
tutionally infringe the child's or the family's rights.
This does not mean that courts ordinarily should be involved in
articulating detailed ground rules for interviewing children. Such
guidelines are best established by agency policy makers and adminis-
trators.272 Although judges are obligated to review guidelines chal-
lenged as unconstitutional, they should be especially careful not to
hinder the constructive efforts of states to comprehensively address the
issue. Where reasonable guidelines exist and where investigators are
trained to implement them, courts should redress only glaring misbe-
havior of police or agency personnel. If agencies have failed to estab-
lish guidelines, however, and glaring violations repeatedly occur,
courts may be forced to impose guidelines for interviews.
d. Forcible Separation of Parent and Child for Questioning or
Forcible Interview When Parent Is Present
This article has argued that the Constitution does not prohibit child
protection agency workers from interviewing children without consent
and without a warrant where there is a reasonable suspicion that the
children have been maltreated. It does not necessarily follow, how-
ever, that the child can be interviewed on the same basis where the
parent is present at the interview and objects. Forcibly separating par-
271. See supra text accompanying notes 167-68.
272. The Seventh Circuit commented in Darryl H. v. Coler: "Nor do we suggest, of course,
that it is the duty or the prerogative of this court or the district court to direct the specific
contents of the [agency handbook on investigations]." 801 F.2d 893, 904 (7th Cir. 1986).
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ent and child for an interview, or conducting an interview over the
objection of a parent who is present, is potentially far more disruptive
than a simple interview of a child when a parent is absent. Such an
interview interferes with parental rights in a way that is similar to the
interference that occurs where the agency takes temporary protective
custody of a child during child abuse proceedings. In both cases, cus-
tody and control of the child are temporarily lost. Accordingly, cases
involving due process challenges to temporary custody procedures are
relevant to agency procedures for such interviews. Courts have held
that where a child is taken into temporary protective custody, there
must be a preremoval hearing unless an emergency presenting an
immediate danger to the child exists.273 Courts have also held that the
child may not be taken into custody without probable cause," 4 and
that where a child is taken into custody under emergency conditions,
an adversary hearing must be provided within a short period of
time.275
When a child is merely interviewed or observed without a prolonged
separation from the parent, however, there is far less interference with
family autonomy than when a child is placed in temporary protective
custody. While temporary protective custody may continue for days,
an interview is typically limited to an hour or two and does not require
placing the child overnight in a separate residence. Just as it is possi-
ble to remove a child from home based on a lesser standard of proof
than is required to permanently terminate parental rights,276 even
273. See Doe v. Staples, 706 F.2d 985 (6th Cir. 1983) (notice before removal of a child
required unless exigent circumstances shown; statute authorizing summary seizure of a child
when necessary for his welfare or in the interests of public safety not unconstitutionally vague),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1033 (1984); Siereveld v. Conn, 557 F. Supp. 1178, 1182 (E.D. Ky. 1983)
(removal of children without prior written notice and opportunity for a hearing not permitted
absent an emergency); Sims v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1192 (S.D. Tex.
1977) (removal of child prior to adversary proceeding permitted only if immediate threat to
safety of child), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Roe v.
Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 777, 780 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (statute authorizing summary seizure of a
child "if it appears that . . . the child is in such condition that his welfare requires" is
unconstitutionally vague); In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 455 A.2d 1313 (Conn. 1983) (ex parte
removal order not permitted unless serious physical illness, serious physical injury, or immediate
physical danger to the child and immediate removal necessary to ensure child safety).
274. In re Juvenile Appeal, 455 A.2d at 1323.
275. Sims v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1193 (S.D. Tex. 1977)
(adversary hearing required within 10 days after removal), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 778 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (six-
week delay between date of removal and hearing not permitted); Newton v. Burgin, 363 F. Supp.
782 (W.D. N.C. 1973) (five-day delay between removal and hearing permitted), aff'd, 414 U.S.
1139 (1974).
276. Compare Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (clear and convincing evidence
required to terminate parental rights) with In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 455 A.2d 1313 (Conn.
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more relaxed procedural protections should be permitted where the
child is questioned only briefly. Of course, where an interview indi-
cates that the child has been maltreated, it may be extended and lead
to the removal of the child. In this situation, the interview results
provide the degree of suspicion or proof needed to justify greater inter-
ference with the family unit.
Where parent and child are temporarily separated for an interview,
or where a parent objects during the interview, the infringement on
parental authority is perhaps roughly comparable to the infringement
of rights during a nonconsensual entry into the family home. This
suggests that the same procedural protections should be employed. 7
It would be complicated and difficult to establish the agency's right to
enter the premises by one evidentiary standard and set of procedures,
and to establish its right to interview the child by another. This would
be especially true where the agency seeks to interview the child at
home, the most common situation in which parents are present or
need to be separated from the child during the interview. 8 If courts
apply a single evidentiary standard and procedure to both gaining resi-
dential entry and to forced interviewing, an agency seeking a court
order authorizing entry into a home could seek and obtain a court
order authorizing the child to be interviewed in connection with the
entry.
Where an interview may directly interfere with parental supervision
and control over a child, procedural protections should include the
issuance of a warrant, as was recommended earlier for residential
entries.279 Because detaining a child for an interview when parents are
present but do not consent is highly disruptive, advance impartial
screening is necessary.
As with residential entries, such interviews should be permitted
where there is a reasonable suspicion that the child has been mal-
treated. A warrant authorizing a child protection agency investigation
could be issued without probable cause as defined in criminal proceed-
1983) (preponderance of evidence sufficient as standard of proof in contested temporary custody
hearing).
277. See supra notes 91-208 and accompanying text. This would require a warrant or
equivalent order in nonemergency circumstances and some particularized proof short of probable
cause, such as that of a reasonable suspicion that the child has been maltreated.
278. As a general rule, interviews take place outside the presence of parents so that parents
may not register approval or disapproval of the child's answer or subtly pressure the child to give
false responses. Parents are most often present prior to the interview where the interview takes
place in a home setting as opposed to at school or at a day care center.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 207-09.
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ings.280 However, strict protections are imposed before a child may be
taken into protective custody.281 There must be some clear distinction
between what constitutes an interview and what constitutes protective
custody. One practical way to make this distinction would be to set a
strict time limit of one or two hours for interviews. The interview
itself should be permitted upon a reasonable suspicion of abuse or
neglect. However, any prolonged custody of the child requires a
stricter standard of proof indicating maltreatment has occurred and
immediate custody is needed.282
e. Fourth Amendment Issues Where Parent and Child Are Forcibly
Separated for Questioning
Questioning children without parental permission in the course of a
child protection investigation raises fourth as well as fourteenth
amendment issues. Whether the child is temporarily taken from the
parents for questioning, or questioned in their presence without their
permission, there is arguably a fourth amendment "seizure. '283 To
determine if forced questioning is a "seizure," and, if so, what proce-
dural protections are required, at least three issues must be considered:
First, whether the interference with personal liberty is severe enough
to constitute a fourth amendment seizure; second, whether holding the
child for questioning represents a seizure as against the parents; and
third, whether the questioning is "rehabilitative" under Wyman v.
James,284 thus ensuring that detaining a child for questioning is not a
seizure.
i. Detention for Questioning as a Fourth Amendment Seizure
The brief detention of an individual for questioning may constitute a
"seizure" even if such detention falls short of an arrest.285 If briefly
restraining a person on the street may constitute a seizure,286 so may
holding an individual for questioning for a longer time.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 200-06.
281. See supra notes 273-75 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 273-74 and accompanying text.
283. The fourth amendment provides in part: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .. " U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
284. 400 U.S. 309 (1971); see supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
285. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); W.
LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 9.1, at 10.
286. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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ii. Forced Questioning as a Seizure Against the Parents
Questioning a child when the parents are present probably does rep-
resent a "seizure" of the child from the parents. When present, the
parent, rather than the child, has ultimate control over the child's
activities. Questioning the child over the parent's objections thus
interferes with parental rights concerning the child. It is well estab-
lished that depriving a parent of control and supervision of a child is a
severe deprivation of personal liberty.28 7 Because the interest of a par-
ent in the control and supervision of a child transcends property
rights, 88 the holding of a child for questioning should constitute a
seizure protected by the fourth amendment, at least as much as a tem-
porary taking of personal property.289 However, there are no cases
directly on point.
i. Forced Questioning as "Rehabilitative"
Some commentators have concluded, based upon the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Wyman v. James,2 90 that residence entries
in the course of civil child protection investigations are not "searches"
governed by the fourth amendment.291 In Wyman, the Supreme
Court held that welfare home visits were not searches because they
were "rehabilitative" in nature. The Court reasoned that such visits
were not accomplished by force, and that the denial of permission to
enter was not a criminal offense.292 Following Wyman, at least one
court has held that residential entries in child protection investigations
are not searches because of the rehabilitative character of the investi-
gation.293 Similarly, it might be argued that detaining children for
questioning without parental permission during a child abuse investi-
gation is rehabilitative and, therefore, is not a "seizure" governed by
the fourth amendment.
Most of the lower courts have held, however, that residential entries
in child abuse investigations are primarily investigative rather than
rehabilitative, and, where nonconsensual, constitute fourth amend-
287. See supra notes 159-61, 252-55 and accompanying text.
288. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
289. Cf Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (state statute authorizing
prejudgment garnishment of wages unconstitutional).
290. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
291. See, eg., D. BnsHrAiov, supra note 7, at 142.
292. See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
293. Darryl H. v. Coler, 585 F. Supp. 383, 389 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd in part and vacated in
part, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cit. 1986). The Seventh Circuit reached an opposite conclusion on appeal
of the case, however. 801 F.2d 893, 899-900 (7th Cir. 1986).
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ment searches. 294  These authorities represent the better reasoned
view. 29' Because children or adults detained for questioning in the
course of civil child abuse investigations are held for the purpose of
determining whether children have been maltreated, the detention
probably constitutes a fourth amendment "seizure."
iv. Procedural Protections
Assuming that temporarily depriving a parent of immediate control
of a child for the purpose of questioning constitutes a fourth amend-
ment seizure, a balancing test then must be applied to determine what
procedural protections are required.296 The fourth amendment test
articulated in Camara v. Municipal Court297 balances the need for the
search against its intrusiveness, and is essentially similar to the four-
teenth amendment balancing test. The procedural protections man-
dated by the fourteenth amendment also adequately address the fourth
amendment issues at stake.2 98
2. Constitutional Issues in Conducting Physical
Examinations of Children
The right to enter a residence or detain a child for interviews does
not necessarily carry with itthe right to compel the child to disrobe or
to submit to a physical examination. Physical examination involves a
greater intrusion into the child's personal privacy than does detaining
the child for the purpose of interviews. Accordingly, a separate analy-
sis of constitutional issues related to physical examinations of children
in child abuse investigations is required.
It seems obvious that the examination must be relevant in light of
the nature of the accusation and the preliminary evidence. Among the
issues raised are: Whether a stricter level of suspicion must be satisfied
to permit a nonconsensual physical examination than is required for
an interview; whether the Constitution limits the method of the exami-
nation; whether the Constitution places limits upon who may conduct
the examination; and whether a warrant or its equivalent is required
before the child may be examined.2 99
294. See supra notes 132-53 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 252-64 and accompanying text.
297. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
298. See supra text accompanying notes 273-82.
299. A fifth issue, whether the child may independently consent to the examination, is
discussed elsewhere. See supra notes 240-45 and accompanying text.
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a. Quantum of Suspicion Required
It is unclear whether case law requires a physical examination of a
child in a child abuse investigation to be supported by probable cause
or by some lesser quantum of suspicion. Some cases suggest that a
stricter standard should apply to physical examinations than to other
searches in the child protection context. The better view, however, is
that the standard of reasonable suspicion should apply to both, but
that the Constitution places limits on the permissible methods of
examination. Whichever standard is ultimately applied, courts should
show restraint in creating their own criteria for physical examinations.
i. Probable Cause or Reasonable Suspicion
As with other cases involving searches and seizures by administra-
tive agencies, the level of suspicion and procedural protections man-
dated by the fourth amendment for physical examinations of children
are determined by applying a balancing test. Specifically, the extreme
intrusiveness of the examination must be balanced against the need to
determine whether abuse has occurred. The highly probative nature
of the examination must also be taken into account.
Some analogous cases suggest that the intrusiveness of at least some
physical examinations requires a stricter standard of proof; such cases
are not convincing in the context of child protection investigations,
however. One such analogous case is Schmerber v. California,"
where a doctor extracted a blood sample over the objection of a man
who had been arrested. The Supreme Court held that the extraction
did not violate the man's fourth amendment rights. The Court held
that the extraction was permissible because there was a "clear indica-
tion" that the extraction would produce evidence of a crime, namely
that the man had driven under the influence of intoxicating liquor.3
A more recent case, United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,30 2 held
that an intrusive alimentary canal search during a border crossing
required a "reasonable suspicion" that the search would produce evi-
dence of drug smuggling.303
Both Schmerber and Montoya de Hernandez required a stricter evi-
dentiary standard to justify an unusual bodily intrusion than would
have been required to justify a more routine search under the same
300. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
301. Id at 770.
302. 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
303. Id at 541. The case also held that the "clear indication" requirement is equivalent to
the requirement of reasonable suspicion. Id at 540-41.
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circumstances. Routine border searches and searches of prisoners
after arrest may be conducted without any particularized suspicion.
Thus, these cases arguably provide some support for applying a
stricter evidentiary standard for cases involving particularly intrusive
examinations, such as examinations where a child is compelled to dis-
robe. There is further authority from the lower courts, where espe-
cially restrictive evidentiary standards were applied to strip searches of
adults.3 °5
A physical examination of a child in a child abuse investigation is
not necessarily as intrusive as a physical examination in a criminal
investigation. The purpose of the examination is to protect the child,
not to uncover evidence of the child's criminal behavior. A lesser
degree of suspicion better protects the child's interest in being free of
abuse. Under the circumstances, a better means of protecting the
child's privacy interests would be by regulating who may conduct
examinations and what methods may be employed.
New Jersey v. T.L. 0.306 seems to follow this approach. T.L.O. bars
unduly intrusive searches rather than varying the quantum of evidence
according to the nature of the search. The court in T.L.O. held that
searches of students in schools must be based upon reasonable suspi-
cion, but that the method of the search must be necessary, and that the
intrusion must not be out of proportion to the need for the search. 0 7
The T.L.0. approach might be applied by analogy to physical exam-
inations in child protection investigations. Because T.L.O. involves a
search of a child by an administrative agency in a noncriminal context,
it is logical to apply the same basic approach to a child abuse
investigation.3 °8
304. W. LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 10.5, at 303.
305. See, e.g., United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 902 (1977); J. HALL, JR., supra note 37, § 17.11 (citing Hunt v. Polk County, 551 F. Supp.
339, 342-44 (S.D. Iowa 1982)); W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 65, § 10.5(b) (citing
Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967)).
306. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
307. Id. at 341. The Court held that there are two requirements for a search protected by the
fourth amendment to be deemed reasonable. First, the search must be "justified at its inception."
Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). Where students in public schools are
searched, this means that there must be a reasonable suspicion that the search will turn up
evidence that the student has violated a law or a school rule. Id. at 341- 42. Second, the search
must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified it. Id. at 342. This
requirement is met when the "measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the
search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of
the infraction." Id.
308. First, the examination must be "justified at its inception" by a showing that there is a
reasonable suspicion that the examination will yield evidence that the child has been maltreated.
Second, the examination must be "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified
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il Reviewing Agency Criteria for Physical Examinations of Children
Where child protection agencies have adopted policies containing
criteria governing physical examinations of children, it may be neces-
sary to determine whether the criteria satisfy the requisite level of sus-
picion. However, as illustrated by the following discussion of recent
federal litigation from Illinois, courts should exercise caution in revis-
ing the criteria.
In Darryl H. v. Coler,3°1 a federal district court considered a consti-
tutional challenge to a state policy governing the physical examination
of children in child protection investigations. Applying not only the
three factors articulated in Matthews v. Eldridge,31 0 but also a fourth
amendment balancing test, the court upheld the Illinois policy author-
izing examinations of children whenever the agency received a report
of child abuse or neglect meeting the following "hotline criteria":
1. The child must be less than 18 years of age;
2. The child must either have been harmed, or be in danger of harm,
or of a substantial risk of harm;
3. A specific incident or circumstances which suggest the harm was
caused by child abuse or neglect has been identified;
4. A parent or caretaker must be the alleged perpetrator of neglect;
[and]
5. A parent or other caretaker, an adult family member, an adult
individual residing in the same home as the child, or the parent's par-
amour must be the alleged perpetrator of abuse.311
Measuring the Illinois procedures against the Matthews test, the
court held that while a family's right to privacy and the parent's right
to autonomous decision-making regarding their children are legitimate
constitutional rights, the state's interest in preventing child abuse and
neglect is great, and the Illinois procedures employed did not unduly
risk erroneous deprivation of family rights.312
The district court decision was appealed to the Seventh Circuit
together with a companion case, E.Z. v. Coler.3 13 In each, the above
it" in that the particular examination is necessary to determine whether the maltreatment has
occurred, and that the suspected maltreatment is sufficiently serious to justify a physical
examination.
309. 585 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 801 F.2d 893 (7th
Cir. 1986).
310. 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see supra text accompanying notes 261-62.
311. Darryl H., 585 F. Supp. at 386, 391-92; see supra text accompanying notes 134-37.
312. 585 F. Supp. at 388-92.
313. 603 F. Supp. 1546 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd sub norL Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893 (7th
Cir. 1986). !Z was an appeal from the decision of another judge in the same district.
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procedures had been upheld. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed
with the district court that neither probable cause nor a warrant was
required to conduct physical examinations of children in child abuse
investigations.3 14 However, the Seventh Circuit expressed doubt that
the above criteria are always sufficient justification to conduct a visual
inspection of a child's body.315
The Seventh Circuit concluded that insufficient evidence had been
presented at the trial court level to permit the court to apply the con-
stitutional balancing test fully and to determine the constitutional
requirements for the physical examination of children in child abuse
investigations. Beyond determining that probable cause and a warrant
are not required, the court declined to determine precisely what fac-
tual showing would be required and under what circumstances.
31 6
The court did express a number of specific reservations concerning
Illinois policy, however, and concluded that there was a serious possi-
bility that the present policy might be constitutionally insufficient.
While emphasizing that it must be careful not to interfere with the
efforts of the child protection agency to formulate policy in a new and
difficult area,31 7 the court expressed concern about the hotline criteria
and accompanying policy.
314. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 899 (7th Cir. 1986).
315. Id. at 902. In order to understand the Seventh Circuit's unwillingness to definitively rule
on the criteria, it is necessary to keep in mind the procedural posture of each of the companion
cases. Both cases were appeals of interlocutory orders for which a full factual record had not
been developed at the district court level. Darryl H. v. Coler was an appeal of the district court's
summary judgment order in favor of the defendant agency. Id. at 905. E.Z v. Coler (renamed
B.D. by C.D. v. Coler on appeal) was an appeal of the district court's denial of a motion for a
preliminary injunction by the plaintiff children and parents. Id. at 897. In both cases, the
Seventh Circuit emphasized that certain of its conclusions might be revised in a case presenting a
more complete factual record.
In Darryl H. v. Coler, the Seventh Circuit found that insufficient facts were presented to judge
whether or not the notice criteria violated the Constitution, but affirmed the summary judgment
on behalf of defendants on other grounds. Id. at 893. The court upheld a denial of retrospective
damages against the agency for the acts of defendant state officials based on the eleventh
amendment, and disallowed damages against the individual defendants based on the doctrine of
qualified immunity. Id. at 906-08.
E.Z. v. Coler, where the district court had denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary
injunction, was a class action challenging, among other things, the Illinois child protection
agency's practice of conducting visual examinations of children solely based upon the hotline
criteria. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit emphasized the limited scope of review applicable to
denial of a preliminary injunction ("abuse of discretion") as well as the limited factual record
before the trial court. Id. at 897-99. In evaluating the preliminary injunction, the court
concluded that while the ultimate outcome of the case was difficult to predict on the record
before it, the potential risk to Illinois children from an erroneous granting of the injunction
outweighed the potential harm to children from improper investigations. Id. at 904-05.
316. Id. at 902.
317. Id. at 904.
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What disturbed the court most about the Illinois policy was that a
child protection worker receiving a child abuse report meeting the hot-
line criteria must arrange a physical examination whenever the exami-
nation was relevant to the investigation. The court expressed
skepticism that a more complete inquiry should not sometimes be
undertaken before deciding whether to make a visual inspection or
physical examination of the child.31 Among other things, the court
stated, the agency might sometimes make an effort to verify reports
received from minors, anonymous callers, or sources whose reliability
might be reasonably suspect. Although third party verification can be
counterproductive under many circumstances, the record before the
court did not show that such verification is inevitably inadvisable.319
Based on its concern that a visual inspection or physical examination
should not always be made when hotline criteria are satisfied, the
court stated: "[I]n further litigation, one of the principal issues will be
whether the hotline criteria are sufficiently precise to achieve the legiti-
mate ends of the [agency] without amounting to a needless intrusion
into the privacy of the child and his family." 320
It is difficult to fault the court's view that an agency investigator
should not be locked into conducting a visual examination of a child's
body every time the hotline criteria are met and the examination is
relevant to the investigation. There surely are some cases in which
alternative, less intrusive and reliable means of verification are appro-
priate. For example, where the report is based on hearsay and, when
contacted, the original source of the information fully satisfies the
investigator that there is no reason to suspect maltreatment, an exami-
nation of the child would be improper.32'
What is disturbing about the court's opinion is not its suggestion
that a visual inspection or physical examination may not always be
necessary when hotline criteria are satisfied, but rather its suggestion
that it might revise or expand the hotline criteria. The court might
have simply held that, until the agency revises its policy concerning
318. Id at 903.
319. Id
320. Id
321. Consider the following example:
A teacher makes a child abuse report suggesting that a child may have been physically abused.
Upon close questioning, the teacher states that most of the information upon which her report
was based came from another teacher, not from direct observation or conversations with the
child. When the investigator questions the second teacher, it turns out that there was a
miscommunication between the teachers and, while the child described some intense but typical
parent-child conflicts, there is no basis to suspect parental maltreatment. Physical examination
of the child is an unnecessary, unjustifiable intrusion.
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mandatory physical examinations, investigators must not be required
to conduct examinations of children's bodies when they or their super-
visors determine it unnecessary to the investigation. Instead, the court
implied that a more detailed, court-imposed set of criteria should be
created, as if, after hearing more evidence, the court would be able to
establish precise and detailed criteria where the agency had failed to
do so. This overrates the ability of the court to create workable inves-
tigation guidelines in the complex area of child maltreatment.
When the Seventh Circuit in Darryl H. v. Coler suggested a possible
refinement of the hotline criteria, it may have been referring only to
further steps that might need to be taken by investigators prior to con-
ducting a visual inspection or physical examination. It is possible,
however, that the Seventh Circuit meant that courts might need to
articulate more detailed criteria concerning what proof must be
presented before an inspection or examination is to be conducted.
Beyond articulating a quantum of suspicion needed to justify a type of
search, however, a court, which lacks expertise and experience in child
abuse investigations, is ill-suited to develop comprehensive guidelines
for what proof is required to justify a search. Rather, the proper role
of a court in determining what proof is sufficient to justify an inspec-
tion or examination is to state a general principle concerning the
required proof, and test any guidelines that might be presented to it
against this general principle. Refining and revising comprehensive
guidelines for inspections or examinations requires subject matter
expertise; identifying the correct standard of proof requires Constitu-
tional expertise. The former is the province of an administrative
agency, and the latter that of the courts.
Deciding which standard should apply requires a fundamental value
judgment: A relaxed standard of proof will allow a greater number of
unnecessary examinations, while a strict standard of proof will avoid
unnecessary examinations but inevitably lead to a certain number of
situations where abuse is permitted to continue because the investiga-
tion has been frustrated by the evidentiary requirement. Moreover, it
is impossible to determine the precise statistical impact of the different
standards of evidence because, among other things, they must be
applied by a variety of judges and agency employees on a case-by-case
basis. Determining an evidentiary standard at most can be based upon
a rough assessment of its practical impact together with a value judg-
ment concerning the risks and interests on either side.
Another objection raised by the Seventh Circuit to the hotline crite-
ria illustrates the limited role that courts should play in evaluating
agency criteria for inspections and examinations. The court expressed
570
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concern that "[agency policy] does not differentiate between the search
of the very young child and the search of a child with the maturity and
ability to communicate. 322 By this, the court apparently meant that
an inspection or search might not be necessary if a child could verbally
satisfy the investigator that the suspicion is unfounded. It is not diffi-
cult to imagine circumstances in which a child can satisfactorily
explain circumstances that have created a suspicion of maltreatment.
On the other hand, it is not unusual for children to deny maltreatment
that has actually occurred. While it is proper for the court to invali-
date a policy which requires the agency to invariably inspect or
examine the child no matter what the child says, the court should hesi-
tate to articulate detailed criteria for determining when the statements
of the child make the examination unnecessary.
b. Permissible Methods of Examination
For the examination of a child to be constitutionally permissible, it
should be conducted in a manner respecting the dignity of the child
and with minimal violation of the child's privacy.
The Schmerber v. California 323 case lends support to the proposition
that an examination should be conducted by a medical professional.
One of the key factors cited in the case as justifying the taking of a
blood sample from a person arrested for driving while intoxicated was
that the blood was taken by a physician in a hospital environment
according to "accepted medical practices. ' 32 a Some lower court deci-
sions also require physical inspections and examinations to be con-
ducted by medical professionals. 325 This requirement should be
applied to the physical examination of children in child abuse
investigations.
The procedures approved by the federal district courts in E.Z v.
Coler326 and Darryl H. v. Coler327 concerning examination of the
322. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 903 (7th Cir. 1986).
323. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
324. IdL at 771.
325. United States ex reL Guy v. McCauley, 385 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (where
defendant, seven months pregnant, was twice forced to submit to vaginal searches, and searches
were not done in a hospital or medical environment nor performed by persons with either
medical training or medical equipment, searches violated defendant's due process rights); see also
State v. Gammill, 2 Kan. App. 2d 627, 585 P.2d 1074 (1978) (warrantless seizure of pubic hair
that was "plucked" from defendant's body held to be in error where provision could have been
made for physician to obtain sample under circumstances that preserved defendant's dignity).
326. 603 F. Supp. 1546 (N.D. I1. 1985), aff'd sub nom. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893 (7th
Cir. 1986).
327. 585 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 801 F.2d 893 (7th
Cir. 1986).
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child's body for evidence of physical abuse support the preference for
examinations by medical professionals. Under the Illinois procedures,
the caseworker is to offer the parent the following three options:
1. The parent can take the child to a physician or hospital emer-
gency room for a physical examination.
2. The child protection worker can take the child to a physician or
hospital emergency room for a physical examination.
3. The caretaker and the child protection worker can jointly disrobe
the child and conduct a cursory physical examination.
328
If the child is in school, the worker is to contact the caretaker and
present the above three options plus a fourth one, which is that a phys-
ical examination may be made by the school nurse.3 29 In the event
that sexual abuse is alleged, however, only the first two options apply:
the examination must in all cases be conducted by a physician or other
outside medical personnel.330
This procedure would appear to be sufficient, as least as far as small
children are concerned. However, because the examination of an ado-
lescent is potentially embarrassing, he or she should have the choice of
being examined by medical personnel, rather than being disrobed in
the presence of a child protection worker.331 Otherwise, state law
probably precludes, and should preclude, consent except by parents,
guardians, or others with specific legal authority to arrange medical
care for the child.332
A final note about the Seventh Circuit opinion in Darryl H. v. Coler
is that it erroneously describes the Illinois policy concerning whether
there is to be a visual examination of a child's body by an agency
investigator or a physical examination by a medical professional. The
opinion states that agency policy provides no guidelines for resolving
disputes concerning which option is selected for the method of exami-
nation 33 3 and suggests that existing policy leaves the choice to the
caseworker. 334 In fact, both the district court opinions335 and the
agency handbook itself clearly state that parents can decide who con-
328. HANDBOOK, supra note 134, at 66.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. See supra notes 240-45 and accompanying text.
332. However, medical examinations and care can be provided without consent in certain life-
threatening situations. See, e.g., Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Lacey v.
Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25, 29 (1956).
333. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 896 (7th Cir. 1986).
334. Id. at 901.
335. E.Z. v. Coler, 603 F. Supp. 1546, 1549-50 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Darryl H. v. Coler, 585 F.
Supp. 383, 386-87 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
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ducts the examination.336 Parents may veto a visual inspection of the
child's body by an agency investigator.
This error casts some doubt on the rationale of the Seventh Circuit
opinion, which emphasizes the intrusiveness of "nude searches" and
bodily inspections by government officials.3 37 Had the court realized
that it was reviewing a policy allowing only medical professionals to
conduct examinations without parental permission, the court might
have expressed fewer reservations about the criteria for allowing such
examinations.
c. Warrant Requirement
The Seventh Circuit held in Darryl H. v. Coler that no warrant is
required for the physical examination of a child during a child abuse
investigation.33 However, the better view is that a warrant or its
equivalent should be required, at least where a nude examination of an
older child or extraction of blood or other substances is involved. A
warrant or other equivalent screening device is needed to protect
against errors where inspections or examinations are highly invasive.
Requiring a warrant would not be an unreasonable burden in non-
emergency circumstances, particularly where telephonic warrants are
permissible.339 Further, a single warrant could be issued authorizing
entry into the home, as well as physical examinations of a child.
E. Proposed Statutory Provisions Authorizing Interviews and
Examinations of Children Prior to the Initiation of Child
Abuse Proceedings
Every state has enacted a statute authorizing the investigation of
child abuse and neglect. 3" These statutes at least implicitly authorize
interviews and examinations of children because these are obviously
necessary to such investigations. However, few states have enacted
statutes that set forth the powers of the agency when the child's par-
ents, school, or other caretakers deny access to the child. Further,
only fifteen states provide explicit statutory remedies to enable agen-
336. HANDBOOK, supra note 134, at 65-66.
337. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 899-901 (7th Cir. 1986).
338. Id at 904.
339. See supra text accompanying note 229. Requiring a warrant probably would not also
impose the traditional standard of probable cause. See supra notes 202-08 and accompanying
text.
340. STATE STATuTEs, supra note 85, at 17-36, 254-74.
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cies to gain access to a child during an investigation.34" ' Accordingly,
current laws need to be expanded and revised.
There are several key statutory issues concerning access to children
in child abuse investigations that need to be addressed in most states.
First, there is the social worker's explicit authority to interview and
examine the child. The law should authorize the social worker to
interview the child and to arrange for the examination of children
based upon a reasonable suspicion of child abuse, but provide that
agency regulations shall set procedures and conditions for examina-
tions. The Illinois procedures are, for the most part, a good example
of what such regulations might look like.342 Statutes should also
authorize the social worker to take photographs of the child in the
course of the investigation. 343 Finally, the statute should permit the
child protection worker to record the child's statement either by sound
or audio visual recording. 344
Second, medical professionals conducting physical examinations in
the ordinary course of medical practice who become suspicious that a
child is being maltreated should be empowered to conduct additional
examinations over the objections of parents when necessary to reach a
more conclusive determination. This should include X-rays and pho-
tographs where necessary, 34 5 as well as other methods of examination
not inflicting substantial pain or endangering the child. By conducting
an examination, medical professionals not only may validate their sus-
picions of maltreatment but also may determine that their suspicions
are groundless, thus eliminating the necessity to report the maltreat-
ment. Filing a report would compel the child protection agency to
conduct its own investigation. In addition, medical professionals
341. ALA. CODE § 26-14-7(c) (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-813(c) (Supp. 1985); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 19-10-109(3) (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.505(1)(d) (West 1986); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 23, para. 2057.5, § 7.5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-6-7-12, 31-6-
11-1 l(e)(6) (Burns 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.71(3) (West Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:403(G)(5) (West 1986); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1034(2) (McKinney 1983); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 40-11-7 (Supp. 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-650(C) (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 37-1-406(e) (Supp. 1987); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.05(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-50 (1987); Wyo. STAT. § 14-6-218 (1986).
342. See supra text accompanying notes 311, 328-32.
343. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.507(1) (West Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23,
para. 2056, § 6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 685(d) (Supp. 1987).
344. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-609 (Supp. 1987). A list of statutes authorizing
videotaping of interviews appears in R. EATMAN & J. BULKLEY, PROTECTING CHILD VICTIM/
WrrINEss 47 (1986).
345. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.064 (Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-11-6 (Burns
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should be excused from liability for such an examination conducted in
good faith.
Third, state statutes should explicitly require schools and other tem-
porary caretakers to cooperate in granting the child protection agency
access to the child for the purpose of interviews, observation, or exam-
ination. Because some schools, day care providers and others are
reluctant to permit access to the child for fear of being sued, they
should also be explicitly excused from liability for cooperating.
Statutes should provide that advance notice to the parent or guard-
ian is not required prior to interviewing the child. State law should
also provide that an authorized employee of the child welfare agency
be empowered to determine who is and is not to be present during
such interviews or examinations. Although school and day care offi-
cials sometimes wish to be present during interviews and observations
of the child, it is the child protection agency that has the ultimate
responsibility for the investigation. This and similar issues are dealt
with in many states through interagency agreements between, for
example, schools and child welfare agencies. 3" However, it is easier
to resolve the issue by statutory mandate. In addition, school districts
are not always willing to enter into such agreements.
Fourth, statutes should provide child protection agencies with the
means to compel cooperation by parents or others who deny access to
children.347 An enforcement remedy is needed to ensure compliance
in the event of noncooperation or conflict, even when the law requires
cooperation with the investigation. Statutes should permit the child
protection agency to obtain a court order, where needed; to compel
noncooperative parents, schools, or other caretakers to permit the
agency to interview or observe the child. Where an examination by a
medical professional is required in order to determine whether or not
abuse or neglect has taken place, there should be a remedy to obtain
such an examination.
Because interviewing or examining a child without parental permis-
sion represents a lesser intrusion than taking the child into custody for
a period of days, and because lesser procedural protections are appro-
346. See Interagency Agreement Between North Carolina Department of Public Instruction
and Department of Human Resources, Jan. 1, 1986, § II(E) (providing for full cooperation
between school personnel and child protective services workers and specifically providing for a
"private" interview between worker and child "without the presence of local school personnel");
Working Agreement Regarding Suspected Child Abuse/Neglect and Child and Family Services
Between M.S.A.D. #54 School System and the Department of Human Services, 1985,
Skowhegan, Maine, § C(6) (permitting caseworker/child interviews at school by prior
arrangement with school officials).
347. See supra Section II.A.
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priate both to permit and encourage this less intrusive approach, there
should be different statutory standards for brief access to the child.
Specifically, for brief questioning where parents are present and object,
or for a physical examination requiring the disrobing of an older child
or the infliction of pain, the following should be provided under state
law: A requirement of a reasonable suspicion that the child has been
abused and neglected as defined by state law; a limit on the question-
ing or examination for a fixed time such as one hour for questioning
and two hours for an examination; and an ex parte remedy to provide
access to the child for the purpose of an interview or examination.
The law also might provide that, following the interview or examina-
tion, a child could be taken into custody pursuant to other existing
remedies under state law.
Where the statutory criteria for emergency custody are already
strict, creating a complementary remedy to allow investigative inter-
views and examinations should be sufficient. Where this is not the
case, the temporary custody statute should be tightened at the same
time that investigative remedies are provided. The main purpose of
authorizing short-term interviews and examinations is to permit pro-
tective action short of temporary custody, thus discouraging the
unnecessary separation of families. Temporary custody of the child
should be permitted only upon probable cause that the child is seri-
ously endangered and can be protected only by immediate state cus-
tody. If brief questioning or an examination cannot produce probable
cause of maltreatment, it is unlikely that there will be evidence to sus-
tain a temporary custody petition. To acquire immediate temporary
custody, the agency should be required to show that the child is in
imminent danger of further harm, or that there is an imminent danger
that the child will be removed from the jurisdiction, or be coerced by
the abuser into recanting statements concerning maltreatment. Tem-
porary custody should be followed by an adversary hearing within a
few days, as is presently required in most states.348 At the hearing,
parents should be able to try to regain custody of the child pending
further proceedings.
The above recommendations modify some of the Standards Relating
to Abuse and Neglect proposed by the Juvenile Justice Standards Pro-
348. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-6 (1986); ALASKA STAT. § 47-10-142(d) (Supp. 1984);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2312 (1981); GUAM GOV'T CODE § 9120.25(c) (1978), reprinted in STATE
STATUTES, supra note 85, at 221; IDAHO CODE § 16-1612 (Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-
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ject.349 The proposed standards provide that emergency removal may
occur only where there is probable cause that removal is necessary to
prevent the child's imminent death or serious bodily injury. Instead, a
brief interview and examination of the child should be permitted based
upon a reasonable suspicion that the child may have been abused or
neglected, as defined by state law. Temporary custody, without prior
notice and the opportunity for a hearing, should require that there be
probable cause that the child has been neglected or abused and that
the child is in imminent danger of serious harm, of being removed
from the jurisdiction, or of being pressured to recant statements made
to investigators. Temporary custody should include the power to
arrange for a medical examination of the child. Finally, state law
should explicitly empower adolescents to consent to interviews and
examinations without parental permission.35 °
IV. ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS AND
INFORMATION CONCERNING CHILD ABUSE
A. Introduction
Ordinarily, child protection agencies obtain records and statements
from witnesses on a voluntary basis. Part B of this section discusses
how witnesses may be questioned, including whether Miranda warn-
ings should be given in child protection investigations, and what limits
should be imposed on coercive or deceptive questioning.
When witnesses refuse to volunteer information, the agency may file
a petition alleging maltreatment of the child and seek the information
during discovery or at trial. Sometimes, however, it may be necessary
to compel oral and written information before a formal child protec-
tion proceeding can or should be initiated. Part C of this section deals
with legal issues related to compelling disclosure of information dur-
ing the investigation stage.
B. Limits on Witness Questioning in Child Abuse and
Neglect Investigations
In Miranda v. Arizona,"' the United States Supreme Court held
that an individual's statements while in police custody may not be
used against him in a criminal prosecution unless it can be shown that
349. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN./AM. BAR ASS'N, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS
PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT 91-95 (1981). The proposed
standards have not been approved as official policy of the American Bar Association.
350. See supra notes 240-45 and accompanying text.
351. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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the individual was warned about the possible consequences of
testifying.352
As a general principle, Miranda warnings are not required in civil
child abuse and neglect investigations. However, where both police
and child protection agency employees are involved in the questioning
of persons suspected of child maltreatment, special Miranda issues
occasionally emerge.
Miranda warnings are required only when an individual is in police
custody. Where the individual is free to leave or to break off question-
ing, the warnings need not be given.3 53 Thus Miranda warnings are
not required where social workers conduct questioning without the
police being present,354 or where police conduct the questioning but do
not detain the individual or deprive the individual of freedom of action
in any significant way.355
There is no precise test to determine whether an individual is in
police custody. Essentially, the rule is that a person is in custody
where he or she is deprived of freedom of action in any significant
way.35 6 Whether a person is "in custody" thus depends upon the facts
and circumstances of the specific situation. 7 For example, where a
police officer is voluntarily permitted to enter a home and then ques-
tions a parent concerning alleged child abuse while standing in the
doorway to a room, and the person being questioned makes no
attempt to leave the room or to ask the police officer to leave, one
probably would not conclude that the person being questioned is "in
custody." Accordingly, the Miranda warnings should not be required.
On the other hand, if the police officer entered the house pursuant to a
warrant, stood in the same doorway and did not move when the indi-
vidual being questioned approached the police officer and indicated a
352. The person being interrogated must be informed that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything said can and will be used against him in court, that he has the right to consult with
an attorney and have the attorney with him during interrogation, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney, an attorney will be appointed to represent him. Id. at 444.
353. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
354. State v. Hathorn, 395 So. 2d 783, 785 (La. 1981) (statements made by defendant to child
protection center caseworker in hospital emergency room were admissible despite lack of
Miranda warnings).
355. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 19 Or. App. 427, 528 P.2d 569 (1974) (statements made by
defendant juvenile, who voluntarily accompanied officers to crime scene and who was free to
leave at any time, were admissible despite absence of Miranda warnings), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1003 (1975).
356. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 65,
§ 6.6(e), at 496.
357. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 65, § 6.6(c), at 496-97.
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desire to leave, the individual would probably be considered to be "in
custody." '58 In that case, the Miranda warnings should be given.
Where an individual is "in custody," Miranda warnings may be
required although the questioning is being conducted by someone
other than the police. This is especially likely where the questioner is
under an obligation, or is otherwise likely, to share information with
the police.35 9 Although some courts have held that Miranda warnings
are not required when questioning is conducted by government agents
not primarily charged with enforcement of the criminal law,3" these
cases have involved situations where the defendant was not in police
custody. If the government official doing the questioning will share
evidence of law violations with police, and the individual being ques-
tioned is under heavy pressure to cooperate, it is likely that Miranda
warnings must be given.361
In the case of child abuse and neglect investigations, it is not unu-
sual for social workers to question persons suspected of child abuse
while police are present.362 In that case, where the perpetrator of
abuse is "in custody" as discussed above, Miranda warnings are prob-
ably required before questioning begins. For example, Miranda warn-
358. See, eg., United States v. Nash, 563 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1977) (where investigation by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") occurred in security office with doors closed behind
defendant, and agent was unsure door was locked, there was intention on part of agent that
interrogation be custodial); United States v. Bekowies, 432 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1970) (where FBI
agents had warrant for arrest of fugitive when they entered defendant's apartment, agents
requested defendant to accompany them to several areas within apartment, and agents
questioned defendant closely and persistently, defendant was not unreasonable in believing he
was in custody).
359. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 467 (1981) (where defendant in a criminal proceeding
was ordered by the judge to be questioned by a psychiatrist, Miranda warnings were held to be
required); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) (Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
investigator questioning individual in jail required to give Miranda warnings where investigation
was primarily civil but investigator had duty to report criminal violations).
360. See, eg., United States v. Dreske, 536 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1976) (taxpayer interviewed by
IRS agent did not have to be advised of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination before
being questioned); United States v. Harmon, 486 F.2d 363 (10th Cir. 1973) (where defendant
answered local inquiry from Selective Service Board and acknowledged failure to register,
defendant's statement was admissible without prior Miranda warnings because defendant had
not been in custody), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974); United States v. Irion, 482 F.2d 1240 (9th
Cir. 1973) (brief questioning of defendant at his motel room by Customs officers who learned
defendant had been on sailboat which landed without clearing customs did not constitute an "in
custody" interrogation), cert denied, 414 U.S. 1026 (1973).
361. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 65, § 6.10, at 542-44.
362. See, eg., Agreement for Joint Investigative Procedures of Child Physical and Sexual
Abuse Between Charles County Dep't of Social Servs., Charles County Sheriff's Dep't, Maryland




ings should be given if a social worker intends to question a suspect
after the suspect has been placed under arrest.
If the above hypothetical involving the police officer blocking the
doorway is modified slightly, a more subtle situation requiring
Miranda warnings is presented. That is, where the police officer
blocks the doorway or otherwise creates the impression that the indi-
vidual is not free to leave, and questioning is conducted by an
employee of the child protection agency, Miranda warnings probably
are required.363
While it is clear how a failure to give required Miranda warnings
will affect a criminal prosecution, the effects on civil child protection
proceedings are less clear. Where Miranda warnings are not given in a
criminal proceeding, both the statement to the police and any "fruits"
of the statement, including causally related subsequent searches and
statements, will be suppressed in later hearings.36
In civil child protection proceedings, the consequences of not giving
Miranda warnings are uncertain, because it has not been settled
whether illegally obtained evidence must be excluded in such proceed-
ings. However, the exclusionary rule should not and probably does
not apply in such proceedings.3 65 Therefore, failure to give Miranda
warnings before a custodial interrogation by a child protection agency
employee means that the statement and any fruits thereof can be sup-
pressed in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
When the Miranda rule does not apply, there may be other con-
straints upon the questioning of witnesses in child protection investiga-
tions. Confessions obtained through deception, trickery, or coercion
are not admissible in criminal proceedings, even in noncustodial inter-
rogations or other circumstances not requiring Miranda warnings. 366
Analogously, the use of coercion or trickery in questioning in child
abuse investigations is arguably actionable, especially if a parent is
tricked into a false confession.367
Nevertheless, questioning that is misleading and improperly coer-
cive in a criminal investigation may not be so in the context of a child
363. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 65, § 6.6(c), at 491-94 (courts divided
concerning whether a subjective or objective test should be applied in determining whether a
person is in custody, i.e., whether he is deprived of his freedom of action).
364. See id. § 9.5, at 760-63 (detailed discussion of how "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine
applies in the case of confessions obtained in violation of the Miranda rule).
365. See infra text accompanying notes 415-66.
366. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 65, § 6.2(c), at 446-49; see also, Lynumn v.
Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (confession coerced when defendant was informed that she could
lose welfare benefits and custody of her children if she did not cooperate).
367. See generally D. BESHAROV, supra note 11, at 78-86.
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protection case. Whether or not a parent cooperates in a child abuse
case sometimes does affect the ultimate outcome of the case. It there-
fore may be proper to inform the parent of that fact. Where a parent
admits maltreating a child, it becomes possible to develop a rehabilita-
tive plan for the parent, and sometimes to leave the child at home with
proper safeguards rather than to place the child in foster care. There-
fore, it is not necessarily incorrect or improper to inform a person
suspected of child abuse that the agency's recommendations to the
court may be affected by the cooperation of the suspect in the investi-
gation. On the other hand, such advice easily can be misconstrued or
wrongly presented as a threat, where not meticulously and correctly
explained. A safe approach is for investigators to avoid such
statements.
C. Compelling Access to Records and Third Party Information
The power to compel access to information and records pertinent to
a child abuse investigation may be necessary in a variety of circum-
stances. For instance, a school or medical clinic may refuse to provide
information and records regarding a child. Or, the members of a reli-
gious commune may refuse to answer any of the questions of an
agency employee. In these circumstances, the agency may need the
information to determine whether reports of child abuse are well-
founded and whether to initiate formal child abuse proceedings.3 6
.Part C discusses constitutional and statutory issues relevant to gain-
ing access to such records and information. It examines laws obligat-
ing third parties to provide records and information relative to child
abuse investigations, briefly discusses legal barriers such as confidenti-
ality and fear of litigation, and suggests legal remedies through which
parties may be compelled to provide records and information.
One approach an agency might use is to seek the needed informa-
tion through grand jury proceedings. Grand juries are, of course, free
to subpoena witnesses and records in the course of an investigation of
possible criminal activity. 69 Child abuse and neglect are often, but
not always, a violation of criminal law.
Grand jury proceedings, however, are not always a practical means
of investigation for the child protection agency. No criminal proceed-
ings may be contemplated, and therefore the prosecutor may not be
willing to assist the child protection agency in its investigation. Where
criminal charges are pending, there may be unacceptable delays before
368. For two, more detailed, examples, see supra note 6.
369. See e.g., Project: Criminal Procedure, 73 GEO. L.J. 403, 440 (1984).
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the convening of the grand jury, the procedure may be cumbersome,
and the prosecutor may be unable or unwilling to share information
with the child protection agency.370
Where testimony or records are needed but are not practicably
obtainable through grand jury proceedings, the agency must have an
effective means to compel production. Few child protection agencies
currently have clear statutory authority to compel testimony and
records without first initiating a formal child protection proceeding.
Remedies can and should be created, consistent with state and federal
constitutions.
1. Constitutional Issues
The principal that government agencies can require the disclosure
of information through purely investigatory proceedings has been
firmly established for forty years. 37' An administrative agency's inves-
tigatory powers are comparable to those of a grand jury.372 "Fishing
expeditions" for evidence are permitted,373 and the agency "can inves-
tigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just
because it wants assurance that it is not.",374 Probable cause is not
required to compel persons to provide information to the agency
because there is no "search or seizure" for the purposes of the fourth
amendment. 37
Constitutional requirements for compelling testimony and records
as part of an administrative agency investigation are relatively modest.
The investigatory demand must be for a lawful purpose,3 76 validly
authorized by the legislature, 377 and must not be arbitrary or
unreasonable.378
370. Id. at 431-32, 447-48. But cf United States v. Doe, 107 S. Ct. 1656 (1987) (Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure allow attorney who handled criminal prosecution to make use of
grand jury materials in related civil proceeding and, based upon showing of "particularized
need," to share the materials with other government lawyers involved in the civil proceedings).
371. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946). On the constitutional
dimensions of agency investigatory powers, see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 4:6 (2d ed. 1978); B.J. MEZINES, J.A. STEIN & J. GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 19.02
(1987); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3.10 (1984).
372. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642- 43 (1950); Oklahoma Press 327
U.S. at 216.
373. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 642-43; Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at 195.
374. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 642-43.
375. Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at 215.
376. Id. at 209.
377. Id.
378. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 652-53; Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at 209, 216. Professor
Schwartz points out that while the literal language of the fourth amendment has no application
to administrative subpoena power, the "right to be let alone" is implicated by the amendment
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An administrative subpoena duces tecum may be extremely broad
in scope so long as it is not unreasonably burdensome.379 However,
the documents demanded should be "particularly described."38 0
Under the federal Constitution, agencies but not courts may issue
investigatory subpoenas and demands for the production of docu-
ments. Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution limits
the power of the federal courts to cases and controversies. An investi-
gation does not constitute a case or controversy, and therefore investi-
gative subpoenas may not be issued by federal courts. 38 1 Whether this
is true under state constitutions depends upon whether they have
analogous provisions.38 2
Investigative subpoenas can be enforced through the courts, how-
ever.38 3 An agency seeking to enforce an administrative subpoena
must seek a court order requiring compliance with the subpoena. At
this proceeding, a person opposing the subpoena may appear and chal-
lenge its validity. Only after the court order has been issued may the
agency bring a contempt proceeding for violation.384
State legislation may, however, establish penalties for failure to obey
an agency's investigatory subpoena.385 There is a division of author-
ity, however, concerning whether the agency itself can both issue a
subpoena and assess a penalty for its violation. While it is clear that
federal agencies may not do so,38 6 there is some authority to the effect
that state agencies may do so under some state constitutions.387
and requires that the purpose and scope of the subpoena be reasonable. B. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 371, § 3.15, at 124.
379. Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at 208; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 371, § 3.15, at 124.
380. Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at 208.
381. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 641-42.
382. Compare, eg., ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 14 (jurisdiction of superior court extends to cases
and proceedings in which jurisdiction is not vested in another court) with N.M. CONST. art. VI,
§ 13 (jurisdiction of district court extends to all matters and causes not excepted in this
constitution, and such jurisdiction of special cases and proceedings as may be conferred by law).
383. Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at 200; NLRB v. Williams, 396 F.2d 247, 249 (7th Cir. 1968).
384. See, eg., Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964) (describing the procedure of the IRS
for the enforcement of investigatory subpoenas); B. SCHWARTZ, supra .note 371, § 3.10, at
113-14.
385. For the proposition that legislation may create penalties for ignoring an administrative
subpoena, see Federal Power Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U.S. 375 (1938); United
States v. Clyde S.S. Co., 36 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1929); Sabre v. Rutland R.R., 86 Vt. 347, 85 A. 693
(1913).
386. Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
387. See K. DAvis, supra note 371, § 4:6; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 371, § 3.10, at 114.
(arguing against assessment of penalties by administrative agencies for violations of their own
subpoenas); cases collected in Note, The Power of Administrative Agencies To Commit for
Contempt, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 578 (1935); see also In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957). The
Groban case involved a challenge to an Ohio statute permitting the Fire Marshal to enforce a
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Investigatory proceedings are nonadversarial and may be less for-
mal than trial-type proceedings.388 Even if the collateral consequences
of the investigatory proceeding include possible prosecution or the loss
of a job, due process does not require that procedural rights be granted
that are ordinarily associated with criminal proceedings or even
administrative adjudications.38 9 The investigatory proceeding may be
private, and there need be no rights to specific notice, confrontation,
or cross-examination. 390
If criminal proceedings are contemplated, parties should be notified
of the possibility of criminal prosecution when investigatory subpoe-
nas and demands for documents are issued. 39 1 The privilege against
self-incrimination does apply in administrative investigatory proceed-
ings, 392 and providing notice of contemplated criminal proceedings
provides the opportunity for exercising that privilege.393 Notice is pre-
sumably also necessary with regard to child protection investigations
where both subsequent juvenile court proceedings and subsequent
criminal charges are expected.
Where parties are called upon to testify in administrative proceed-
ings, including investigatory proceedings, several conditions must be
present for the privilege against self-incrimination to apply. First, the
danger of prosecution must be real and demonstrable.394 Second,
while it is ordinarily not necessary to warn a witness of the potentially
incriminating effects of required testimony, 395 this is not a universal
rule, and failure to provide a warning may create an unnecessary risk
penalty against an individual who failed to respond to a subpoena and was not provided with
counsel at the investigatory hearing. The summary punishment authority of the Fire Marshal
was not challenged, but rather the denial of counsel at the investigatory hearing. The court
suggested that while counsel would not be required during the course of the investigatory
hearing, counsel might be required prior to the assessment of a penalty.
388. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Association for Benefit of Non-Contract
Employees, 380 U.S. 650 (1965).
389. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 441-43 (1960).
390. Id. at 446; B. MEZINES, J. STEIN & J. GRUFF, supra note 371, § 19.04, at 19-56.
391. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11-12, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970).
392. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957); L. TAYLOR, WITNESS IMMUNITY 107 (1983); J.
VARON, SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND IMMUNITIES 787, 789 (2d ed. 1974).
393. See, e.g., Capitol Prod. Corp. v. Hernon, 457 F.2d 541, 543 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding that
fifth amendment privilege was improperly raised where there was no pending criminal
investigation or proceeding of defendant, and where defendant had been given no notice of such);
United States v. Lipshitz, 132 F. Supp. 519, 523 (E.D.N.Y. 1955) (failure of government to notify
defendant during civil tax audit that criminal case was also contemplated was instrumental in
defendant's failure to raise a fifth amendment objection to his questioning).
394. See Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 478 (1972).
395. L. TAYLOR, supra note 392, at 24-25.
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in later proceedings.3 96 Third, any statement invoking the privilege is
generally sufficient.397
When, after demonstrating that there is a real danger of prosecu-
tion, a witness refuses to testify in an investigatory hearing based on
the privilege against self-incrimination, the witness nevertheless can be
compelled to testify if granted immunity from any prosecution that
may result from the testimony.398 The immunity granted must be at
least coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination, so that
the witness will be in no additional danger of prosecution as a result of
the grant of imnmunity.39 9 In order to compel testimony after the priv-
ilege has been asserted, the immunity granted must protect the witness
from use of the testimony in subsequent criminal proceedings, even
where subsequent proceedings are based on information derived from
additional investigation conducted as a result of the testimony. This is
referred to as "use and derivative use immunity."'  While total and
unconditional immunity from any prosecution, known as "transac-
tional immunity," is sometimes granted, only use and derivative use
immunity is required as a precondition of compelling testimony."
A grant of immunity may not be valid unless there is express statu-
tory authority for it.' 2 Grants of immunity by prosecutors in the
absence of statutory authority may or may not be upheld even when
they are approved by a judge.4 3 Generally, prosecutorial immunity
has been upheld in the absence of explicit legislative authority only
where the prosecutor has been held to have an implied constitutional
or statutory power to grant immunity.' A fortiori, a valid grant of
immunity from another government official requires explicit statutory
authorization.
396. See, eg., In re P.N., 533 P.2d 13 (Alaska 1975) (failure to advise father accused of child
molestation of his privilege of self-incrimination was reversible error in dependency case).
397. L. TAYLOR, supra note 392, at 24-26.
398. Id. at 29-31; J. VARON, supra note 392, at 732-33.
399. J. VARON, supra note 392, at 748.
400. Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 475 (1972);
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972); L. TAYLOR, supra note 392, at 47-48, 79-86;
J. VARON, supra note 392, at 738.
401. Zicarelli, 406 U.S. at 475-76.
402. See Annotation, Prosecutor's Grant of Immunity to Witness, 4 A.L.R.4th 1221, § 2
(1981).
403. Id. §§ 4[a], [b], 5[a], [b].
404. Id. § 2; J. VARoN, supra note 392, at 746-47.
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2. Proposed Statutory Provisions Authorizing Access
to Records and Information
Based on the principles discussed above, there are several elements
that should be included in any statute authorizing child protection
agencies to compel testimony and the production of records prior to
initiating child protection proceedings.
First, the statute should require persons working with children to
provide information relevant to the investigation. This is already
accomplished, in part, by existing child abuse reporting acts. These
laws, in effect in every state, require certain professional persons and
others working with children to report any instances in which a child
appears to have been abused or neglected." 5 In addition to requiring
that there be reports of child abuse or neglect, these statutes make
reporters immune from liability so long as the reports are made in
good faith." 6
Child abuse reporting laws generally do not require, however, that
the reporter provide information or records beyond those included in
the original report. Nor do they require persons not reporting child
abuse or neglect to cooperate with the investigation." 7 Accordingly,
state laws should be amended to require both persons obligated to
report, and the agencies and institutions for which they work, to pro-
vide any information that may be relevant or helpful to an investiga-
tion of child abuse or neglect. Where child abuse is reported by an
individual who has no legal obligation to do so, the law should require
the reporter to provide such relevant follow-up information as is
requested by the agency. Confidentiality laws should be abrogated
where necessary to accomplish these purposes, and persons or entities
meeting these statutory obligations in good faith should also be
exempted from liability. The same statutory penalties that presently
apply to willful failures to report child abuse and neglect should be
extended to failures to provide obligatory follow-up information.
Second, the statute should grant explicit authority to the agency to
subpoena witnesses and require the production of documents and
405. Excerpts of relevant statutory provisions for all United States jurisdictions are collected
in STATE STATUTES, supra note 85, at 777-94.
406. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.03 (Vernon 1986) (any person reporting immune
from liability, civil or criminal, except those reporting in bad faith); see also STATE STATUTES,
supra note 85, at 475-89.
407. For a discussion of extending child abuse acts to require mandatory reporters to
cooperate with investigations, see generally Weisberg & Wald, Confidentiality Laws and State
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other materials pertinent to an investigation. Subpoenas may be nec-
essary to obtain information from persons not covered by the report-
ing act, where there is a dispute concerning confidentiality or privilege,
and where persons legally obligated to provide information are recalci-
trant. Although agency investigatory powers can be implied to some
extent,4° 8 statutory amendment is necessary because courts may be
unwilling to recognize extensive investigatory powers in the absence of
express statutory language." 9 Among other things, it is probably nec-
essary to have explicit statutory authority to issue an investigatory
subpoena.41°
One approach might be to enact a statute authorizing the agency to
establish regulations governing procedures for compelling testimony
and the production of records in the course of a preliminary child
abuse investigation.41 At present, only Maine and Utah authorize
investigative subpoenas in child abuse cases. 412
In most states, the statute should provide that the agency itself, act-
ing through its attorney, issue the subpoena or the demand for produc-
tion, as opposed to the court. This is required in states where
separation of powers doctrines make it unconstitutional for courts to
issue a summons or demand for production where no child abuse peti-
tion has been filed.41 3 On the other hand, if the state constitution per-
mits courts to issue investigative subpoenas, that procedure would be
preferable. Court-issued subpoenas would provide for immediate judi-
cial oversight and would eliminate the necessity of a second enforce-
ment proceeding through the courts.41 4
Third, the statute should encourage compliance with the subpoena.
Where administrative subpoenas must be agency-issued, the statute
should provide a penalty for failure to obey the subpoena; without
408. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 210 (1946); see also United
States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980) (statute authorizing the agency to compel the production of
books and records held to imply authority to compel witness to produce handwriting exemplar);
Jones v. Unknown Agents of Fed. Elec. Comm'n, 613 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (statute
authorizing investigation held to imply right to conduct field interviews), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1074 (1980); B. MEZINES, G. STEIN & J. GRuFF, supra note 371, § 19.03, at 19-53 to -54.
409. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652-53 (1950).
410. See, eg., In re Di Brizzi, 303 N.Y. 206, 101 N.E.2d 464 (1951); Commonwealth v.
Orsini, 368 Pa. 259, 81 A.2d 891 (1951); B. ScHWARTz, supra note 392, § 3.8, at 109.
411. See B. MEZINEs, J. STEIN & J. GRUFF, supra note 371, § 20.02, at 20-28 to -30.
412. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4021(1)(A) (Supp. 1987) (department may issue
subpoenas requiring persons to disclose information necessary in an abuse or neglect
investigation); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-50 (1987) (juvenile court may issue investigative
subpoenas in neglect proceedings, but must follow the procedures set forth in the code of
criminal procedure).
413. See supra notes 381-82 and accompanying text.
414. See supra notes 383-84 and accompanying text.
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such penalties the subpoena may be ignored without risk.415 In addi-
tion, the law should permit the agency to enforce the subpoena
through the courts. Persons responding to the subpoena should be
excused from liability for doing so.
Fourth, the state statute should expressly authorize a grant of
immunity to the witness, should the witness claim the fifth amendment
or be demonstrably likely to do so.4 16 The statute should explicitly
permit use and derivative use immunity when necessary to comply
with constitutional requirements.
An attorney representing the agency in child protection proceedings
should be authorized to grant immunity with the approval of the
court. The attorney for the agency, rather than the administrative
head of the agency, should have this authority because granting immu-
nity is a litigation strategy decision. Such decisions are generally made
by the attorney rather than the client.417
If the attorney representing the child protection agency is not the
prosecutor in criminal proceedings, the agency attorney should be
required to consult with the prosecutor prior to granting immunity.
The agency attorney, rather than the prosecutor, should decide
whether to grant immunity because protecting the child should have
priority over exacting a criminal penalty. The prosecutor should be
consulted because of the importance of criminal prosecution and
because of its direct and powerful impact upon the child. The statute
should set forth a clear and simple process for granting immunity and,
where necessary, compelling testimony.
V. APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN
CASES INVOLVING CHILD ABUSE OR NEGLECT
This section discusses the application of the exclusionary rule in
cases involving child abuse and neglect. It considers first, whether the
exclusionary rule applies in civil child protection cases, and second,
whether the rule applies in criminal proceedings where evidence has
been illegally obtained by social workers employed by child protection
agencies.
415. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 392, § 3.10, at 113-16.
416. Cf In re Vance A., 105 Misc. 2d 254, 432 N.Y.S.2d 137 (Fain. Ct. 1980) (New York
statute authorizing Family Court judge to grant immunity can be used to compel a party to
testify in dependency proceeding; civil proceeding need not be adjourned pending the criminal
proceeding, because of the importance of avoiding delay in child protection proceedings).
417. LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 31:301-:310 (1986); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983).
Vol. 63:493, 1988
Legal Barriers in Child Abuse Investigations
Court decisions do not offer a clear answer concerning whether the
exclusionary rule applies in child abuse cases. In general, case law is
divided concerning the applicability of the exclusionary rule in non-
criminal proceedings,418 and it is difficult to draw clear rules or even
consistent threads of analysis from the cases for application in child
abuse cases. Only a few reported cases have ruled on the application
of the exclusionary rule to civil child protection cases, and each has
involved the introduction of evidence obtained by the police. In three
cases, the courts held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in civil
child protection cases,419 while one case stated that the rule does
apply.420 Because the cases directly on point are inconclusive, it is
necessary to consider United States Supreme Court cases on the exclu-
sionary rule that are analogous to the issues under discussion. Fur-
ther, since recent United States Supreme Court cases apply a
balancing test to determine whether the exclusionary rule applies in
noncriminal proceedings, it is necessary both to describe the factors
that have been emphasized in analogous cases and to consider whether
different factors apply in child protection investigations.
The principal purpose of the exclusionary rule, as stated by the
Supreme Court, is to deter law enforcement officers from obtaining
evidence through unconstitutional means.42 By denying law enforce-
ment officers the use of such evidence in criminal proceedings, the rule
helps eliminate their motivation for misconduct. Since the case of
418. See generally W. LAFAvE, supra note 18, § 1.5, at 83-102; W. RINGEL, SEARCHES &
SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 3.6(c) (2d ed. 1987).
419. In re Christopher B., 82 Cal. App. 3d 608, 147 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1978); In re Robert P., 61
Cal. App. 3d 310, 132 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1976), appeal dismissed sub nom. Potter v. Department of
Social Servs., 431 U.S. 911 (1977); In re Diane P., 110 A.D.2d 354, 494 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1985),
appeal dismissed, 67 N.Y.2d 918, 492 N.E.2d 1235, 501 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1986); cf Baxter v.
Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 678 S.W.2d 265, 267 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (exclusionary rule
codified in the Texas Criminal Procedure Code does not apply in termination of parental rights
cases, and also does not apply where evidence was acquired by an individual not acting as an
agent of the state).
420. In re Melinda I., 110 A.D.2d 991, 488 N.Y.S.2d 279 (1985) (stating that evidence
illegally obtained by police is not admissible but holding that evidence in question had been
legally obtained); see also In re T.L.S., 139 Vt. 197, 425 A.2d 96 (1981) (where juvenile court
unlawfully ordered the mother of an allegedly maltreated child to submit to a psychiatric
examination, testimony regarding the results of examination excluded).
421. Other justifications that have been suggested for the rule include judicial integrity
(preventing judges from being tainted by reliance upon illegally obtained evidence), Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), and upholding public confidence in the criminal justice
system, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 356 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
589
Washington Law Review
Mapp v. Ohio 422 in 1961, the rule has been applied in criminal pro-
ceedings brought in state as well as federal courts.423
Following Mapp, there have been several decisions by the Court
dealing with the applicability of the exclusionary rule in noncriminal
proceedings. In the case of One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Penn-
sylvania,424 the exclusionary rule was applied to a forfeiture proceed-
ing in state court. Pennsylvania had sought ownership of an
automobile that had been used in the illegal transportation of liquor
and had been seized in an unlawful search. The Court held that the
state could not keep the automobile because its case rested on illegally
obtained evidence. The exclusionary rule should apply, it reasoned,
because the procedure for forfeiture of the automobile was "quasi-
criminal in character."425 This was because the proceeding was
brought "to penalize for the commission of an offense against the
law."
4 2 6
Eleven years after One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, the Supreme Court
ruled on the application of the exclusionary rule in proceedings that
were clearly civil in character. In United States v. Janis,42 7 the ques-
tion was whether evidence illegally seized by Los Angeles police would
be admissible in a civil tax enforcement action.4 28 The evidence in
question consisted of cash and wagering records of a professional
bookie that had been obtained as the result of a defective warrant.42 9
The arresting officer had notified the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") of the arrest and provided assistance in estimating the illegal
income from the gambling operation.4 3' After the IRS made an
422. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
423. The exclusionary rule had been applied much earlier to federal criminal cases involving
illegal searches. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). It did not follow, however, that
the exclusionary rule and all other protections related to the Bill of Rights were applicable to the
states. In Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), the Court had held that only
"fundamental rights" guaranteed by the Bill of Rights were applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. And in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Court held that there
was no fundamental right requiring application of the exclusionary rule to state cases involving
illegal searches and seizures. Several years later, however, the Court ruled in Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), that the fourteenth amendment did require the exclusion of
evidence from state court proceedings resulting from extreme violations of fourth amendment
rights by the police. The Mapp case overruled Wolf v. Colorado and held that the exclusionary
rule did apply to criminal proceedings brought in state courts involving all types of fourth
amendment violations.
424. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
425. Id. at 700.
426. Id.
427. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
428. Id. at 434.
429. Id. at 436.
430. Id.
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assessment against monies seized in the search, the bookie filed a tax
refund suit, arguing that the evidence used by the IRS in making its
assessment had been illegally obtained and therefore should be
suppressed.431
Noting that it had never applied the exclusionary rule "to exclude
evidence from a civil proceeding, '432 the Court held that evidence ille-
gally seized by the police could be admitted in the civil tax proceed-
ing.433 The Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule need not be
applied because its deterrent effect upon police misconduct was too
"attenuated" under the circumstances of the case.434 That is, making
illegally seized evidence inadmissible in a federal civil tax proceeding
would not deter state police from conducting illegal searches. This
was true both because two sovereigns were involved, the state of Cali-
fornia and the federal government, and because the tax proceeding was
civil in nature. As the Court phrased it, the tax proceeding fell
"outside the offending officer's zone of primary interest," and exclud-
ing the evidence in the tax proceeding therefore would not have sub-
stantial deterrent value.4 35
The Janis Court distinguished an earlier case, Elkins v. United
States,436 which held that evidence illegally obtained by state police
could not be admitted into evidence in a federal criminal proceeding.
In Elkins, the Court reasoned that state and federal law enforcement
officers do work closely together, and the rule prevents collusion
between state police and federal officers. 4 37 But because the Janis case
involved use of the evidence in the civil proceeding of another sover-
eign, the Janis Court held that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary
rule was too "attenuated" to justify its application.438 Furthermore,
the pblice officers would be sufficiently "punished" by the application
of the exclusionary rule in the state and federal criminal proceedings,
as required by Mapp and Elkins. 
439
431. Id. at 438.
432. Id. at 447.
433. Id. at 459-60.
434. Id. at 458.
435. Id
436. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
437. Id at 221-22. Elkins overruled the former "silver platter doctrine," Lustig v. United
States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949), that had permitted state police to turn over illegally obtained evidence
to federal officers, who then could use the evidence in federal criminal proceedings.
438. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 (1976).
439. Id.
Washington Law Review
A 1984 decision of the United States Supreme Court, INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza, " held that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in a civil
deportation hearing. At issue was whether two aliens who had been
illegally arrested by officials of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service could be legally deported as a consequence of the arrests. The
Court held that the exclusionary rule did not apply, based in part on
special factors that limited the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule
in deportation proceedings."' Among other things, the Court empha-
sized that applying the exclusionary rule to civil deportation cases
could force public officials to tolerate a continuing violation of the
law." 2 Deportation cases thus differ from criminal proceedings,
where the exclusionary rule only serves to bar prosecution for past
crimes. Were the exclusionary rule to apply in a deportation case, it
might later be argued that it could be invoked to prevent an agency
from ordering corrective action at a leaking hazardous waste dump.44 3
This reasoning, incidentally, is consistent with dictum in One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania 4 that the exclusionary rule should
not be applied if to do so would compel the return of illegal contra-
band to its owner.
Because the Court has not followed a consistent method of analysis
in the above cases, it is difficult to apply the rationale of its decisions to
child abuse cases. Nevertheless, the cases shed some light on the issue
and certainly suggest how arguments must be framed in child protec-
tion cases. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan suggests that the exclusionary
rule does not apply in civil cases that are not quasi-criminal, and Janis
emphasizes the distinction between civil and criminal proceedings." 5
440. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
441. The following four factors were cited: First, regardless of how an arrest of an illegal alien
is effected, "deportation will still be possible when evidence not derived directly from the arrest is
sufficient to support deportation," id.; second, Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS")
agents are aware that it is highly unlikely that any particular arrestee will challenge the
lawfulness of his arrest in a deportation hearing; third, the INS has an effective and
comprehensive scheme for deterring fourth amendment violations by its agents; fourth, the
deterrent value of applying the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings is undermined by
the availability of alternative remedies. Id. at 1043-45. For a critique of these arguments, see W.
LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 1.5, at Supp. 69-71.
442. 468 U.S. at 1046. Where evidence is excluded in deportation proceedings, the continued
illegal presence of the aliens must be tolerated if there is insufficient legally obtained evidence to
sustain the deportation.
443. Id.
444. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
445. At least one leading commentator concludes that whether a civil proceeding is quasi-
criminal is critical to whether the exclusionary rule applies. J. HALL, JR., supra note 37, § 25:3.
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Civil child protection cases should not be considered quasi-criminal
for several reasons." 6 First, civil child protection proceedings are not
an adjunct to a criminal proceeding. Child protection proceedings
may be accompanied by criminal proceedings, but those are brought
independently, and the police typically play a minor role in the presen-
tation of the evidence in the civil proceeding.' 7
Second, although child protection proceedings incorporate a
number of special procedural protections," they neither apply most
criminal procedural protections nor rules of civil procedure.' 9 Third,
although child protection proceedings sometimes result in the loss of
parental rights, they do not ordinarily assess the kinds of penalties
applied in criminal proceedings. Child protection proceedings do not
culminate in jail sentences, fines, or forfeitures of property as do crimi-
nal proceedings.450 While the loss of a child is certainly onerous, this
may also happen in such indisputably civil matters as custody disputes
and adoption proceedings.
Finally and most importantly, a child protection proceeding is not
brought for the purpose of penalizing parental misconduct, but rather
to safeguard the child. This fact is clear from the statements of pur-
pose in many state child protection statutes.45' Indeed, parental rights
may be maintained where it is best for the child, in spite of reprehensi-
446. See, e-g., In re J.R., 147 Vt. 7, 508 A.2d 719 (1986); In re Neglected Child, 130 Vt. 525,
296 A.2d 250 (1972).
447. D. BESHAROV, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVOCACY 133-34 (1974).
448. For example, laws in nearly every state require that a guardian ad litem or counsel be
appointed for the child in child protection proceedings. Davidson & Horowitz, Protection of
Children from Family Maltreatment in LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 7.17 (1984) [hereinafter
Protection of Children]; see, eg., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1602(C) (West 1983); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 260.155(2), (4)(A) (West Supp. 1988); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.10(a), (c) (Vernon
1986).
449. See Protection of Children, supra note 448, § 7.16, at 295-96 (while proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is required in criminal proceedings, either a preponderance of the evidence or
clear and convincing evidence is required in child protection proceedings). Id. § 7.20, at 303-04
(describing procedure at disposition). For a discussion of applying the rules of civil procedure to
child protection proceedings, see Hardin & Bulkley, The Rights of Foster Parents to Challenge
Removal and Seek Adoption of Their Foster Children in FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE COURTS
309-10 (M. Hardin ed. 1983).
450. See Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures" A Framework for Constitutional
Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REv. 379, 381 (1976).
451. See, eg., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-102 (1986) ("in enacting this article it is the intent
of the general assembly to protect the best interests of children of this state and to offer protective
services in order to prevent any further harm to a child suffering from abuse"); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-1501-1502 (1986) ("[Ihe Kansas code for care of children ... shall be liberally
construed, to the end that each child within its provisions shall receive the care, custody, [and]
guidance... as will best serve the child's welfare and the best interests of the state.").
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ble parental misconduct.452 Where there has been child abuse, but
there is no ongoing threat to the child, civil child protection proceed-
ings should not be brought. 453
After the Janis decision, the exclusionary rule has continued to
apply in both criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings, but classifying
a case as noncriminal no longer automatically makes the exclusionary
rule inapplicable. Although the Janis Court mentioned that it had
never applied the exclusionary rule in a civil case, it did not rely on
this in reaching a decision. Rather, the Court determined that given
the circumstances of the case, applying the exclusionary rule would do
little to actually deter the unlawful conduct of the police.454
Janis emphasized that the civil proceeding was outside the "zone of
primary interest" of the officer who illegally obtained the evidence. 5
This suggests that the inquiry in a civil child protection proceeding
should be whether the proceeding falls within the "zone of primary
interest" of a police officer who illegally obtains the evidence of child
abuse. Janis suggests that we should ask a practical question: Would
applying the exclusionary rule in civil child protection proceedings
actually deter unlawful searches by police in child abuse cases?
If the police have a strong interest in obtaining admissible evidence
for civil child protection proceedings, the exclusionary rule might have
a strong deterrent function. If the police do not have a strong interest
in the use of the evidence in civil child abuse proceedings, the deter-
rent effect of the exclusionary rule is arguably insufficient to support
its application in such cases. In most areas, police play a significant
role in civil child protection cases, but view their principal role as
gathering evidence for criminal prosecutions. The degree to which
this is true, of course, varies depending on the locality. Whether this
takes the civil proceeding outside the police officer's "zone of primary
interest" is difficult to say.
It should be noted that the deterrence issue presented in Janis is not
strictly analogous to the civil child protection case, because Janis not
only involved the use of evidence collected by police officers in a civil
452. See Painter v. Barkley, 157 Ga. App. 69, 276 S.E.2d 850 (1981) (trial court's refusal to
terminate parental rights of father who had been convicted of murder in the death of child's
mother upheld on appeal); Vermilyea v. Department of Human Resources, 155 Ga. App. 746,
272 S.E.2d 588, 591 (1980) (in proceeding to terminate parental rights, "[t]he question is not that
the parents must be punished by termination ... because of their misconduct .... but whether
the children were without proper parental care or control.").
453. See Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role in
Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 923 (1975).
454. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 457-58 (1976).
455. Id. at 458.
594
Vol. 63:493, 1988
Legal Barriers in Child Abuse Investigations
proceeding, but also involved two sovereigns-evidence gathered by
state police was being used in a federal proceeding. Ordinarily, only
one sovereign is involved in a civil child protection case. Thus, the
possibility of close cooperation and collusion is heightened, making it
more likely that police have an interest in the outcome of the civil
proceeding.
A similar issue emerges where evidence illegally obtained by child
welfare agency employees is introduced in a criminal prosecution for
child abuse. One might ask whether the use of evidence obtained by
child protection agency employees in criminal proceedings falls within
their "zone of primary interest." And again, the close working rela-
tionship between police and child welfare agency employees in some
jurisdictions must be noted.456 Just as police might be interested in the
outcome of child protection proceedings as an alternative to prosecu-
tion, child protection workers may be interested in prosecution as a
means to force cooperation, or to reinforce agency decisions to sepa-
rate parents and children.
Although the impact of the Janis deterrence analysis on child abuse
cases is unclear, the concern of the Court in Lopez-Mendoza with the
costs of applying the exclusionary rule more clearly applies to child
abuse cases. Lopez-Mendoza and One 1958 Plymouth Sedan indicate
that the exclusionary rule should not be applied where the result
would be to force public officials to tolerate ongoing illegal acts.
Just as applying the exclusionary rule in a civil deportation proceed-
ing or in a forfeiture proceeding involving illegal contraband may con-
done ongoing illegal conduct, so may applying the rule in a civil child
abuse proceeding.457 There is usually a substantial likelihood of
456. See, eg., CoLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-109 (1986) (permitting law enforcement agencies to
investigate reports of abuse provided that all investigatory documents and data be shared with
county social services); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2057.1(a), (b) (Smith-Hurd 1987)
(providing for extensive cooperation between law enforcement and child services, including joint
consultation, case management, and case handling); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1523(b) (1986)
(providing for joint investigations between law enforcement and social services when reports
indicate serious physical injury). The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5101-07 (1982), and its implementing regulations, 45 C.F.R. §§ 1340.1-.14 (1986), require
cooperation between child protection and law enforcement agencies, as well as for criminal
proceedings to be brought as a means of protecting the child.
457. Consider the following hypothetical:
Police and child protection agency employees gain illegal entry into a home in the course
of a child abuse investigation. As a result, they seize implements that the parent had used to
physically abuse the child and also obtain the confession of the abusive parent. The parent
confesses that he was the one who beat the child, that he had done it many times in the past,
and that he sometimes lost his temper. In the subsequent civil child protection proceeding,
both the implements and the confession are suppressed. The civil petition is denied and the
child remains in the unsupervised custody of the abusive parent.
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repeated abuse if protective action is not taken. Furthermore, leaving
the child with the abuser may be harmful in itself. For example, as the
result of past abuse, a child may be profoundly terrified and with-
drawn while in the custody of the abuser and may need to be removed
for his or her emotional well-being regardless of whether similar acts
of abuse are likely to recur.
It is important to reemphasize that both the "zone of primary inter-
est" analysis of Janis and the "ongoing legality" focus of Lopez-Men-
doza are only applications of the balancing test, which is employed to
determine whether the exclusionary rule might apply to a particular
category of civil case. The balancing test weighs the deterrent value of
the exclusionary rule against its social cost. Therefore, to determine
when the exclusionary rule applies in child abuse cases, it is necessary
to more broadly consider the deterrent value and social cost of the rule
in such cases.
Certainly, deterring police and child welfare agencies from illegally
obtaining evidence in child abuse investigations is a matter of
profound constitutional concern.458 Forcibly entering homes, examin-
ing children, questioning children without parental permission, and
other forms of compulsory investigation represent profound intrusions
into family life.459
It is difficult to say, however, to what extent applying the exclusion-
ary rule in civil child protection proceedings would in fact substan-
tially deter police, as opposed to child protection workers, from
unlawfully obtaining evidence in child abuse investigations. As dis-
cussed earlier, police are probably primarily concerned with obtaining
a successful prosecution in a child abuse investigation, rather than
supporting a civil child protection proceeding. However, empirical
research is lacking on this issue. Furthermore, the police do work
closely with child protection agencies in some jurisdictions, and some-
times serve as important witnesses in child protection proceedings.
There is a strong need for an effective mechanism to assure that the
rights of families are respected by child welfare agencies. Child pro-
tection agencies generally do not have the sophistication of the police
regarding the constitutional rights of families in child abuse investiga-
tions, and many lack strong internal administrative mechanisms to
Under the above hypothetical, the child abuse is likely to continue and the application of the
exclusionary rule will permit an ongoing illegality, namely the abuse of the child.
458. See supra notes 159-61, 252-55 and accompanying text.
459. See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 7-8 (1973).
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assure compliance. This is aggravated by the fact that child abuse
cases tend to be factually complex and nonrepetitious.
The exclusionary rule could have a substantial effect in deterring
child protection agency employees from conducting illegal searches,
examinations, and other intrusions into family life. On the other
hand, because child protection employees are generally not well
trained in procedural rights under the Constitution, applying the
exclusionary rule in civil cases might encourage child protection work-
ers to increasingly rely on the police in child protection investigations.
Because of the intimidating presence of the police, this may worsen the
intrusive impact of such investigations on families falsely suspected of
abuse.
Child protection agencies would be more deterred by the possible
inadmissibility of evidence in child protection proceedings than in
criminal cases, since they are seldom directly involved in criminal
prosecutions. In some cases, however, such as those involving sexual
abuse, criminal sanctions are often viewed as essential to effective
work with abusive families.' This is particularly true in states where
juvenile courts hearing child protection proceedings lack the power to
control the conduct of perpetrators. Thus, excluding evidence illegally
seized by child protection workers in criminal cases may have a practi-
cal deterrent impact on employees of child protection agencies.
In fact, if the exclusionary rule is held not to apply to civil child
protection cases, its application in criminal cases might partially com-
pensate for its nonapplication in child protection cases. That is, if the
courts conclude that the social cost of applying the rule to child pro-
tection cases is too high, applying it in criminal cases may help deter
child protection workers from illegal conduct during their investiga-
tions. This assumes, of course, that child protection workers have
some knowledge and concern about the outcome of the criminal pro-
ceedings, which will not always be true.
Among the alternative means to compel child protection agencies to
respect the constitutional rights of families, there is the possibility of
civil rights litigation.46 Law suits against child protection agency
employees and other social workers are on the increase, and there is
460. See, e.g., H. DAVIDSON & R. HOROWITZ, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT LITIGATION,
U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 141 (1981); Leaman & Huhn, Sexual Acts
Against Children: Medical-Legal Aspects in SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN: SELECTED
READINGS 31 (1980); Berliner & Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim of Sexual Assault,
40 J. Soc. ISSUES 125, 128 (1984).
461. For a discussion of constitutional torts, see W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 65,
§ 3.1(k), at 157-59.
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considerable anxiety among social workers concerning such liabil-
ity.462 On the other hand, the financial and professional risks from
failing to protect a child from injury resulting from abuse may be more
significant than the risks involved in violating a family's constitutional
rights.463
Civil rights litigation is an appropriate remedy for glaring violations
of personal liberty in child protection investigations, so long as child
protection workers are not unfairly exposed to liability. Agencies can
protect child protection workers by adopting clear, workable, and
uncomplicated standards and procedures. If such standards and pro-
cedures have been adopted, child protection workers who follow them
should not be unfairly exposed to the risk of liability. At the same
time, if the standards and procedures are willfully disregarded, and
gross invasions of personal liberty result, liability should be easier to
establish.
While the exclusionary rule clearly does have deterrent value in
child protection cases, there are significant social costs in applying the
rule. But before identifying the particular social costs in this area, a
preliminary word is needed concerning the methodology of evaluating
social costs.
Because the exclusionary rule was first developed in the area of
criminal law, deciding whether to apply it to a particular area of civil
law inevitably requires a comparison of the relative costs and benefits
of the rule in the criminal context. To dispense with the rule, we must
conclude that the costs weigh more heavily against the benefits of the
rule than in the area of criminal law.4 64
The consequences of applying the exclusionary rule in civil child
abuse cases are arguably far more serious than the consequences of
applying the rule in the typical criminal proceeding. Perhaps the most
compelling social cost of applying the exclusionary rule to civil child
protection proceedings is that, if the rule is applied, there may be no
means to protect the child. By law, child protection proceedings are
to be brought only when the special protection of the court and the
child welfare agency are essential to the protection of the child. 465 The
462. D. BESHAROV, supra note 11, at 13-16.
463. Id. at 2-9.
464. In I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), the Supreme Court weighed the
costs and benefits of applying the exclusionary rule in the context of immigration proceedings
and determined that applying the rule under such cases had greater costs and fewer benefits than
in the area of criminal law. Id. at 1050.
465. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2124(c) (1981) (providing that child protection
proceedings are to be brought only "when it has been determined that the child cannot be
adequately protected... by any other services"); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-11-10(b) (Bums Supp.
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circumstances are different from those in a criminal case where there
is an identified victim who is at risk of further harm from the accused.
The police can provide direct protection to the potential victim, and
the victim may have civil remedies against the accused, civil remedies
in which the accused will not have the benefit of the exclusionary rule.
In line with this analysis, an exception to the exclusionary rule
might be created for protective proceedings, i.e., proceedings brought
for the sole purpose of safeguarding one individual from another iden-
tified individual. This exception would include, but be broader than,
child protection proceedings. Consider the following:
A police officer has illegally obtained evidence of the assault of a
young woman by her boyfriend. The evidence cannot be used against
the boyfriend in a criminal proceeding. Unable to afford a private
attorney, the woman seeks the assistance of the district attorney to
obtain a civil injunction under state law. The evidence may be admit-
ted in the proceeding seeking injunctive relief.
This example is analogous to a child abuse case in which, although
the perpetrator cannot be prosecuted because of the unlawful seizure
of critical evidence, the evidence can be introduced in the civil child
protection proceeding.
There are, it must be admitted, particular criminal cases in which
excluding evidence may inevitably endanger members of the public.
In those cases, the social cost of applying the exclusionary rule is as
great as in civil child abuse and neglect proceedings. An example
might be a case in which an individual has been charged with a series
of sexually motivated homicides. Because critical evidence has been
illegally obtained, the Constitution requires that the individual be set
free, even if the evidence indicates that he will continue to commit
murders and assaults.
Nevertheless, it is illogical to focus on an unusual or extreme exam-
ple from the criminal law when balancing the costs and benefits of the
exclusionary rule in civil proceedings. Although it seems anomalous
that the costs and benefits of applying the rule in a particular category
of civil cases should be compared to the costs and benefits of applying
the rule in the entire area of criminal law, this is the approach cur-
rently followed by the Supreme Court.466
1987) (providing that the child protective service team shall "by juvenile court order, provide
protective services to prevent cases where a child may be a victim of further child abuse or
neglect").
466. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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In summary, the deterrent value of applying the exclusionary rule to
civil child protection cases is significant, but is balanced in part by the
fact that applying the rule would probably increase police involvement
in civil investigations. Involvement of the police is likely to be exper-
ienced by families as more rather than less intrusive, even if police are
better schooled than social workers in constitutional protections. The
cost of applying the rule in the civil proceeding would be overwhelm-
ing for the child who is the subject of the proceeding. On balance,
therefore, the rule should not be applied in the civil proceeding.
There is no compelling reason not to apply the rule in a criminal
case, whether the evidence has been illegally obtained by a child pro-
tection worker or by police. Applying the rule to child protection
workers would deter collusion in illegally obtaining evidence for the
police, and may, to some extent, make child protection workers more
careful about adhering to constitutional requirements whenever a pos-
sibility of prosecution exists.
VI. CONCLUSION
While most parents, professionals, agencies, and members of the
public cooperate with child abuse investigations, state laws need to be
strengthened to address those situations where they do not. Clear
legal requirements and remedies not only can prove useful in cases of
blatant noncooperation, but also can subtly influence the conduct of
routine investigations. When investigators know that they have the
right to information and know how legally to go about getting it, they
can take a more straightforward and thorough approach in conducting
an investigation.
There are difficult constitutional issues that must be addressed in
creating investigative remedies. These constitutional issues present
sharply conflicting concerns-the need to safeguard families from
state intrusion and the need to protect children from possible maltreat-
ment. There are no solutions that can fully accommodate both con-
cerns. Nevertheless, we should not evade these issues because of their
difficulty; we should implement solutions that seem consistent with
good policy and current law while we await definitive answers by the
courts.
The following is a brief summary of proposed responses to the key
constitutional issues discussed in this article:
First, to enter a family residence, the child protection investigator
either should have consent (obtained without coercion or trickery), or
have a reasonable suspicion that the child has been maltreated and
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that evidence of the maltreatment will be found in the residence.
Unless there are exigent circumstances, prior court approval should be
required for a nonconsensual entry.
Second, a child protection agency should be permitted to briefly
interview the child without parental permission where there is a rea-
sonable suspicion of maltreatment. Unless there are exigent circum-
stances, prior court approval should be required for a nonconsensual
interview when parents are present.
Third, while no additional quantum of proof should be needed to
conduct a physical inspection or examination of the child, the exami-
nation should be permitted only if it is relevant and necessary to the
investigation, and it should be done in a manner respecting the child's
dignity and privacy. Ordinarily, an examination of older children and
adolescents should be conducted by medical professionals. Older ado-
lescents should be permitted to independently consent to such
examinations.
Fourth, an agency should be able constitutionally to compel third
parties to provide information that may be relevant to a child abuse
investigation, without particularized evidence that the information
will in fact indicate that maltreatment has taken place. If the party
claims a privilege against self-incrimination, the agency may constitu-
tionally compel testimony by offering use and derivative use
immunity.
Fifth, the exclusionary rule should not apply in child protection
proceedings, but should apply in related criminal proceedings, even
where the evidence illegally obtained originated with child protection
agency investigators.
Legislation is needed to implement these principles and to deal with
a number of other issues as well, as discussed more fully in Sections
II.G, III.E, and IV.C.2 of this Article. Legislation also should outline
the duties and authority of child protection investigators to interview
children, to conduct or arrange examinations, to question witnesses, to
obtain relevant records, and to prepare written, audio, and visual
records of their own investigations. It should authorize medical pro-
fessionals to conduct an examination of a child on their own initiative
as needed to confirm or rebut suspicions of maltreatment.
Legislation should clarify the duties of professionals and members
of the public to cooperate with child protection investigations. This
* includes not just reporting maltreatment but also sharing any informa-
tion relevant to the examination, even if otherwise protected by confi-
dentiality or privilege. Schools and residential facilities also should
Washington Law Review
be required to provide unrestricted access to children for brief inter-
views and examinations, as requested by child protection agency
investigators.
Finally, legislation is needed to establish or strengthen prepetition
remedies for overcoming noncooperation with child abuse investiga-
tions. These remedies should permit child protection agency investi-
gators to gain entry to the child's residence, to gain access to the child,
and to obtain pertinent testimony and records. Such remedies must
articulate the required level of suspicion and procedures required by
the Constitution, and attend to other relevant procedural details
needed to make the remedy work smoothly in the particular
jurisdiction.
Equally important is the need to establish clearer and more com-
plete administrative guidelines for child maltreatment investigations.
Investigators need clear direction concerning such issues as limits in
obtaining consent, how to proceed during emergencies, and what steps
to take when faced with noncooperation by parents and other persons.
By outlining concrete steps and criteria for child maltreatment investi-
gations, agencies can help ensure that their investigators both persist
in their investigations and obtain information by the least intrusive
and offensive means practical, respecting the dignity of children and
families.
Establishing or strengthening administrative criteria and procedures
for child protection investigations requires intellectual exertion,
including collaboration by agency policymakers, staff, legal counsel,
and police. It also requires political courage, for in such a sensitive,
difficult, and controversial area agency officials sometimes feel safer in
leaving investigative procedures and decisionmaking to the discretion
of individual investigators and supervisors. Establishing explicit crite-
ria and procedures produces something that can be criticized, while
failing to do so helps keep the investigative process obscured from the
public view.
Yet strengthening investigative guidelines, which can help guide,
but can never entirely replace, professional discretion, can benefit
child protection agencies. Not only can they help the agency to better
detect and stop the maltreatment of children without needlessly sepa-
rating families, but guidelines can also help prevent sensational law-
suits caused by uncorrected maltreatment and harmful judicial
interference. The Illinois investigative guidelines,4 67 created in
467. See supra text accompanying notes 311, 328-32. The reader should be aware that the
American Bar Association, the author's employer, was involved in the development of the
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response to broad-based judicial challenges to Illinois investigative
procedures, 46 are a good example of an administrative effort to estab-
lish guidelines for investigations.
Illinois handbook. See E.Z. v. Coler, 603 F. Supp. 1546, 1549 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd sub nom.
Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986).
468. Darryl H. v. Coler, 585 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. IM. 1984), aff'd in part and vacated in part,
801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986), and E.Z. v. Coler, 603 F. Supp. 1546 (N.D. InI. 1985), aff'd sub
nom. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986), were filed prior to development of the
Illinois handbook, which was created in part as a response to the litigation. While some aspects
of the procedures were subject to criticism by the Seventh Circuit, Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d
893, 903-04 (7th Cir. 1986), Illinois has so far escaped any sweeping or comprehensive judicial
prescriptions concerning the investigative process.
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APPENDIX
STATUTES AUTHORIZING INVESTIGATIVE ENTRIES
Remedy for Entry into Standard of Ex Parte
Remedy for Entry into Other Places Where Proof to Procedure to
the Child's Home Evidence May Be Found Gain Entry Gain Entry




California X X Cause









Indiana X X Prob. Cause X
Iowa X Prob. Cause
Kansas
Kentucky X X Prob. Cause X
































Wyoming X _ Prob. Cause x
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Explanation of Chart
This chart surveys state statutes authorizing investigative entries in child abuse investigations. Each
statute has been examined for the presence of four criteria: One, a remedy established for entry into the
child's home to inspect or search; two, a remedy established for entry into other places where evidence
may be found; three, a standard of prpof to gain entry; and four, an ex parte procedure to gain entry.
The existence of a "remedy for entry into the child's home" to inspect or search will be established
where the statute specifically provides for access to the child's home for investigative purposes. For
example, the language of the following Indiana statute is clearly applicable: "A court may issue war-
rants only upon probable cause.., to search any place for... [e]vidence necessary to enforce statutes
enacted to prevent cruelty to or neglect of children." IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-5-1(a)(6) (Burns 1985).
Note that a statute allowing entry for the purpose of merely locating or interviewing the child will be
insufficient.
The second criterion, "the remedy for entry into other places where evidence may be found," is
similarly specific. There must be statutory language providing for entry, not only into the home or
place where the child is located, but also into any place where evidence is likely to be found.
The third criterion, "the standard of proof to gain entry," is established where the statute provides
for some threshold level of causation to trigger the right to search. "Good cause," "probable cause," or
"reasonable cause" are typical standards that will suffice.
The fourth criterion, an "ex parte procedure to gain entry," is met wherever the statute allows the
investigator to apply for a judicial remedy or court order without notice to the other party. Generally,
any search warrant provision applicable to a child abuse investigation will suffice to meet the require-
ment.
An "X" mark on the chart indicates express statutory language on point in regard to any require-
ment. Absence of an "X" mark indicates no express affirmative language or inconclusive statutory
language. Note that in some cases where there is no express affirmative language, courts fill in the gaps
through judicial interpretation.
The following state statutes establish remedies for investigative entries:
ALA. CODE § 26-14-7(c) (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-813(b), (c) (Supp. 1985); CAt CIV.L PROC.
CODE §§ 1822.50-.51 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988); COLO. REV STAT. § 19-10-109(3) (1986); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-33-5-1(a)(6) (Burns 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.71(3) (West Supp. 1988); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 199.335 (Baldwin 1985); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(G)(5) 122 (West Supp. 1988);
NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:6-8, 30:4C-12 (West 1976 & 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 29-29.1.01,-1.02,-1.03;
50-25.1-05 (1974 & Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-650(C) (Law. Co-Op. 1985); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 37-1-406(e) (Supp. 1987); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.05(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988); WYo. STAT.
§ 14-6-218 (Supp. 1988).
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